Productionize WP Suite: auth, security hardening, sync, dashboard, PWA, email

Brings the Work Package Suite from a browser-local prototype to a
multi-tenant, SQL-backed deployment hardened for customer IP.

Auth & access control
- Local username/password login (bcrypt + JWT in an HttpOnly cookie),
  admin-managed users, per-project membership, and project-scoped API access.
- Admin console: change user roles, view the audit trail, manage settings.

Security hardening
- CSP / HSTS / X-Frame-Options / nosniff headers in nginx; Secure cookie via
  X-Forwarded-Proto; CSRF Origin check; attribute-safe output escaping.
- Login lockout, token_version session revocation, stronger password policy,
  fail-closed secret loading, encrypted (AES-256) database backups.

Persistence & schema
- SOPs and Work Packages are now DB-backed and shared across users, written
  through a durable client sync outbox that queues offline edits.
- Alembic migrations applied automatically on container start.

New capabilities
- Phase 2 dashboard (progress, gating, pagination, archive).
- Phase 3 PWA "Field View" with offline caching and auth fallback.
- WP owner assignment with OPTIONAL email notifications, OFF by default and
  toggled from the admin console. SMTP password is read only from the
  SMTP_PASSWORD env var (never stored); emails carry a WP number + deep link,
  never customer IP.

Also: IBM Carbon restyle, Help section, and DEPLOYMENT.md brought up to date.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

scripts/db-backup.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# One database backup: pg_dump -> gzip [-> openssl AES-256] -> timestamped file in
+# $BACKUP_DIR, then prune to the newest $BACKUP_KEEP files.
+#
+# Encryption: if BACKUP_ENC_PASSPHRASE is set, the dump is encrypted at rest with
+# AES-256 (openssl, PBKDF2) and written as *.sql.gz.enc. STRONGLY recommended once
+# the database holds customer IP — otherwise the dump (and every offsite copy) is
+# plaintext. Keep the passphrase OUT of the backups directory (and off the host if
+# possible); losing it means the backups are unrecoverable.
+#
+# Runs inside a container that has pg_dump + openssl (see scripts/backup.Dockerfile).
+set -eu
+
+BACKUP_DIR="${BACKUP_DIR:-/backups}"
+KEEP="${BACKUP_KEEP:-14}"
+PGHOST="${PGHOST:-db}"
+PGPORT="${PGPORT:-5432}"
+DB="${POSTGRES_DB:?POSTGRES_DB is required}"
+DB_USER="${POSTGRES_USER:?POSTGRES_USER is required}"
+export PGPASSWORD="${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:?POSTGRES_PASSWORD is required}"
+ENC="${BACKUP_ENC_PASSPHRASE:-}"
+
+mkdir -p "$BACKUP_DIR"
+ts="$(date -u +%Y%m%d-%H%M%SZ)"
+if [ -n "$ENC" ]; then
+  out="$BACKUP_DIR/wpsuite-$ts.sql.gz.enc"
+else
+  out="$BACKUP_DIR/wpsuite-$ts.sql.gz"
+  echo "[db-backup] WARNING: BACKUP_ENC_PASSPHRASE not set — this dump is UNENCRYPTED. Set it to protect data at rest." >&2
+fi
+tmp="$out.partial"
+
+echo "[db-backup] $(date -u) dumping ${DB}@${PGHOST} -> ${out}"
+if [ -n "$ENC" ]; then
+  if pg_dump -h "$PGHOST" -p "$PGPORT" -U "$DB_USER" -d "$DB" --clean --if-exists \
+       | gzip -c \
+       | openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -pbkdf2 -salt -pass env:BACKUP_ENC_PASSPHRASE > "$tmp"; then
+    mv "$tmp" "$out"
+  else
+    echo "[db-backup] FAILED — pg_dump/encrypt error" >&2; rm -f "$tmp"; exit 1
+  fi
+else
+  if pg_dump -h "$PGHOST" -p "$PGPORT" -U "$DB_USER" -d "$DB" --clean --if-exists | gzip -c > "$tmp"; then
+    mv "$tmp" "$out"
+  else
+    echo "[db-backup] FAILED — pg_dump error" >&2; rm -f "$tmp"; exit 1
+  fi
+fi
+echo "[db-backup] wrote $(du -h "$out" | cut -f1) ${out}"
+
+# Retention: keep the newest $KEEP dumps (plaintext or encrypted), delete the rest.
+count="$(ls -1t "$BACKUP_DIR"/wpsuite-*.sql.gz* 2>/dev/null | grep -v '\.partial$' | wc -l | tr -d ' ')"
+if [ "$count" -gt "$KEEP" ]; then
+  ls -1t "$BACKUP_DIR"/wpsuite-*.sql.gz* 2>/dev/null | grep -v '\.partial$' | tail -n +"$((KEEP + 1))" | while IFS= read -r f; do
+    echo "[db-backup] pruning $f"
+    rm -f "$f"
+  done
+fi