Commit Graph

4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
4ace2afb1c Move user administration to its own page; add Project Super User
User accounts lived in the Admin Console, which is admins-only. Project admins
need to create the accounts on their own jobs without an app admin on the phone,
so accounts move to a new User Directory page and a new role carries the right.

server/auth.py, server/app.py
  New permissions role `project_super_user`, between admin and project_admin:
  everything a project admin may do, plus user administration SCOPED to the
  projects they hold the role on. Four limits make it safe to hand out, all
  enforced server-side:

    * Scope comes from projects, not the job title. It resolves per membership
      (managed_project_ids), so an ordinary account can hold it on one job via
      ProjectMember.role, and a super user demoted on one job administers
      nobody there. No projects, no authority.
    * Account-level changes (password, disable, rename, permissions, delete)
      require EXCLUSIVE scope: refused when the target is also on a project the
      caller does not administer, because those changes are global. The
      directory renders such rows read-only with the reason.
    * No admin or super-user targets, and neither role can be granted by a
      super user -- that is the line that stops it becoming app-wide control.
    * PUT .../projects rebuilds only the caller's own slice; memberships on
      projects they do not administer are left untouched. A payload that simply
      omits them must not cut someone off a job the caller cannot see.

  Creating requires naming at least one of your own projects: an account with
  none would be one the creator instantly cannot manage.

  /api/auth/users is now scoped rather than admin-only, and carries a per-row
  `manageable` verdict plus the reason. Non-managers get a contact card only --
  a project user has no business reading colleagues' login history. New
  /api/auth/user-scope tells the page what it may offer. Administrative
  password resets are now audited; they were the one account change that left
  no trace. Settings, feature flags and the auto-add rule stay admin-only.

  While here: one definition of "is a user manager", derived from the managed
  set. An account-role-only version disagreed with the scoped one and locked
  per-project super users out of routes they were entitled to.

html/users.html, html/users.js
  The directory: three renderings from one page -- admin (everything), super
  user (controls per row, read-only where scope is shared), everyone else (a
  read-only directory of the people on their own projects).

html/console.css, html/console-util.js
  Extracted from admin.html/admin.js so both console pages share them. A
  divergent jsq() is an XSS and a divergent role list offers permissions the
  server refuses, so neither may exist twice.

html/wp-sidenav.{js,css}
  Global nav drawer, role-gated, carrying ?project= across links. Mounted on
  the field view (which had no way to anywhere) plus both console pages.

No migration: users.role is already String(20) and the new value fits.

Verified: 93 scope/gate tests, 29 live HTTP tests through the real dependency
stack, 33 static JS checks. Not verified in a browser -- no JS engine on this
machine -- so users.html and field.html want one manual load.

server/smoketest.py still fails with 401s. Pre-existing: it has no login code,
so auth_gate refuses it. Confirmed unchanged by stashing this work.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-05 17:36:14 -07:00
79b0e955b4 Wave 1: permissions roles, account-backed SOP team, critical constraints, password reset, BIM flag
Acts on the site comments from 8/3 plus the follow-ups. Foundation work first —
four of the comments all needed the project team to resolve to real user accounts.

Permissions vs project role (new)
- User.role is now the PERMISSIONS role: admin | project_admin | project_user.
  project_admin may delete work packages, change a SOP after it is complete, and
  delete a project; project_user may not (archiving a WP is still open to them).
  Enforced by require_project_admin() server-side; the UI only hides dead ends.
- New User.project_role holds the person's JOB FUNCTION on the project. It grants
  nothing — it feeds the SOP team pickers and notification routing.
- Admin console shows both columns and explains the difference. Migration rewrites
  the legacy role 'user' to 'project_user'.
- Deleting a project was previously open to any member and unaudited; it now needs
  project_admin and writes an audit event. ProjectData.remove no longer drops the
  project from the local cache when the server refuses.

SOP project team from user accounts
- PM/APM/CM/QM and additional team members are pickers over the project's members,
  storing the account id next to the display name. A name from an older SOP with no
  matching account is kept and flagged rather than dropped.
- The WP Creator lists the SOP team first in the Owner picker, and a new package
  defaults to whoever is creating it.

Critical constraints
- SOP constraints carry a Critical flag; buildConstraints() now copies the whole
  definition through to the package (it previously reduced them to names, losing
  description too), and critical rows are marked in the WP form. The email on
  reopen-after-release is wave 3.

Password reset by email
- login.html gains Forgot password and a set-a-new-password view, offered only when
  the server reports email is actually configured.
- Single-use signed token (AUTH_RESET_MINUTES, default 60) bound to token_version,
  sent immediately rather than through the notifications outbox so a reset link is
  never persisted. Identical response for unknown accounts; per-account send
  cooldown; a completed reset clears any login lockout.
- Session and reset tokens are no longer interchangeable.

BIM kill-switch
- New admin Features card with bim_enabled, OFF by default. The SOP creator hides
  the BIM section and the Creator treats every package as install-only while it is
  off; a SOP that already has BIM keeps its data untouched.

Verified with two throwaway-database test scripts: 44 checks on the permissions
matrix and token handling, 22 on the reset flow end-to-end against a local SMTP
sink (real message captured, link extracted and used). Front-end files parse-checked
in headless Chrome. Not yet exercised in a browser against a real login.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-03 14:48:59 -07:00
39b48055ff Productionize WP Suite: auth, security hardening, sync, dashboard, PWA, email
Brings the Work Package Suite from a browser-local prototype to a
multi-tenant, SQL-backed deployment hardened for customer IP.

Auth & access control
- Local username/password login (bcrypt + JWT in an HttpOnly cookie),
  admin-managed users, per-project membership, and project-scoped API access.
- Admin console: change user roles, view the audit trail, manage settings.

Security hardening
- CSP / HSTS / X-Frame-Options / nosniff headers in nginx; Secure cookie via
  X-Forwarded-Proto; CSRF Origin check; attribute-safe output escaping.
- Login lockout, token_version session revocation, stronger password policy,
  fail-closed secret loading, encrypted (AES-256) database backups.

Persistence & schema
- SOPs and Work Packages are now DB-backed and shared across users, written
  through a durable client sync outbox that queues offline edits.
- Alembic migrations applied automatically on container start.

New capabilities
- Phase 2 dashboard (progress, gating, pagination, archive).
- Phase 3 PWA "Field View" with offline caching and auth fallback.
- WP owner assignment with OPTIONAL email notifications, OFF by default and
  toggled from the admin console. SMTP password is read only from the
  SMTP_PASSWORD env var (never stored); emails carry a WP number + deep link,
  never customer IP.

Also: IBM Carbon restyle, Help section, and DEPLOYMENT.md brought up to date.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-15 17:51:15 -07:00
20afb0e565 Add secure username/password login portal
Gate the suite behind a self-contained login (no external IdP):

- User model with bcrypt-hashed passwords; admin/user roles
- /api/auth endpoints: login, logout, me, change-password, and
  admin-only user management (list/create/delete/reset/enable)
- Stateless JWT session in an HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, auto-Secure
  cookie; middleware refuses every /api data route without a session
- login.html + auth-guard.js: login page and per-page guard with a
  top-right "name / Admin / Sign out" pill
- Admin Console now gated on admin role (passphrase gate removed) with
  a User administration card
- manage_users.py CLI to bootstrap the first admin
- Rebuilt help.js into a searchable, multi-topic help center
- Local-dev convenience: app serves html/ so the site + API share one
  origin under uvicorn (inactive in the prod container)
- Docs/env: AUTH_SECRET_KEY, requirements (bcrypt, PyJWT), README

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-25 16:55:54 -05:00