Add secure username/password login portal

Gate the suite behind a self-contained login (no external IdP): - User model with bcrypt-hashed passwords; admin/user roles - /api/auth endpoints: login, logout, me, change-password, and admin-only user management (list/create/delete/reset/enable) - Stateless JWT session in an HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, auto-Secure cookie; middleware refuses every /api data route without a session - login.html + auth-guard.js: login page and per-page guard with a top-right "name / Admin / Sign out" pill - Admin Console now gated on admin role (passphrase gate removed) with a User administration card - manage_users.py CLI to bootstrap the first admin - Rebuilt help.js into a searchable, multi-topic help center - Local-dev convenience: app serves html/ so the site + API share one origin under uvicorn (inactive in the prod container) - Docs/env: AUTH_SECRET_KEY, requirements (bcrypt, PyJWT), README Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-25 16:55:54 -05:00
parent a02f7ec511
commit 20afb0e565
18 changed files with 1470 additions and 99 deletions
--- a/server/auth.py
+++ b/server/auth.py
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+"""Authentication for the Work Package Suite.
+
+A self-contained username/password login. Passwords are stored only as bcrypt
+hashes; a successful login issues a signed JWT that rides in an HttpOnly cookie
+(`wp_session`). Because the token is signed and self-validating, there is no
+server-side session store — every request is checked by verifying the cookie's
+signature and expiry (see `auth_gate` and `get_current_user`).
+
+Security model:
+  • The real boundary is `auth_gate` (middleware in app.py): every /api/ data
+    route is refused with 401 unless a valid session cookie is present.
+  • The cookie is HttpOnly (JS can't read it → XSS can't steal the session),
+    SameSite=Lax (blunts CSRF), and Secure whenever the request arrives over
+    HTTPS (detected via X-Forwarded-Proto behind NGINX).
+  • The signing secret comes from AUTH_SECRET_KEY. In production this MUST be
+    set; if it is missing we fall back to a random per-process key (which logs a
+    warning and invalidates every session on restart) so dev still works.
+
+Roles: 'admin' (may manage users) and 'user'.
+"""
+import os
+import secrets
+import logging
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from typing import Optional
+
+import bcrypt
+import jwt
+from fastapi import Depends, HTTPException, Request, Response, status
+from sqlalchemy import select, func
+from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
+
+from .db import get_db
+from . import models
+
+log = logging.getLogger("wpsuite.auth")
+
+COOKIE_NAME = "wp_session"
+JWT_ALG = "HS256"
+# How long a login lasts before the user must sign in again.
+SESSION_HOURS = int(os.getenv("AUTH_SESSION_HOURS", "12"))
+
+# Paths under /api that do NOT require a session (login itself, health, docs).
+_EXEMPT_PREFIXES = ("/api/auth/",)
+_EXEMPT_EXACT = {
+    "/api/health",
+    "/api/docs",
+    "/api/openapi.json",
+    "/api/docs/oauth2-redirect",
+    "/api/redoc",
+}
+
+
+def _load_secret() -> str:
+    s = os.getenv("AUTH_SECRET_KEY")
+    if s:
+        return s
+    # No secret configured: generate an ephemeral one so the app still runs in
+    # dev. Sessions won't survive a restart, and this is unsafe across multiple
+    # workers — production must set AUTH_SECRET_KEY.
+    log.warning(
+        "AUTH_SECRET_KEY is not set — using a random ephemeral key. "
+        "Logins will reset on restart and break across multiple workers. "
+        "Set AUTH_SECRET_KEY in the environment for production."
+    )
+    return secrets.token_urlsafe(48)
+
+
+SECRET_KEY = _load_secret()
+
+
+# ── password hashing ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+def hash_password(plain: str) -> str:
+    # bcrypt operates on at most 72 bytes; longer inputs are truncated by the
+    # algorithm. Encode explicitly so non-ASCII passwords hash consistently.
+    return bcrypt.hashpw(plain.encode("utf-8")[:72], bcrypt.gensalt()).decode("ascii")
+
+
+def verify_password(plain: str, hashed: str) -> bool:
+    if not hashed:
+        return False
+    try:
+        return bcrypt.checkpw(plain.encode("utf-8")[:72], hashed.encode("ascii"))
+    except (ValueError, TypeError):
+        return False
+
+
+# ── tokens ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+def create_token(user: "models.User") -> str:
+    now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    payload = {
+        "sub": user.id,
+        "username": user.username,
+        "role": user.role,
+        "iat": now,
+        "exp": now + timedelta(hours=SESSION_HOURS),
+    }
+    return jwt.encode(payload, SECRET_KEY, algorithm=JWT_ALG)
+
+
+def decode_token(token: str) -> Optional[dict]:
+    """Return the token claims if the signature and expiry are valid, else None."""
+    try:
+        return jwt.decode(token, SECRET_KEY, algorithms=[JWT_ALG])
+    except jwt.PyJWTError:
+        return None
+
+
+# ── cookie helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+def _is_https(request: Request) -> bool:
+    # Behind NGINX, TLS is terminated at the proxy and forwarded as plain HTTP,
+    # so trust X-Forwarded-Proto (set in nginx-wp-suite.conf) when present.
+    xfp = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-proto", "")
+    if xfp:
+        return xfp.split(",")[0].strip().lower() == "https"
+    return request.url.scheme == "https"
+
+
+def set_session_cookie(response: Response, request: Request, token: str) -> None:
+    response.set_cookie(
+        key=COOKIE_NAME,
+        value=token,
+        max_age=SESSION_HOURS * 3600,
+        httponly=True,
+        secure=_is_https(request),
+        samesite="lax",
+        path="/",
+    )
+
+
+def clear_session_cookie(response: Response) -> None:
+    response.delete_cookie(COOKIE_NAME, path="/")
+
+
+# ── request gate (used as middleware in app.py) ─────────────────────────────────
+def _needs_auth(path: str) -> bool:
+    if not path.startswith("/api/"):
+        return False  # static assets are served by NGINX, not this app
+    if path in _EXEMPT_EXACT:
+        return False
+    return not any(path.startswith(p) for p in _EXEMPT_PREFIXES)
+
+
+def is_request_authenticated(request: Request) -> Optional[dict]:
+    """Validate the session cookie on a raw request. Returns claims or None.
+    Used by the middleware gate, which has no dependency-injection context."""
+    token = request.cookies.get(COOKIE_NAME)
+    if not token:
+        return None
+    return decode_token(token)
+
+
+# ── dependencies (used inside route handlers) ───────────────────────────────────
+def get_current_user(request: Request, db: Session = Depends(get_db)) -> "models.User":
+    """Resolve the logged-in user from the session cookie, or raise 401.
+
+    Unlike the middleware gate (which only checks the token signature), this also
+    confirms the account still exists and is active — so disabling a user takes
+    effect on their next request."""
+    claims = is_request_authenticated(request)
+    if not claims:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Not authenticated")
+    user = db.get(models.User, claims.get("sub"))
+    if not user or not user.is_active:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Account is inactive")
+    return user
+
+
+def require_admin(user: "models.User" = Depends(get_current_user)) -> "models.User":
+    if user.role != "admin":
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail="Admin access required")
+    return user
+
+
+# ── account helpers (shared by routes and the CLI) ──────────────────────────────
+def find_user(db: Session, username: str) -> Optional["models.User"]:
+    """Look up by username, case-insensitively (also matches on email)."""
+    uname = (username or "").strip().lower()
+    if not uname:
+        return None
+    return db.scalars(
+        select(models.User).where(
+            (func.lower(models.User.username) == uname)
+            | (func.lower(models.User.email) == uname)
+        )
+    ).first()