T13.3: Okta deprovisioning sync job, fail closed (D18)
run_sync() compares the Okta user list (T13.2) to active local accounts and disables the ones Okta no longer vouches for. One AuditLog row per change, actor system:okta_sync, action user_deprovisioned_by_sync. Fail closed: any exception from the fetch, an empty or untrusted answer, or a failed save changes nothing and writes nothing. The fetch runs before the database is read, so a failed fetch has no path to a change. It only ever disables; an already-disabled account is untouched and gets no new row. Decided with Matt 2026-10-16: disable on missing, SUSPENDED or DEPROVISIONED. PASSWORD_EXPIRED, LOCKED_OUT and RECOVERY do not disable (the job never re-enables, so a literal "not ACTIVE" would lock people out for good). Added a guard: no match between any active local account and any Okta user is refused as a wrong identity attribute, not read as a mass offboarding. tests/okta_sync_job_check.py: 71 checks; removing the fail-closed branch and the guard fails 28 of them. BL-069 logs the missing per-run cap.
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@@ -662,3 +662,20 @@ deliberately deferred.
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worth confirming rather than assuming).
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- **Suggested wave or follow-up:** next housekeeping pass — needs Nick on
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whether to delete, archive, or rewrite it as historical record.
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### BL-069 - The sync has no cap on one run and no last-admin guard
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- **Found during:** T13.3 (D18)
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- **Where:** `server/okta_sync.py` `run_sync()`
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- **What:** a run disables every account the rules select, however many. If the
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identity attribute is partly wrong (it matches some accounts and not others),
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one run can disable most of the company, including every admin. The
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zero-match guard only stops the case where nothing matches. Disabled accounts
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cannot sign in, so re-enabling needs an admin who is still active, or the
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`manage_users.py` command line on the host.
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- **Why not now:** D18 does not ask for it, and the right limit is a product
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call: a count, a share of accounts, a rule that the last active admin never
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disables, or all three.
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- **Suggested wave or follow-up:** before the first live run, or in T13.6 if
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Matt decides. Needs Matt.
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@@ -144,18 +144,44 @@ assert zero rows changed and zero `AuditLog` entries written.
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**Done when:**
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- [ ] a user missing from Okta's list, or present but not active, is disabled
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- [x] a user missing from Okta's list, or present but not active, is disabled
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with a correctly-detailed audit row
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- [ ] a user already disabled is left alone (no duplicate audit row each run)
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- [ ] an active Okta user already active locally produces no audit row (only
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*(2026-10-16: see "Decided 2026-10-16" below for which statuses count as "not active". Audit row: actor `system:okta_sync`, action `user_deprovisioned_by_sync`, `entity_type` user, `detail` `{okta_status, via}`; a missing user is recorded as `MISSING`.)*
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- [x] a user already disabled is left alone (no duplicate audit row each run)
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*(2026-10-16: a second run over the same data writes no new rows.)*
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- [x] an active Okta user already active locally produces no audit row (only
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changes are logged, not a clean bill of health every cycle)
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- [ ] **a simulated Okta API failure results in zero account changes and zero
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*(2026-10-16: verified in `tests/okta_sync_job_check.py`.)*
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- [x] **a simulated Okta API failure results in zero account changes and zero
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audit rows** — this is the one check that must never be skipped or
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weakened
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- [ ] the job never re-enables an account under any input
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*(2026-10-16: 10 stand-in failures (OktaSyncError, RuntimeError, ConnectionError, TimeoutError, ValueError, KeyError, empty list, None, two kinds of garbage), 4 through the real client (HTTP 401/403/429/500), the default path with no token, a failed commit, and a wrong identity attribute. Each: `ok` is False, zero accounts changed, zero audit rows. Mutation test: removing the fail-closed branch and the zero-match guard fails 28 of these.)*
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- [x] the job never re-enables an account under any input
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*(2026-10-16: a disabled account that is ACTIVE in Okta stays disabled, and `okta_sync.py` contains no assignment of `is_active` to True.)*
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---
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**Decided 2026-10-16 (Matt, in chat):** which Okta statuses disable an account.
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The spec says "a non-active status". Read literally, that also catches
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`PASSWORD_EXPIRED`, `LOCKED_OUT` and `RECOVERY`, which people leave on their
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own, and this job never re-enables, so one AD password expiry would lock someone
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out of the app until an admin stepped in. Decided: an account disables when it is
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**missing** from Okta's list, or every Okta entry for it is **SUSPENDED** or
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**DEPROVISIONED** (`DISABLING_STATUSES` in `server/okta_sync.py`). Okta's default
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user list already leaves out DEPROVISIONED users, so those arrive as "missing".
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**Added 2026-10-16, inside decision 4's "anything the sync can't confidently
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parse":** if there are active local accounts and **none** of them matches any
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Okta user, the run is refused and nothing changes. That pattern means the
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identity attribute is wrong (`OKTA_SYNC_PROFILE_ATTRIBUTE`), not that the whole
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company left. It is a guard, not a new feature. Raise it in the PR.
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**Open, for the PR / Nick:** which Okta profile attribute equals the
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`preferred_username` claim in this tenant. The client assumes `profile.login`,
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Okta's default. Confirm before the first live run. A wrong value is caught by the
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zero-match guard above only when it matches nobody at all; a value that matches
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some accounts and not others would disable the rest. See `BL-069`.
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### T13.4 — D18: run it on a schedule
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- **Items:** `D18`
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