wave 16: planning docs for D19, D20, D21
D19 - uploaded files download safely (SEC-01, SEC-15e) D20 - one SOP per project (SEC-02) D21 - session decode fails closed, PyJWT 2.15.1 (SEC-07) From the security review of 2026-10-01. Decision record and task breakdown only in this commit - no code yet.
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# Decisions — October 2, 2026
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Three items, from the security review of 2026-10-01
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(`docs/reference/security-review-2026-10-01.md`). They get `D` ids because they
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are internal security calls made mid-build, the same category as `D15` and
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`D18`, not features a user asked for.
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Decided by Matt Mabrey, 2026-10-02.
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| Item | Title | Review finding | Task |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| `D19` | Uploaded files download safely | SEC-01, SEC-15e (BL-035, BL-036) | T16.2 |
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| `D20` | One SOP per project | SEC-02 (BL-048) | T16.3 |
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| `D21` | Session decode fails closed; PyJWT upgraded | SEC-07 (BL-052) | T16.1 |
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**Schedule:** wave 16. It is **independent of waves 12 to 15**: it touches
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`server/` only, and no file in it is changed by a task in those waves except
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`server/app.py`, in functions they do not touch (`get_wp_file`, `upsert_sop`,
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the SOP baseline readers). Wave 16 may merge before wave 12.
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**Out of this round, by decision:** SEC-06 (session revocation) waits for the
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AWS work. All other SEC findings stay as backlog drafts in
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`docs/reference/security-review/backlog-drafts.md`.
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---
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## D19 — Uploaded files download safely
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- **Problem:** an SVG drawing can carry a script. The server sends it back
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`inline` with its own content type, on the app's origin, so the script runs
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as whoever opens it (SEC-01). Separately, a file name that is not Latin-1
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(for example `Plan é.pdf`) makes the download fail with 500, and CR/LF in a
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name reaches the response header (SEC-15e).
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- **Decision:** SVG uploads stay **accepted**, but every file that is not a
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PDF or a raster image downloads as an **attachment** inside a **sandbox**:
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`Content-Disposition: attachment` and
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`Content-Security-Policy: sandbox; default-src 'none'`. PDF and raster images
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(PNG, JPEG, GIF, WebP, BMP, AVIF) keep opening inline. Every file name goes
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out in the RFC 6266 / RFC 5987 form (ASCII fallback plus `filename*`).
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- **Why accept SVG instead of refusing it:** no change for the person who
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uploads, and no migration for SVGs already stored. The protection is on the
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way out, which also covers any SVG already in the database.
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- **Must not change:** inline preview of PDF and images (CR-007), the
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`Cache-Control` the offline drawing cache relies on, the D8 limits, and the
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upload API.
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## D20 — One SOP per project
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- **Problem:** the rule "changing a completed SOP is a Project Admin action"
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checks only the SOP row being posted. A `project_user` can post a NEW SOP id
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with `complete: true`. Every reader picks "the latest complete SOP", so that
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row becomes the baseline every page loads and the source of PM, CM and QA
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mail routing (SEC-02, probe S3).
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- **Decision:**
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1. A project has one SOP, with the id `sop__<project_id>`. The browser has
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always written that id (`pushSOP` in `project-data.js`). A request with no
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id gets it. A request that would CREATE a SOP with any other id on a
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project is refused with 400.
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2. Existing SOP rows with other ids (for example rows `seed_demo.py` made)
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stay. They can still be updated under the old rules. Nothing is deleted.
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3. While a project has a complete SOP, writing any SOP on that project with
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`complete: true`, and changing a complete SOP, needs Project Admin on the
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project.
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4. The readers prefer the canonical row: `project_sop_team`,
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`project_qa_group`, `project_summary` and `GET /api/sops/latest` with
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`complete=true&project_id=` read `sop__<project_id>` when it is complete,
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and fall back to "latest complete" only when it is not. So a rogue row
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made before this fix cannot stay the baseline.
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- **Must not change:** a project member drafting the SOP and completing it the
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first time (allowed today, allowed after); admin access to project-less
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SOPs; the response shape of every SOP route.
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## D21 — Session decode fails closed; PyJWT upgraded
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- **Problem:** a crafted 1.6 KB cookie makes PyJWT 2.13.0 raise an error that
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`decode_token` does not catch, so an unauthenticated request gets a 500 and
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a stack trace in the log (SEC-07, probe S12). `pip-audit` lists 13
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advisories for 2.13.0.
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- **Decision:** pin **PyJWT 2.15.1** (`pip-audit`: no known vulnerabilities on
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2026-10-02). `decode_token` treats ANY decode failure, and any cookie longer
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than 4096 characters, as "not signed in" (401). It also requires the `exp`
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and `sub` claims, which every token this app issues carries.
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- **Must not change:** every valid session, the D18 sliding refresh and
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ceiling, and the fake Okta test seam.
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