Wave 10: task breakdown for the Okta OIDC build

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

docs/reference/file-map.md

@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ Wave 8 adds these:
 ```bash
 python tests/kitting_check.py        # CR-009/010/012 - statuses, owner, delivery 26 checks
 python tests/kitting_notify_check.py # CR-011 - kitting mail, coalesced, gated    17 checks
-python tests/materials_check.py      # D6 - material list, the CR-005 pattern     17 checks
+python tests/materials_check.py      # D6 - material list, the CR-005 pattern     20 checks
 python tests/mreq_check.py           # CR-013 - lightweight request, end to end   19 checks
 ```
 

docs/waves/decisions-2026-09-02.md

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+# Decisions — September 2, 2026
+
+One item, and it retires two decided-and-built items rather than amending them.
+
+---
+
+## D15 — Authentication moves to Okta OIDC; D13 and D14 are retired before deployment
+
+- **Amends:** retires `D13` (LDAPS simple bind against `prime.local`) and `D14` (the CLI
+  authenticates against the domain). Both were decided and reaffirmed August 21 2026,
+  built across nine tasks (`T10.1`–`T10.9`), and verified against the live domain. Neither
+  reached production. Approved by Nick Siegfried.
+- **Surface:** `server/auth.py`, `server/app.py` (`login()`), `html/login.html`,
+  `html/login.js`, `html/auth-guard.js`. `server/ldap_auth.py` does not carry forward —
+  there is no LDAPS bind in the new design, not even as a fallback.
+- **Wave:** 10. The label is reused fresh: the LDAPS work that previously answered to
+  "wave 10" was built on `feat/ldaps-directory-auth`, which is deleted rather than merged,
+  and never appeared in `IMPLEMENTATION.md`'s wave table. It carries no claim on the
+  number.
+
+### What D13/D14 were, for the record
+
+The branch carrying them is deleted, not merged, so their decision record
+(`docs/waves/decisions-2026-08-21.md`) no longer exists on any branch. Preserved here so
+the reasoning isn't lost along with it:
+
+D13 chose a direct LDAPS simple bind to `ldaps://prime.local:636` as the sign-in
+mechanism: no password stored, a successful bind was the authentication, accounts were
+provisioned just-in-time from the directory, and roles stayed local. D14 moved the CLI
+onto the same bind, removing `create-admin`/`create`. Both were built, tested
+(1284/1288 checks, Aug 24), and screenshotted at 390px and 1440px. Neither ever deployed —
+`wp.controls.dev` still runs the pre-D13 local-password login as of this decision.
+
+### The decision
+
+Skip LDAPS entirely. Authentication becomes an Okta OIDC authorization-code flow,
+replacing local passwords directly — the same full replacement D13 intended, just via
+Okta instead of a domain bind. No LDAPS bind exists in this design at any point.
+
+Four things carry forward from D13 unchanged, because they were never LDAPS-specific to
+begin with:
+
+1. **No password is stored.** The app never sees a credential of any kind; Okta owns
+   authentication entirely.
+2. **Accounts are provisioned just-in-time.** A first successful Okta sign-in with no
+   matching local `users` row creates one, at the default role. The matching logic that
+   was going to key off a directory search instead keys off an OIDC identity claim.
+3. **Roles stay local.** Okta, and AD behind it, supplies identity only. This app decides
+   what an identity may do. Restated because it is the one rule the whole access-control
+   design depends on — see `BL-029` and the governance discussion that followed it.
+4. **Existing accounts keep their roles** on first Okta login, exactly as D13's criterion
+   4 read for LDAPS.
+
+### Why this, and not LDAPS first and Okta second
+
+`BL-029` (recorded on this branch as `BL-027` before the renumbering forced by main's
+independent use of that number) already laid out why OIDC beats the LDAPS bind on three
+counts: this app never sees a password, MFA comes from Okta rather than needing to be
+built, and the domain-lockout hazard that forced `AUTH_MAX_ATTEMPTS` down to 2 disappears,
+because failed attempts land on Okta rather than on a bind this app makes. D13 was decided
+before it was known the company already runs an Okta tenant. Once that was confirmed
+(security's scoping reply, September 2026), shipping LDAPS first and replacing it with
+Okta days later would mean building and deploying the weaker mechanism on purpose. Going
+straight to Okta avoids that.
+
+### What still needs answering before this is buildable
+
+Open from the security scoping thread, not yet closed:
+
+- Which OIDC claim carries the AD `sAMAccountName` equivalent (`preferred_username`,
+  `upn`, or a custom claim) — asked of security, answer pending.
+- The exact redirect/callback URI once the hostname situation is reconfirmed
+  (`https://wp.controls.dev/api/auth/okta/callback` proposed).
+- The `Business Technology Group` pilot in Okta, requested for initial testing, with
+  normal Okta session/MFA behavior rather than a stricter per-app rule.

docs/waves/wave-10.md

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+# Wave 10 — Okta OIDC authentication
+
+Fresh wave 10. The label was previously used by the LDAPS work under `D13`/`D14`, built on
+`feat/ldaps-directory-auth`; that branch was deleted rather than merged and never appeared
+in `IMPLEMENTATION.md`'s wave table, so it carries no claim on the number. See
+`docs/waves/decisions-2026-09-02.md` (`D15`) for why LDAPS was retired before deployment
+and Okta chosen instead.
+
+Depends only on `main` as it stands after `D15`. Not sequenced behind any other wave.
+
+## Tasks
+
+- **T10.1 — Add the Okta OIDC client.** Authlib as a dependency. Config via env vars
+  (`OKTA_ISSUER`, `OKTA_CLIENT_ID`, `OKTA_CLIENT_SECRET`, `OKTA_REDIRECT_URI`), same
+  pattern `AUTH_SECRET_KEY` already uses in `server/auth.py`.
+
+- **T10.2 — Login-redirect and callback routes.** A route that sends the browser to
+  Okta's authorize endpoint, and a callback route that exchanges the code for tokens and
+  validates the ID token. Access gating is Okta's job, not this app's: only accounts
+  assigned to the app integration in Okta can reach it at all, so there is no app-side
+  required-group or claim check layered on top. This is a deliberate difference from D13,
+  which had to gate on a required AD group itself because an LDAPS bind alone could not
+  distinguish an assigned user from any other domain account.
+
+- **T10.3 — Identity matching and JIT provisioning.** Reuses D13's shape
+  (`_provision_from_directory`-style matching) keyed off an OIDC claim instead of an LDAP
+  search result. **Open dependency:** which claim carries the AD `sAMAccountName`
+  equivalent (`preferred_username`, `upn`, or a custom claim) is asked of security and not
+  yet answered. Build with a configurable claim name and a documented default, not a
+  hardcoded one, so the answer can drop in without a code change.
+
+- **T10.4 — Remove the local password path entirely.** Drop `password_hash`, remove the
+  bcrypt-based `login()`, remove the username/password form. Real deletion, matching
+  `D15`'s "full replacement," not a toggle or a fallback.
+
+- **T10.5 — Frontend: login becomes a redirect, not a form.** `login.html`/`login.js`
+  change to a "Sign in with Okta" flow. Sign-out lands back on the app's own login page.
+
+- **T10.6 — Deployment docs and env var reference.** `DEPLOYMENT.md`,
+  `server/.env.example`, `server/README.md` describe the Okta config in place of the LDAP
+  config they never ended up describing (D13 never shipped, so these still describe the
+  original local-password system today).
+
+- **T10.7 — Test coverage without a live Okta dependency.** A fake-OIDC-provider test
+  seam, mirroring `ldap_fake.py`, so the suite runs with no live Okta tenant reachable.
+
+- **T10.8 — Verification.** 390px and 1440px, full suite, done-when checks per task,
+  matching the rigor D13 was held to.
+
+## Still open
+
+- The OIDC claim mapping (`T10.3`).
+- Final confirmation of the redirect/callback URI (`https://wp.controls.dev/api/auth/okta/callback`
+  proposed, pending security).
+- The `Business Technology Group` pilot assignment in Okta.

html/wp-list-import.js

@@ -105,6 +105,18 @@
       say(bits.join(''), problem);
     }
 
+    // A 500 answers plain text ("Internal Server Error"), and r.json() on that
+    // throws - which used to land in catch() and read as "could not reach the
+    // server" while the server was answering fine (found 2026-08-23, the
+    // production locations import). Read text, parse if it parses, keep status.
+    function readJson(r) {
+      return r.text().then(function (t) {
+        var j = null;
+        try { j = t ? JSON.parse(t) : null; } catch (e) { /* not JSON: a proxy or 500 page */ }
+        return { ok: r.ok, status: r.status, body: j };
+      });
+    }
+
     function importText(dryRun) {
       var text = (el(p + '-paste') || {}).value || '';
       if (!text.trim()) { say('Paste some rows or choose a CSV file first.', true); return; }
@@ -114,7 +126,7 @@
         method: 'POST', headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', 'Accept': 'application/json' },
         body: JSON.stringify({ text: text, dry_run: !!dryRun }),
       })
-        .then(function (r) { return r.json().then(function (j) { return { ok: r.ok, status: r.status, body: j }; }); })
+        .then(readJson)
         .then(function (res) {
           if (!res.ok) {
             say('⚠ Import refused — ' + esc((res.body && res.body.detail) || ('HTTP ' + res.status)), true);
@@ -142,7 +154,7 @@
         method: 'POST', headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', 'Accept': 'application/json' },
         body: JSON.stringify(read.payload),
       })
-        .then(function (r) { return r.json().then(function (j) { return { ok: r.ok, status: r.status, body: j }; }); })
+        .then(readJson)
         .then(function (res) {
           if (!res.ok) {
             setAddError((res.body && res.body.detail) || ('Could not add it (HTTP ' + res.status + ')'));
@@ -161,7 +173,7 @@
         method: 'PATCH', headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', 'Accept': 'application/json' },
         body: JSON.stringify(patchBody),
       })
-        .then(function (r) { return r.json().then(function (j) { return { ok: r.ok, status: r.status, body: j }; }); })
+        .then(readJson)
         .then(function (res) {
           if (!res.ok) {
             say('⚠ ' + esc((res.body && res.body.detail) || ('HTTP ' + res.status)), true);

server/alembic/env.py

@@ -52,6 +52,13 @@ def run_migrations_online() -> None:
             connection=connection,
             target_metadata=target_metadata,
             compare_type=True,
+            # Each migration commits on its own. One transaction for the WHOLE
+            # run meant a crash at step N rolled back steps 1..N-1 while their
+            # "Running upgrade" lines stayed on screen claiming they ran - the
+            # 2026-08-21 outage's stamp-to-head repair trusted those lines and
+            # left production missing two tables (found 2026-08-23 when the
+            # locations import 500'd on a table that "had been created").
+            transaction_per_migration=True,
         )
         with context.begin_transaction():
             context.run_migrations()

server/app.py

@@ -2388,6 +2388,24 @@ def parse_location_rows(text: str) -> tuple[list[tuple[int, list[str]]], list[di
             rejected.append({"line": i, "text": line,
                              "reason": "no letters or digits to make a code from"})
             continue
+        # Postgres enforces VARCHAR lengths and refuses NUL/control bytes;
+        # SQLite shrugs at both - which is how ONE bad CSV line 500'd the whole
+        # production import (2026-08-23, BL-027's class again) instead of coming
+        # back as a rejection with its line number. Validate per row, here,
+        # so every dialect answers the same way: with a reason.
+        if any(any(ord(ch) < 32 for ch in p) for p in parts):
+            rejected.append({"line": i, "text": line[:120],
+                             "reason": "contains control characters — re-save the file as plain CSV (UTF-8)"})
+            continue
+        long_p = next((p for p in parts if len(p) > 200), None)
+        if long_p is not None:
+            rejected.append({"line": i, "text": line[:120],
+                             "reason": "a name is longer than 200 characters (%d)" % len(long_p)})
+            continue
+        if any(len(location_slug(p)) > 60 for p in parts):
+            rejected.append({"line": i, "text": line[:120],
+                             "reason": "a code would be longer than 60 characters"})
+            continue
         rows.append((i, parts))
     return rows, rejected
 
@@ -2454,6 +2472,7 @@ def import_locations(project_id: str, body: LocationImportIn,
     require_project_writable(db, user, project_id, "The location list cannot be changed")
 
     rows, rejected = parse_location_rows(body.text)
+    read_total = len(rows) + len(rejected)
 
     existing = {n.path: n for n in db.scalars(
         select(models.LocationNode).where(models.LocationNode.project_id == project_id)
@@ -2468,6 +2487,10 @@ def import_locations(project_id: str, body: LocationImportIn,
     for line_no, parts in rows:
         segs = [location_slug(p) for p in parts]
         full = "/".join(segs)
+        if len(full) > 200:
+            rejected.append({"line": line_no, "text": "/".join(parts)[:120],
+                             "reason": "the combined path is longer than 200 characters"})
+            continue
         if full in seen_in_file:
             duplicates.append({"line": line_no, "path": full, "names": parts,
                                "reason": "already on line %d of this import" % seen_in_file[full]})
@@ -2510,7 +2533,7 @@ def import_locations(project_id: str, body: LocationImportIn,
 
     result = {
         "project_id": project_id, "dry_run": bool(body.dry_run),
-        "read": len(rows) + len(rejected),
+        "read": read_total,
         "created": created, "duplicates": duplicates,
         "reactivated": reactivated, "rejected": rejected,
     }
@@ -3007,6 +3030,18 @@ def parse_material_rows(text: str):
             rejected.append({"line": i, "text": raw.strip()[:120],
                              "reason": "more than three columns - description, unit, code is the whole shape"})
             continue
+        # Same guard as parse_location_rows: reject what Postgres would refuse
+        # (VARCHAR limits, control bytes) with the line number, never a 500.
+        if any(any(ord(ch) < 32 for ch in p) for p in parts):
+            rejected.append({"line": i, "text": raw.strip()[:120],
+                             "reason": "contains control characters - re-save the file as plain CSV (UTF-8)"})
+            continue
+        caps = ((300, "description"), (20, "unit"), (80, "code"))
+        long_col = next((("%s is longer than %d characters (%d)" % (label, cap, len(p)))
+                         for (cap, label), p in zip(caps, parts) if len(p) > cap), None)
+        if long_col:
+            rejected.append({"line": i, "text": raw.strip()[:120], "reason": long_col})
+            continue
         rows.append((i, parts))
     return rows, rejected
 

tests/locations_check.py

@@ -323,6 +323,13 @@ def run(page, base, tok):
                 {"text": "Probe Building One,Probe Level 1,Probe Sector B"})
     chk("the import reports it as reactivated, not created or duplicate",
         len(again["body"]["reactivated"]) == 1 and not again["body"]["created"], again["body"])
+    # The 2026-08-23 production 500, pinned (locations side): Postgres-refused
+    # values reject by line, on every dialect, never crash the request.
+    hz = api(page, "POST", "/api/projects/projA/locations/import",
+             {"text": "Probe Building One," + "Y" * 220 + ",S1", "dry_run": True})
+    chk("an over-long name is a line rejection, not a 500",
+        hz["status"] == 200 and hz["body"]["rejected"]
+        and "200 characters" in hz["body"]["rejected"][0]["reason"], hz["body"])
     same = [n for n in api(page, "GET",
                            "/api/projects/projA/locations?include_inactive=true")["body"]["nodes"]
             if n["path"] == sec["path"]]

tests/materials_check.py

@@ -105,6 +105,20 @@ def main():
         _, listing = api(base, "/api/projects/projA/materials", root)
         chk("...and nothing was written", listing["items"] == [])
 
+        # The 2026-08-23 production 500, pinned: what Postgres refuses (VARCHAR
+        # overflow, control bytes) must come back as a per-line rejection - on
+        # EVERY dialect - never crash the request.
+        code, rep = api(base, "/api/projects/projA/materials/import", root, "POST",
+                        {"text": "Sample " + "x" * 300 + ",EA", "dry_run": True})
+        chk("an over-long description is a line rejection, not a 500",
+            code == 200 and rep["rejected"] and "300 characters" in rep["rejected"][0]["reason"]
+            and not rep["created"], ascii_(rep))
+        code, rep = api(base, "/api/projects/projA/materials/import", root, "POST",
+                        {"text": "Sample widget\u0000,EA", "dry_run": True})
+        chk("a control byte is a line rejection, not a 500",
+            code == 200 and rep["rejected"]
+            and "control characters" in rep["rejected"][0]["reason"], ascii_(rep))
+
         code, rep = api(base, "/api/projects/projA/materials/import", root, "POST",
                         {"text": text, "dry_run": False})
         _, listing = api(base, "/api/projects/projA/materials", root)