T16.1: D21 session decode fails closed; PyJWT 2.15.1
decode_token treats any decode failure, and any cookie over 4096 chars,
as not signed in, and requires exp and sub. PyJWT 2.13.0 -> 2.15.1
(pip-audit: 13 advisories -> none).
Security review SEC-07: a crafted 1.6 KB cookie with no account gave
500 + stack trace; now 401.
New tests/security_check.py (no browser): D21 section 6/6. Against
da1325c with PyJWT 2.13.0 it fails 3 checks (crafted cookie 500,
token with no exp accepted, old pin) - the findings. The over-long
cookie and the two still-works checks pass on both.
Smoke test 27/27.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -17,7 +17,9 @@ pymssql==2.3.13 # read-only lookups against the Micron asset DB (SQL
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# MICRON_DB_URL to mssql+pyodbc://…?driver=ODBC+Driver+18+for+SQL+Server
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pydantic==2.13.4
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python-dotenv==1.2.2
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PyJWT==2.13.0 # signed session tokens
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PyJWT==2.15.1 # signed session tokens. D21 (2026-10-02): was 2.13.0, which
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# pip-audit lists 13 advisories for (GHSA-8wjv-2p76-3863 let a
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# crafted cookie raise past decode_token). 2.15.1: none known.
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starlette==1.3.1 # pinned transitive (cookie / CORS handling — security-relevant)
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Authlib==1.7.2 # Okta OIDC authorization-code flow (T10.1, wave 10 / D15)
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httpx==0.28.1 # Authlib's OIDC client needs an HTTP client; explicit, not transitive
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