16afc56c0a7f5f1f618d169e9cd8fd5317fa8c3d
3 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4ace2afb1c |
Move user administration to its own page; add Project Super User
User accounts lived in the Admin Console, which is admins-only. Project admins
need to create the accounts on their own jobs without an app admin on the phone,
so accounts move to a new User Directory page and a new role carries the right.
server/auth.py, server/app.py
New permissions role `project_super_user`, between admin and project_admin:
everything a project admin may do, plus user administration SCOPED to the
projects they hold the role on. Four limits make it safe to hand out, all
enforced server-side:
* Scope comes from projects, not the job title. It resolves per membership
(managed_project_ids), so an ordinary account can hold it on one job via
ProjectMember.role, and a super user demoted on one job administers
nobody there. No projects, no authority.
* Account-level changes (password, disable, rename, permissions, delete)
require EXCLUSIVE scope: refused when the target is also on a project the
caller does not administer, because those changes are global. The
directory renders such rows read-only with the reason.
* No admin or super-user targets, and neither role can be granted by a
super user -- that is the line that stops it becoming app-wide control.
* PUT .../projects rebuilds only the caller's own slice; memberships on
projects they do not administer are left untouched. A payload that simply
omits them must not cut someone off a job the caller cannot see.
Creating requires naming at least one of your own projects: an account with
none would be one the creator instantly cannot manage.
/api/auth/users is now scoped rather than admin-only, and carries a per-row
`manageable` verdict plus the reason. Non-managers get a contact card only --
a project user has no business reading colleagues' login history. New
/api/auth/user-scope tells the page what it may offer. Administrative
password resets are now audited; they were the one account change that left
no trace. Settings, feature flags and the auto-add rule stay admin-only.
While here: one definition of "is a user manager", derived from the managed
set. An account-role-only version disagreed with the scoped one and locked
per-project super users out of routes they were entitled to.
html/users.html, html/users.js
The directory: three renderings from one page -- admin (everything), super
user (controls per row, read-only where scope is shared), everyone else (a
read-only directory of the people on their own projects).
html/console.css, html/console-util.js
Extracted from admin.html/admin.js so both console pages share them. A
divergent jsq() is an XSS and a divergent role list offers permissions the
server refuses, so neither may exist twice.
html/wp-sidenav.{js,css}
Global nav drawer, role-gated, carrying ?project= across links. Mounted on
the field view (which had no way to anywhere) plus both console pages.
No migration: users.role is already String(20) and the new value fits.
Verified: 93 scope/gate tests, 29 live HTTP tests through the real dependency
stack, 33 static JS checks. Not verified in a browser -- no JS engine on this
machine -- so users.html and field.html want one manual load.
server/smoketest.py still fails with 401s. Pre-existing: it has no login code,
so auth_gate refuses it. Confirmed unchanged by stashing this work.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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| 928ab8c900 |
Archive projects, auto-add default members, rebuild the admin console
Three things asked for together, plus the migration they share (a7c31f9e5b02 —
additive, with database defaults for existing rows, so unlike the users.role
rewrite it is safe under a code-only rollback).
ARCHIVE A PROJECT. A finished job leaves every picker, switcher and search, and
freezes read-only, without losing anything. Hiding is free: GET /api/projects
defaults to archived=exclude, so the home picker and the app-bar switcher drop it
without either of them changing. Freezing is require_project_writable(), which
every write that lands on a project now goes through — SOP and WP upserts (both
ends, so a package can be moved neither into nor out of an archived job), deletes,
issue, status, WP archive, and comments on its WPs/SOPs. It answers 409, not 403:
nobody lacks a permission, the project's state is the objection, and the browser
outbox in project-data.js retires 4xx ops instead of retrying them against a job
that will never accept them. Unarchive and delete stay allowed on purpose —
unarchive is the one write an archived project must take, and archive-then-delete
is a normal sequence.
DEFAULT MEMBERS ON NEW PROJECTS. users.auto_add_projects / auto_add_role flag the
people who belong on every job, so an admin says it once instead of remembering it
at each project creation. It runs on the is_new branch of upsert_project, which is
the single road into project creation, so the home page, the sample project and the
demo seeder are all covered and an update never re-runs it. Note the interaction
with the existing creator-grant: that row commits first and add_default_members
never overwrites an existing membership, so the creator grant now carries the
creator's own auto_add_role — otherwise someone flagged "Project Admin on every
job" would land as a plain member on the one job they started themselves.
ADMIN CONSOLE. The user table had outgrown .wrap{max-width:860px}: nine columns in
an 860px card meant every cell wrapped, so one user occupied a ~100px band, the
action buttons stacked, and the table spilled outside its own white card. Now
1240px, with wide tables scrolling inside .tscroll so the page itself never scrolls
sideways, and one spacing/control scale across all twelve cards. Truncation hangs
off a span inside the cell rather than max-width on the td, which table-layout:auto
treats as advisory — the usual reason cell ellipsis works in the stylesheet and not
on the page.
Found in review and fixed here rather than later:
- Stored XSS in the new Projects card, reachable by any signed-in user, landing in
an admin's session. The uesc(v).replace(/'/g,"\'") idiom this file already used
in eight places escapes in the wrong order — uesc leaves backslashes alone, so a
stored name containing \' closes the JS string literal and the rest executes.
jsq() does backslash, then quote, then HTML, and all thirteen handler bindings go
through it. The same bug, unescaped entirely, was in the SOP builder's custom
constraint names (escHandlerArg there). Three of seven test payloads escaped the
literal under the old idiom — one of them a plain name ending in a backslash, so
it was breaking buttons for innocent input too.
- _save_comment resolved wp_id and sop_id with if/elif but stored both, so a
payload naming a WP you may touch and a SOP you may not was authorised on the WP
alone and still wrote into the other project's thread. Both are checked now.
- Promoting an account to admin left its default-member flag set but invisible,
ready to take effect again on demotion — cleared, as set_user_auto_add already
does for the role.
smoketest.py and the console's own smoke test both assert the archive round trip:
out of the default list, present with archived=all, writes refused with 409, and
all of it undone by unarchiving.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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| e5977758c0 |
Hand-off runbook for the 2026-08-04 deploy
A step-by-step deploy procedure for someone who administers the Docker host but does not know this app. Two things about this deploy need spelling out for them, and neither is obvious from DEPLOYMENT.md: - nginx's config and all of html/ are baked into the image, so the stack has to be re-pulled and re-built. A restart deploys nothing and looks like a success. - the pending users.role rewrite (b41c7ae9) is one-way as far as the app is concerned: rolling the API image back after it commits breaks logins, because the old code doesn't recognise 'project_user'. So the runbook records `alembic current` and both image IDs up front, and splits rollback by symptom — an nginx-only failure is a safe code-only rollback they can do alone, a failed migration is escalate-don't-improvise. Backups go through the existing sidecar rather than an ad-hoc pg_dump: it works from Portainer's console without SSH, writes an encrypted timestamped dump to backups/ on the host, and prints a success line worth checking. Commands use `docker exec <name>` throughout, since `docker compose` from an SSH session can't find a Portainer-managed stack's compose project. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
