diff --git a/.env.example b/.env.example
index fe6d4c1..1a50edb 100644
--- a/.env.example
+++ b/.env.example
@@ -16,10 +16,30 @@ ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=your-anthropic-api-key-here
APP_USERS=
# Legacy single shared login. Only used if APP_USERS is blank. Everyone who
-# logs in with this pair shares one identity and one token quota.
+# logs in with this pair shares one identity and one token quota. Prefer
+# APP_USERS instead: a shared login means the audit log below can't tell
+# which real person made a given request.
APP_USERNAME=
APP_PASSWORD=
+# Login lockout (brute-force protection). After this many failed logins from
+# one address within the window, that address is locked out for the lockout
+# period, even with the correct password. Only applies when a login is
+# required (APP_USERS or APP_USERNAME/APP_PASSWORD is set). Defaults: 10
+# failed attempts per 10 minutes locks out for 15 minutes.
+LOGIN_ATTEMPT_MAX=10
+LOGIN_ATTEMPT_WINDOW_MS=600000
+LOGIN_LOCKOUT_MS=900000
+
+# Sign-in audit log. One line per login event (timestamp, source address,
+# username, success or failure) - never the password. Failures are logged
+# individually; successes are logged at most once per address+user within
+# SIGNIN_LOG_DEBOUNCE_MS, since Basic Auth resends credentials on every
+# request and logging each one would flood the file. Persists across
+# restarts if AUTH_LOG_FILE's folder is a mounted volume.
+AUTH_LOG_FILE=./data/auth-log.jsonl
+SIGNIN_LOG_DEBOUNCE_MS=1800000
+
# Optional. Caps AI draft calls per source IP, to catch a runaway script
# fast. Defaults: 20 requests per 5 minutes.
RATE_LIMIT_MAX=20
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index e837fc0..0f1bfc1 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@
All notable changes to this project are logged here, newest first. This file starts from the point the toolkit was handed off and set up in this repo.
+## 2026-09-29
+
+- Fixed: the AI draft button returned a 502 ("Could not reach the Anthropic API") once the container moved onto the `proxy` network. Cause: Compose only attaches a container to networks explicitly listed for it, so joining `proxy` alone dropped the container from the network that had internet access. `proxy` reaches other containers but not the public internet. `docker-compose.yml` now lists both `proxy` and `default`, so the container keeps its internet route for the outbound call to `api.anthropic.com` while staying reachable from Nginx Proxy Manager by name.
+- Changed: replaced the plain, unstyled landing page (`server.js`) with one matching both tools' existing design (dark header bar, IBM Plex Sans, the same card/border/interactive-blue styling), with a short description of each tool and a link into it.
+- Milestone: `MVP.controls.dev` is live through Nginx Proxy Manager, SSL issued, `*.controls.dev` already covered by an existing wildcard DNS record (no new DNS record was needed).
+
## 2026-09-23
- Added: joined the toolkit's Docker container to the `proxy` network, the same shared network Nginx Proxy Manager already uses to reach Work Package Suite's internal nginx container by name. Confirmed by reading NPM's own generated config for `wp.controls.dev` (`/data/nginx/proxy_host/11.conf`), which forwards to a container named `nginx_webserver`, not an IP address. `docker-compose.yml` now declares `proxy` as an external network and attaches the container to it.
diff --git a/DOCKER_TESTING.md b/DOCKER_TESTING.md
index 31e154b..839920e 100644
--- a/DOCKER_TESTING.md
+++ b/DOCKER_TESTING.md
@@ -92,6 +92,18 @@ Use a personal or trial API key here, not the company-billed key. Keep the compa
2. Confirm the next click returns a rate-limit message instead of a normal draft or a silent failure.
3. Wait for the time window to pass, then confirm the button works again.
+## Step 8b: Test the login lockout and audit log
+
+1. Open a new private or incognito browser window, or use `curl -u tester:wrongpass http://localhost:5173/`.
+2. Enter the wrong password enough times to exceed `LOGIN_ATTEMPT_MAX` (default 10) within the window.
+3. Confirm the next request — even with the correct password — is refused with a 429 and a lockout message, not a login prompt.
+4. Wait past `LOGIN_LOCKOUT_MS` (default 15 minutes; lower it in `.env` for a faster test), then confirm the correct password works again.
+5. Run this command to view the sign-in audit log:
+ ```
+ cat data/auth-log.jsonl
+ ```
+6. Confirm it lists one line per failed attempt (username tried, address, timestamp) and one line for the eventual success. No passwords appear in the file.
+
## Step 9 (optional): Test the per-user token quota
Skip this step for a normal test run. The quota ships off by default; this is only for confirming the feature still works if you turn it back on.
diff --git a/docker-compose.yml b/docker-compose.yml
index 6d5284b..d374eeb 100644
--- a/docker-compose.yml
+++ b/docker-compose.yml
@@ -5,6 +5,13 @@
# Package Suite's own internal nginx container. "proxy" must already exist
# on the host; it is not created here (external: true), since NPM's own
# stack owns it.
+#
+# Also stays on "default" (Compose's own auto-created network for this
+# project). "proxy" is scoped to proxy-to-backend traffic only and has no
+# route to the public internet, so without "default" too, the AI draft
+# button's outbound call to api.anthropic.com fails (502: "Could not reach
+# the Anthropic API"). Landing page and tool pages still work without it,
+# since those never leave the container, which is why this was easy to miss.
services:
sde-meeting-toolkit:
build: .
@@ -20,6 +27,11 @@ services:
- APP_PASSWORD=${APP_PASSWORD:-}
- RATE_LIMIT_MAX=${RATE_LIMIT_MAX:-20}
- RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS=${RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS:-300000}
+ - LOGIN_ATTEMPT_MAX=${LOGIN_ATTEMPT_MAX:-10}
+ - LOGIN_ATTEMPT_WINDOW_MS=${LOGIN_ATTEMPT_WINDOW_MS:-600000}
+ - LOGIN_LOCKOUT_MS=${LOGIN_LOCKOUT_MS:-900000}
+ - AUTH_LOG_FILE=${AUTH_LOG_FILE:-./data/auth-log.jsonl}
+ - SIGNIN_LOG_DEBOUNCE_MS=${SIGNIN_LOG_DEBOUNCE_MS:-1800000}
- TOKEN_LIMIT_PER_USER=${TOKEN_LIMIT_PER_USER:-0}
- TOKEN_USAGE_FILE=${TOKEN_USAGE_FILE:-./data/token-usage.json}
volumes:
@@ -28,6 +40,7 @@ services:
- ./data:/app/data
networks:
- proxy
+ - default
networks:
proxy:
diff --git a/server.js b/server.js
index 5d769f6..e8001e5 100644
--- a/server.js
+++ b/server.js
@@ -80,22 +80,26 @@ function loadUserMap() {
const USER_MAP = loadUserMap();
const AUTH_REQUIRED = Object.keys(USER_MAP).length > 0;
-// Returns the identified username on success, or null on failure.
+// Returns { ok, user, attempted }. "user" is the identified name on success
+// (null on failure); "attempted" is the name that was tried, even on
+// failure, so a failed attempt can still be logged without ever logging
+// the password itself.
function checkBasicAuth(req) {
- if (!AUTH_REQUIRED) return 'local';
+ if (!AUTH_REQUIRED) return { ok: true, user: 'local', attempted: null };
const header = req.headers['authorization'] || '';
- if (!header.startsWith('Basic ')) return null;
+ if (!header.startsWith('Basic ')) return { ok: false, user: null, attempted: null };
let decoded;
try {
decoded = Buffer.from(header.slice(6), 'base64').toString('utf8');
} catch (err) {
- return null;
+ return { ok: false, user: null, attempted: null };
}
const idx = decoded.indexOf(':');
- if (idx === -1) return null;
+ if (idx === -1) return { ok: false, user: null, attempted: null };
const name = decoded.slice(0, idx);
const pass = decoded.slice(idx + 1);
- return USER_MAP[name] === pass ? name : null;
+ const ok = USER_MAP[name] === pass;
+ return { ok, user: ok ? name : null, attempted: name };
}
function requireAuth(res) {
res.writeHead(401, {
@@ -105,6 +109,76 @@ function requireAuth(res) {
res.end('Authentication required.');
}
+/* ===== Login lockout (brute-force protection) =====
+ * Separate from the AI-proxy rate limiter below: this protects the login
+ * gate itself. Basic Auth has no built-in throttling, so without this a
+ * script could try passwords as fast as the network allows.
+ *
+ * After LOGIN_ATTEMPT_MAX failed logins from one IP within
+ * LOGIN_ATTEMPT_WINDOW_MS, that IP is locked out for LOGIN_LOCKOUT_MS -
+ * every request refused with 429, even with the correct password, until
+ * the lockout expires. In-memory only: resets if the process restarts. */
+const LOGIN_ATTEMPT_MAX = parseInt(process.env.LOGIN_ATTEMPT_MAX || '10', 10);
+const LOGIN_ATTEMPT_WINDOW_MS = parseInt(process.env.LOGIN_ATTEMPT_WINDOW_MS || String(10 * 60 * 1000), 10);
+const LOGIN_LOCKOUT_MS = parseInt(process.env.LOGIN_LOCKOUT_MS || String(15 * 60 * 1000), 10);
+const loginFailures = new Map(); // ip -> [timestamps]
+const loginLockouts = new Map(); // ip -> lockout-expires-at (ms epoch)
+
+function isLockedOut(ip) {
+ const until = loginLockouts.get(ip);
+ if (!until) return false;
+ if (Date.now() < until) return true;
+ loginLockouts.delete(ip);
+ loginFailures.delete(ip);
+ return false;
+}
+function recordLoginFailure(ip) {
+ const now = Date.now();
+ const hits = (loginFailures.get(ip) || []).filter((t) => now - t < LOGIN_ATTEMPT_WINDOW_MS);
+ hits.push(now);
+ loginFailures.set(ip, hits);
+ if (hits.length > LOGIN_ATTEMPT_MAX) {
+ loginLockouts.set(ip, now + LOGIN_LOCKOUT_MS);
+ }
+}
+function clearLoginFailures(ip) {
+ loginFailures.delete(ip);
+}
+
+/* ===== Sign-in audit log =====
+ * Appends one JSON line per login event to AUTH_LOG_FILE: timestamp,
+ * source IP, the username, and the result. Never logs the password.
+ * Durable across restarts, same as the token usage file below, as long as
+ * AUTH_LOG_FILE's folder is a mounted volume.
+ *
+ * Basic Auth resends credentials on every request (every page, every
+ * asset, every AI call), not just once at "login" - logging every one of
+ * those would flood this file with noise. Failures are logged individually
+ * (that is what makes brute-force attempts visible). Successes are
+ * debounced per (ip, user) to roughly one line per session, not one per
+ * request. */
+const AUTH_LOG_FILE = process.env.AUTH_LOG_FILE || path.join(ROOT, 'data', 'auth-log.jsonl');
+const SIGNIN_LOG_DEBOUNCE_MS = parseInt(process.env.SIGNIN_LOG_DEBOUNCE_MS || String(30 * 60 * 1000), 10);
+const lastLoggedSignin = new Map(); // "ip|user" -> timestamp
+
+function logAuthEvent(ip, user, result) {
+ const line = JSON.stringify({ ts: new Date().toISOString(), ip, user: user || null, result }) + '\n';
+ try {
+ fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(AUTH_LOG_FILE), { recursive: true });
+ fs.appendFileSync(AUTH_LOG_FILE, line);
+ } catch (err) {
+ console.error('Could not write auth log:', err.message);
+ }
+}
+function shouldLogSuccess(ip, user) {
+ const key = ip + '|' + user;
+ const now = Date.now();
+ const last = lastLoggedSignin.get(key) || 0;
+ if (now - last < SIGNIN_LOG_DEBOUNCE_MS) return false;
+ lastLoggedSignin.set(key, now);
+ return true;
+}
+
/* ===== Rate limiting for the AI proxy =====
* Caps AI draft calls per source IP, independent of the token quota below.
* This catches a runaway script quickly, before it burns through a whole
@@ -250,13 +324,73 @@ function proxyToClaude(req, res, user) {
function serveStatic(req, res) {
const urlPath = decodeURIComponent(req.url.split('?')[0]);
if (urlPath === '/') {
- const index = `
Two tools for the Micron Pilot. Cluster and name problems in the Field Problem Workshop, then lock scope decisions in the Scope Lock Meeting Suite. Clusters tagged with a candidate solution can be sent straight to the Scope Boundary Board.