'Delete selected…' in the bulk bar. The dialog lists every affected
username (scrolling inside the dialog for a long list), says the
delete cannot be undone and offers disable instead, and sends nothing
until the word DELETE is typed in capitals, whatever the count
(confirmed 2026-10-06). Wrong words keep the dialog open with the
reason; cancel sends nothing.
Your own account cannot be selected; if it ever reached the request,
the server refuses that row and the report names it with the reason.
The bulk delete is a prompt-style dialog, so it is covered in
tests/console_dialogs_check.py (its docstring asks for exactly this):
new section 4 drives it in the browser with native dialogs poisoned.
DOM harness: 48/48.
POST /api/auth/bulk-users/resolve reads a list of usernames (first
column; comma, semicolon or tab; header skipped) and answers line by
line, the CR-005 validate-and-report pattern. A line is rejected, with
its number and reason, when it names nobody the caller can see ('User
not found', as everywhere else), an account they may not change (the
single route's own reason), their own account, or a username already
listed (duplicate of line N). An email address resolves only when
exactly one account has it. Nothing is changed by this route.
The console's 'Select from CSV' turns the accepted accounts into the
ordinary selection (filter reset so every selected row is visible) and
lists every rejected line. The action, confirm and per-row report are
the checkbox ones, through the same T12.1 routes, which re-check each
row: a CSV cannot reach an account a checkbox could not.
Usernames only, action in the toolbar (decided 2026-10-06). Files over
1 MB are refused before upload; FileReader fallback for browsers
without Blob.text().
bulk_users_check.py: 61/61. DOM harness: 40/40.
Role change, enable/disable, and project add/remove on the selected
rows, wired to the T12.1 endpoints. Delete is T12.5.
- The toolbar offers only what the caller may do: grantable roles,
managed projects (archived last, marked), grantable per-project roles.
- Every action confirms through wpConfirmDialog naming the exact count
(and for projects, the project and role) before anything is sent.
- The result lists every failed row with the server's reason, plus the
changed / already-set counts; a partial failure is a warning, an
all-failed batch an alert, a server error says nothing was changed.
Never a blanket success. Announced through the live-region banner.
- The directory reloads afterwards, which clears the selection.
DOM harness (jsdom, real page and scripts, mocked API): 30/30 with
T12.2.
- A checkbox per row the caller may change; select-all covers only the
rows the current filter and search show, and is indeterminate on a
partial selection.
- Your own row and rows you cannot change show a disabled box whose
label gives the reason.
- Changing the filter or the search clears the selection and says so
in a live region (decided 2026-10-06), so no hidden row stays
selected.
- The bulk bar appears at one or more selected rows and is hidden (out
of the tab order) at zero. Actions arrive in T12.3.
- Selection is updated in place, not by re-rendering, so focus stays on
the checkbox just used. One delegated listener; no ids in inline
handlers.
- The email-width rule now targets td.ell, not nth-child(3), which the
new column would have shifted.
Checked in a DOM harness (jsdom) against the real page and scripts:
14/14; against main the selection checks fail. Browser probe at
390px/1440px follows in T12.6.
Real deletion (D15's 'full replacement'), not a toggle. Okta is now the only
credential this app accepts anywhere.
Backend:
- server/models.py: drop User.password_hash.
- server/alembic/versions/1d60a608bb51_...: matching migration (op.drop_column,
same plain-drop precedent as project_role/locked_until/etc.; downgrade re-adds
it with server_default='').
- server/auth.py: remove hash_password/verify_password/password_problem/
MIN_PASSWORD_LEN/_COMMON_PASSWORDS, create_reset_token/decode_reset_token/
RESET_MINUTES, the bcrypt import. Roles/tokens/cookies/get_current_user
untouched.
- server/app.py: remove login(), the whole self-service reset-password block
(forgot-password/reset-available/reset-password), and change_password()
(POST /api/auth/password). Rework create_user() to drop the password field
(with a docstring note: the username must exactly match the eventual Okta
identity claim, or a later sign-in provisions a second account instead of
matching this one). Remove admin_reset_password() outright - nothing left to
reset. Fixes a bug this task's own predecessor left behind: okta_callback()'s
JIT provisioning (T10.3) was still setting password_hash="", which would have
raised TypeError the moment the column was actually dropped.
Admin bootstrap (D16): server/manage_users.py moves from creating accounts
(create/create-admin/reset-password, all password-based) to a single 'promote
<username> --role <role>' command that changes the role on a row Okta's JIT
provisioning already created - the documented path for naming the first admin.
list/disable/enable unchanged.
Frontend: html/users.js drops the password field and validation from
createUser(), removes resetPw() and its button (nothing left to reset).
html/users.html drops the #nu-password input, adds a tooltip on username
explaining the exact-match-to-Okta requirement. html/auth-guard.js removes the
wpChangePassword dialog; html/wp-sidenav.js removes the 'Password' menu item
that opened it.
Tests: tests/browser_check.py and tests/launcher_check.py stop hashing a
password to seed fixture rows (and the --keep-server hint now prints a
ready-to-use cookie-setting snippet instead of a dead username/password).
tests/pipeline_check.py and tests/token_check.py drop an unused PW import.
tests/console_dialogs_check.py: the admin password-reset dialog it drove no
longer exists, so that scenario is removed - the prompt-with-validate() UI
pattern it exercised is still covered via creator_dialogs_check.py's
wp-creation-app.js call sites, noted in this file's docstring so the coverage
move isn't silent. tests/url_state_check.py: the "next= survives a real sign-in
via login" scenario is explicitly marked SKIPPED (not deleted, not faked) -
that promise is specific to the login FORM this task removed and can't be
honestly re-proven until T10.5 rebuilds it as an Okta redirect; a minted-token
cookie now stands in as setup only, so scenarios 3-6 in that file still get a
signed-in page to run against.
server/smoketest.py and server/seed_demo.py: switched from POST /api/auth/login
to minting a session the same way okta_callback() does (auth.create_token(),
seeded into the cookie jar) rather than waiting on T10.7. This is a real
operational change, documented in both files' own AUTHENTICATION sections: they
now need to run where AUTH_SECRET_KEY and the database match the target
server's (inside the api container, or local dev) - they can no longer sign in
to an arbitrary remote URL from an unrelated workstation, because Okta requires
a real browser and these are stdlib scripts. The account must already exist;
neither script creates or promotes one.
server/requirements.txt: bcrypt dropped, nothing imports it anymore.
Verified: full Alembic chain (baseline through this migration) upgrades and
downgrades cleanly against a throwaway SQLite DB. okta_callback() JIT
provisioning re-tested against the post-migration schema (would have thrown
before the password_hash="" fix above). create_user() verified via a live HTTP
call with no password field. manage_users.py promote verified end to end
(seed a JIT-shaped row at project_user, promote to admin, list). smoketest.py
and seed_demo.py both run to completion against a live uvicorn instance using
the new minted-session path - 25/25 checks, including logout actually
invalidating the session (proving the cookie-jar seeding didn't just fake the
sign-in, it preserved the real expiry mechanics).
wave-10.md T10.4 / D15 / D16
S1 counted 79 native dialogs app-wide and its tasks removed 58; the audit
found the rest on surfaces no S1 task named: admin.js (6), users.js (10), the
launcher's inline script (5). All 21 now go through wp-dialog.js - the T7.9
kit extracted as a self-injecting shared component: markup and styles land on
first use, styles are theme tokens only with its own wp-dlg-* class names (the
consoles' existing .modal styles are untouched), 44px targets on coarse
pointers, and the whole file is guarded so the creator's inline copy - which
owns the same-id markup in its HTML - still wins on its own page. The kit's
toast comes along (S10 role rules), since none of the three pages had one.
Conversion follows the T7.9 precedent: confirms -> wpConfirmDialog with named
ok-labels, the password prompt -> wpPromptDialog whose validate() finally
enforces min-12 AT the input (it was label-text-only before, server-enforced),
API failures with detail -> wpAlertDialog, small info/validation messages ->
the announced toast.
New probe console_dialogs_check (17): counts pinned at 0, kit guarded and
loaded by all three pages, and the users console driven live with natives
poisoned - reset a password end to end (short refused inline, good one accepted
by the server and announced), cancel a delete and prove nothing died.
Items: BL-024 (closed), S1 completed to zero app-wide, C1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The set mixed colour emoji with dingbats, and the same glyph read as two
things partly BECAUSE emoji render as per-platform artwork. The system chosen:
monochrome text-presentation glyphs - the suite is classic-script vanilla HTML
with no bundler, so an SVG sprite or icon font is a new asset pipeline, while
text glyphs render through the same font stack as the words beside them. The
enforceable form of "renders identically on Windows, macOS and a tablet":
no emoji-range codepoint and no U+FE0F selector anywhere in UI source,
swept by the probe on every run.
Converted: green-check/red-cross emoji in the admin and users consoles to
checkmark/cross, no-entry to circled-slash (blocked/on hold), the lock to the
pencil already meaning "edit with a logged reason" on sign-offs, the star to
the diamond, the folder to the reference marker, the side nav's lightning to
the gear, and the WATCH glyph (U+231A - emoji-presentation BY DEFAULT per
Unicode) to a text-presentation clock face. Dropped where the label already
carried the meaning: lightning on Save & view, the camera on Add photo, the
page/frame pictograms on file rows (the filename is the label). Stale help
copy fixed while its emoji left: it still described the pre-T9.4 "Load
sample" and the pre-T7.10 "Usage Logs" locations.
The meaning-to-icon mapping is in docs/reference/tokens.md - one meaning per
glyph, one glyph per meaning, both directions asserted from the document
itself; the probe also sweeps every page for glyphs not in the approved set,
so an unmapped icon cannot creep in.
Verification (each probe run alone): NEW tests/icon_check.py 5/5.
Regressions: frame_check 38/38, files_check 36/36, a11y_check 22/22,
cards_check 44/44.
Items: S6
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
User accounts lived in the Admin Console, which is admins-only. Project admins
need to create the accounts on their own jobs without an app admin on the phone,
so accounts move to a new User Directory page and a new role carries the right.
server/auth.py, server/app.py
New permissions role `project_super_user`, between admin and project_admin:
everything a project admin may do, plus user administration SCOPED to the
projects they hold the role on. Four limits make it safe to hand out, all
enforced server-side:
* Scope comes from projects, not the job title. It resolves per membership
(managed_project_ids), so an ordinary account can hold it on one job via
ProjectMember.role, and a super user demoted on one job administers
nobody there. No projects, no authority.
* Account-level changes (password, disable, rename, permissions, delete)
require EXCLUSIVE scope: refused when the target is also on a project the
caller does not administer, because those changes are global. The
directory renders such rows read-only with the reason.
* No admin or super-user targets, and neither role can be granted by a
super user -- that is the line that stops it becoming app-wide control.
* PUT .../projects rebuilds only the caller's own slice; memberships on
projects they do not administer are left untouched. A payload that simply
omits them must not cut someone off a job the caller cannot see.
Creating requires naming at least one of your own projects: an account with
none would be one the creator instantly cannot manage.
/api/auth/users is now scoped rather than admin-only, and carries a per-row
`manageable` verdict plus the reason. Non-managers get a contact card only --
a project user has no business reading colleagues' login history. New
/api/auth/user-scope tells the page what it may offer. Administrative
password resets are now audited; they were the one account change that left
no trace. Settings, feature flags and the auto-add rule stay admin-only.
While here: one definition of "is a user manager", derived from the managed
set. An account-role-only version disagreed with the scoped one and locked
per-project super users out of routes they were entitled to.
html/users.html, html/users.js
The directory: three renderings from one page -- admin (everything), super
user (controls per row, read-only where scope is shared), everyone else (a
read-only directory of the people on their own projects).
html/console.css, html/console-util.js
Extracted from admin.html/admin.js so both console pages share them. A
divergent jsq() is an XSS and a divergent role list offers permissions the
server refuses, so neither may exist twice.
html/wp-sidenav.{js,css}
Global nav drawer, role-gated, carrying ?project= across links. Mounted on
the field view (which had no way to anywhere) plus both console pages.
No migration: users.role is already String(20) and the new value fits.
Verified: 93 scope/gate tests, 29 live HTTP tests through the real dependency
stack, 33 static JS checks. Not verified in a browser -- no JS engine on this
machine -- so users.html and field.html want one manual load.
server/smoketest.py still fails with 401s. Pre-existing: it has no login code,
so auth_gate refuses it. Confirmed unchanged by stashing this work.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>