Productionize WP Suite: auth, security hardening, sync, dashboard, PWA, email

Brings the Work Package Suite from a browser-local prototype to a
multi-tenant, SQL-backed deployment hardened for customer IP.

Auth & access control
- Local username/password login (bcrypt + JWT in an HttpOnly cookie),
  admin-managed users, per-project membership, and project-scoped API access.
- Admin console: change user roles, view the audit trail, manage settings.

Security hardening
- CSP / HSTS / X-Frame-Options / nosniff headers in nginx; Secure cookie via
  X-Forwarded-Proto; CSRF Origin check; attribute-safe output escaping.
- Login lockout, token_version session revocation, stronger password policy,
  fail-closed secret loading, encrypted (AES-256) database backups.

Persistence & schema
- SOPs and Work Packages are now DB-backed and shared across users, written
  through a durable client sync outbox that queues offline edits.
- Alembic migrations applied automatically on container start.

New capabilities
- Phase 2 dashboard (progress, gating, pagination, archive).
- Phase 3 PWA "Field View" with offline caching and auth fallback.
- WP owner assignment with OPTIONAL email notifications, OFF by default and
  toggled from the admin console. SMTP password is read only from the
  SMTP_PASSWORD env var (never stored); emails carry a WP number + deep link,
  never customer IP.

Also: IBM Carbon restyle, Help section, and DEPLOYMENT.md brought up to date.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

server/auth.py

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ from fastapi import Depends, HTTPException, Request, Response, status
 from sqlalchemy import select, func
 from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
 
-from .db import get_db
+from .db import get_db, DATABASE_URL
 from . import models
 
 log = logging.getLogger("wpsuite.auth")
@@ -40,6 +40,29 @@ JWT_ALG = "HS256"
 # How long a login lasts before the user must sign in again.
 SESSION_HOURS = int(os.getenv("AUTH_SESSION_HOURS", "12"))
 
+# Password policy (shared by the API and the CLI).
+MIN_PASSWORD_LEN = int(os.getenv("AUTH_MIN_PASSWORD_LEN", "12"))
+_COMMON_PASSWORDS = {
+    "password", "password1", "password123", "passw0rd", "12345678", "123456789",
+    "1234567890", "qwerty123", "letmein123", "changeme", "admin123", "welcome123",
+    "iloveyou1", "abc12345", "qwertyuiop",
+}
+
+
+def password_problem(pw: str, username: str = "", email: str = "") -> Optional[str]:
+    """Return a human-readable reason the password is unacceptable, or None if OK.
+    Shared by the API endpoints and the CLI so the policy is enforced everywhere."""
+    if len(pw) < MIN_PASSWORD_LEN:
+        return f"Password must be at least {MIN_PASSWORD_LEN} characters."
+    low = pw.lower()
+    if username and low == username.strip().lower():
+        return "Password must not be the same as the username."
+    if email and low == email.strip().lower():
+        return "Password must not be the same as the email."
+    if low in _COMMON_PASSWORDS:
+        return "That password is too common — choose something less guessable."
+    return None
+
 # Paths under /api that do NOT require a session (login itself, health, docs).
 _EXEMPT_PREFIXES = ("/api/auth/",)
 _EXEMPT_EXACT = {
@@ -55,13 +78,24 @@ def _load_secret() -> str:
     s = os.getenv("AUTH_SECRET_KEY")
     if s:
         return s
-    # No secret configured: generate an ephemeral one so the app still runs in
-    # dev. Sessions won't survive a restart, and this is unsafe across multiple
-    # workers — production must set AUTH_SECRET_KEY.
+    # No key configured. In production (a real database is configured via
+    # POSTGRES_* / DATABASE_URL) this is FATAL — refuse to start rather than sign
+    # sessions with a throwaway key that silently rotates on every restart. In
+    # local dev (SQLite, no DB env) fall back to an ephemeral key so the app still
+    # runs zero-config.
+    # "Prod" = a real (non-SQLite) database is in use — matches exactly the
+    # condition db.py uses to pick Postgres, so we don't wrongly block a
+    # zero-config SQLite dev run just because a stray POSTGRES_USER is exported.
+    is_prod = not str(DATABASE_URL).startswith("sqlite")
+    if is_prod:
+        raise RuntimeError(
+            "AUTH_SECRET_KEY is not set. Refusing to start in production with an "
+            "ephemeral signing key — set a strong fixed AUTH_SECRET_KEY "
+            "(see server/.env.example / DEPLOYMENT.md)."
+        )
     log.warning(
-        "AUTH_SECRET_KEY is not set — using a random ephemeral key. "
-        "Logins will reset on restart and break across multiple workers. "
-        "Set AUTH_SECRET_KEY in the environment for production."
+        "AUTH_SECRET_KEY is not set — using a random ephemeral key for local dev. "
+        "Logins reset on restart. Set AUTH_SECRET_KEY for anything non-dev."
     )
     return secrets.token_urlsafe(48)
 
@@ -92,6 +126,7 @@ def create_token(user: "models.User") -> str:
         "sub": user.id,
         "username": user.username,
         "role": user.role,
+        "ver": user.token_version or 0,
         "iat": now,
         "exp": now + timedelta(hours=SESSION_HOURS),
     }
@@ -163,6 +198,10 @@ def get_current_user(request: Request, db: Session = Depends(get_db)) -> "models
     user = db.get(models.User, claims.get("sub"))
     if not user or not user.is_active:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Account is inactive")
+    # Session revocation: a mismatch means the token was invalidated (e.g. the
+    # password was changed after this token was issued).
+    if (claims.get("ver", 0) or 0) != (user.token_version or 0):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Session expired")
     return user