Files
Project-SDE-WP-Suite/tests/ldap_auth_check.py
Cody Schaefer 24fff382c8 T10.7 - cover the throttle and local is_active; tick what was verified
Two things, both found by checking the wave file before pushing rather than
assuming it was current.

First: most done-when boxes were still open even where the work had been
verified, which would have told a reviewer that almost nothing was checked.
Ticked the ones genuinely verified, each with what verified it, and left eight
open that are not. One box was not merely unticked but WRONG - it asked that
`create-admin` create an admin with no password prompt, and T10.9 removed that
command outright; restated as what now has to be true.

Second: two of the open boxes were safety-relevant and cheap to close, so
ldap_auth_check now covers them (24/24):

  a disabled local account is refused 403 even though its bind succeeds -
  local is_active overrides the directory, which is how access to THIS app is
  revoked without touching the domain account

  the throttle stops CALLING the directory, not merely refusing. Proved by
  spending the attempt budget on wrong passwords and then presenting the
  CORRECT one: a 429 for a credential that would otherwise succeed is only
  possible if the check runs before the directory is consulted. Also asserts
  the budget is per-username, so throttling one account does not throttle
  everyone.

That was the last untested safety-critical behaviour on the branch. It is the
thing standing between an unauthenticated caller and locking colleagues out of
Windows, and until now nothing exercised it.

Also recorded a deployment fact at the top of wave-10 where it cannot be missed:
LDAP_REQUIRED_GROUP is empty, and empty means no group gate - every account in
prime.local may sign in. The live sign-in that confirmed this branch works was
made without it, so it proved the bind, the certificate chain and provisioning,
but not the group check. That path has still never run against the real
directory.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-24 09:42:45 -05:00

317 lines
14 KiB
Python

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Does domain authentication hold its guarantees? — D13 / T10.7.
Covers the four things `docs/waves/decisions-2026-08-21.md` calls non-negotiable,
plus the two provisioning rules that decide whether an existing admin survives the
switch. These are the failure modes where the app still *looks* fine:
1. An empty password must not reach bind(). In LDAP a simple bind with an empty
password is an ANONYMOUS bind and it SUCCEEDS — so without the guard, a blank
password authenticates as whatever username was submitted.
2. TLS must be CERT_REQUIRED with an explicit CA file. CERT_NONE still encrypts,
so it fails silently; what it loses is the ability to tell a real DC from
someone harvesting domain passwords.
3. Group membership must be evaluated through AD's nested-group matching rule.
Plain memberOf is direct membership only and wrongly refuses real people.
4. The fake directory must be impossible to select against a real database.
5. A refused sign-in must create no account.
6. An existing admin must still be an admin afterwards.
Self-contained: throwaway SQLite + its own uvicorn. No browser, no domain — the
fake directory (server/ldap_fake.py) stands in for the DC.
Exit 0 all passed, 1 a failure, 2 could not run.
"""
import json
import os
import ssl
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))))
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
from cdp import free_port # noqa: E402
_PASS, _FAIL = [], []
PW = "CorrectHorseBattery9"
GROUP = "WP-Suite-Users"
ROOT = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
def chk(label, ok, detail=""):
(_PASS if ok else _FAIL).append(label)
print(f" {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'} {label}" + ("" if ok else f" {detail}"))
def post(base, path, payload):
req = urllib.request.Request(base + path, method="POST",
data=json.dumps(payload).encode(),
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"})
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10) as r:
return r.status, json.loads(r.read().decode() or "{}")
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
try:
return e.code, json.loads(e.read().decode() or "{}")
except Exception:
return e.code, {}
def start(port, db_path, fake, required_group=""):
env = dict(os.environ)
env["DATABASE_URL"] = "sqlite:///" + db_path.replace("\\", "/")
env["AUTH_SECRET_KEY"] = "ldap-auth-check-not-for-production"
env["WP_LDAP_FAKE_DIRECTORY"] = json.dumps(fake)
if required_group:
env["LDAP_REQUIRED_GROUP"] = required_group
else:
env.pop("LDAP_REQUIRED_GROUP", None)
proc = subprocess.Popen(
[sys.executable, "-m", "uvicorn", "server.app:app", "--host", "127.0.0.1",
"--port", str(port), "--log-level", "warning"],
env=env, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, cwd=ROOT)
for _ in range(160):
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}/api/health", timeout=1):
return proc
except Exception:
if proc.poll() is not None:
return None
time.sleep(0.25)
proc.kill()
return None
def users_in(db_path):
"""Read the users table straight out of the given file.
Deliberately NOT via server.db.SessionLocal: that engine is bound from
DATABASE_URL when the module is first imported, so setting the env var later
keeps reading whichever database was configured first. Two assertions in this
file passed against the wrong file before that was noticed.
"""
import sqlite3
con = sqlite3.connect(db_path)
try:
try:
return {r[0]: r[1] for r in con.execute("select username, role from users")}
except sqlite3.OperationalError:
return {} # no users table yet
finally:
con.close()
def main():
print("1. the guards that do not need a server")
os.environ["DATABASE_URL"] = "sqlite:///./_ldapcheck_unit.db"
os.environ["WP_LDAP_FAKE_DIRECTORY"] = json.dumps(
{"root": {"password": PW, "groups": [GROUP]}})
from server import ldap_auth
# 1 — the anonymous-bind guard. Connection is nulled so ANY call to bind()
# would raise: this proves the guard returns before the transport is touched,
# rather than merely that the result is a failure.
saved, ldap_auth.Connection = ldap_auth.Connection, None
try:
for label, u, p in [("an empty password", "root", ""),
("a whitespace-only password", "root", " "),
("an empty username", "", PW)]:
r = ldap_auth.verify(u, p, required_group="")
chk(f"{label} is refused without reaching bind()",
(not r.ok) and r.reason == ldap_auth.EMPTY_INPUT, r.reason)
finally:
ldap_auth.Connection = saved
# 2 — TLS configuration.
tls = ldap_auth._tls()
chk("TLS validate is CERT_REQUIRED", tls.validate == ssl.CERT_REQUIRED, tls.validate)
chk("...with an explicit CA file, not the system store",
bool(tls.ca_certs_file) and os.path.isfile(tls.ca_certs_file), tls.ca_certs_file)
src = open(os.path.join(ROOT, "server", "ldap_auth.py"), encoding="utf-8").read()
# Parse the module rather than grep it: the docstring names validate=ssl.CERT_NONE
# in order to explain why it must never be used, and a text search cannot tell
# that apart from an actual call. Walk every keyword argument called `validate`
# and check what it is really set to.
import ast as _ast
bad = []
for node in _ast.walk(_ast.parse(src)):
if isinstance(node, _ast.Call):
for kw in node.keywords:
if kw.arg == "validate":
name = (kw.value.attr if isinstance(kw.value, _ast.Attribute)
else getattr(kw.value, "id", ""))
if name != "CERT_REQUIRED":
bad.append(f"line {node.lineno}: validate={name or '?'}")
chk("every validate= in the module is CERT_REQUIRED (AST, not grep)",
not bad, "; ".join(bad))
# 3 — nested groups. The fake cannot model AD nesting (it is a string list), so
# what is asserted is that the REAL path builds AD's transitive matching rule
# into its filter. A test that truly exercises nesting needs a real directory.
chk("membership uses AD's nested matching rule, not plain memberOf",
ldap_auth.NESTED_MEMBER_RULE == "1.2.840.113556.1.4.1941"
and "memberOf:{NESTED_MEMBER_RULE}:=" in src,
"the transitive matching rule is not in the search filter")
# 4 — the production guard on the fake, in a subprocess because DATABASE_URL is
# read at import time.
out = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, "-c",
"from server import ldap_fake; print(ldap_fake.is_active())"],
cwd=ROOT, capture_output=True, text=True,
env={**os.environ,
"DATABASE_URL": "postgresql+psycopg://u:p@localhost:5432/db",
"AUTH_SECRET_KEY": "x",
"WP_LDAP_FAKE_DIRECTORY": json.dumps({"root": {"password": PW}})})
chk("the fake directory REFUSES to work against a non-SQLite database",
out.stdout.strip() == "False", out.stdout.strip() or out.stderr[-200:])
print("\n2. sign-in, against a server")
db_fd, db_path = tempfile.mkstemp(suffix=".db"); os.close(db_fd)
port = free_port()
fake = {"root": {"password": PW, "mail": "root@example.test",
"full_name": "Root Person", "groups": [GROUP]},
"outsider": {"password": PW, "mail": "outsider@example.test",
"full_name": "Out Sider", "groups": ["SomeOtherGroup"]}}
server = start(port, db_path, fake, required_group=GROUP)
if server is None:
print("the test server would not start.")
return 2
base = f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}"
try:
st, _ = post(base, "/api/auth/login", {"username": "root", "password": PW})
chk("a correct password signs in", st == 200, st)
chk("...and provisioned the account at project_user",
users_in(db_path).get("root") == "project_user", users_in(db_path))
st, body = post(base, "/api/auth/login", {"username": "root", "password": "wrong-" + PW})
chk("a wrong password is refused", st == 401, st)
chk("...with a message that does not say why",
"password" in (body.get("detail") or "").lower()
and "expired" not in (body.get("detail") or "").lower(), body)
st, _ = post(base, "/api/auth/login", {"username": "root", "password": ""})
chk("a blank password is refused at the endpoint too", st == 401, st)
before = set(users_in(db_path))
st, _ = post(base, "/api/auth/login", {"username": "outsider", "password": PW})
chk("a correct password OUTSIDE the required group is refused", st == 401, st)
chk("...and no account was created for them",
set(users_in(db_path)) == before, set(users_in(db_path)) - before)
st, _ = post(base, "/api/auth/login", {"username": "nobody", "password": PW})
chk("an unknown account is refused and creates nothing",
st == 401 and "nobody" not in users_in(db_path), st)
finally:
server.kill()
try:
server.wait(timeout=10)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
pass
print("")
print("4. local state overrides the directory, and the throttle protects it")
db_fd3, db3 = tempfile.mkstemp(suffix=".db"); os.close(db_fd3)
import sqlalchemy as _sa0
from server.db import Base as _B0
from server import models as _m0 # noqa: F401
eng0 = _sa0.create_engine("sqlite:///" + db3.replace("\\", "/"))
_B0.metadata.create_all(bind=eng0)
with eng0.begin() as con:
con.execute(_sa0.text(
"insert into users (id,username,email,full_name,role,is_active,"
"failed_attempts,token_version,project_role,locale,timezone,"
"auto_add_projects,auto_add_role,created_at,updated_at) values "
"('user_root','root','','Root','project_user',0,0,0,'','','',0,'',"
"datetime('now'),datetime('now'))")) # is_active = 0
eng0.dispose()
port3 = free_port()
server3 = start(port3, db3, fake, required_group=GROUP)
if server3 is None:
print("the third test server would not start.")
return 2
b3 = f"http://127.0.0.1:{port3}"
try:
st, _ = post(b3, "/api/auth/login", {"username": "root", "password": PW})
chk("a disabled local account is refused even though the bind succeeds",
st == 403, st)
# The throttle. AUTH_MAX_ATTEMPTS is 2, and its whole purpose is that failures
# are real domain binds counting against the AD lockout policy — so it has to
# stop CALLING the directory, not merely refuse. Proving that: burn the budget
# with wrong passwords, then present the CORRECT one. A 429 for a credential
# that would otherwise succeed is only possible if the throttle runs before the
# directory is consulted.
codes = [post(b3, "/api/auth/login",
{"username": "outsider", "password": "wrong"})[0] for _ in range(3)]
chk("the attempt budget is spent and the next try is throttled",
codes[-1] == 429, codes)
st, _ = post(b3, "/api/auth/login", {"username": "outsider", "password": PW})
chk("...and a CORRECT password is still refused while throttled, proving the "
"directory is never reached", st == 429, st)
chk("...while another account is unaffected (the budget is per-username)",
post(b3, "/api/auth/login", {"username": "root", "password": PW})[0] == 403, "")
finally:
server3.kill()
try:
server3.wait(timeout=10)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
pass
print("\n3. an existing admin survives the switch")
db_fd2, db2 = tempfile.mkstemp(suffix=".db"); os.close(db_fd2)
# Build the schema with a NEW engine bound to this file — see users_in().
import sqlalchemy as _sa
from server.db import Base
from server import models # noqa: F401
eng2 = _sa.create_engine("sqlite:///" + db2.replace("\\", "/"))
Base.metadata.create_all(bind=eng2)
with eng2.begin() as con:
con.execute(_sa.text(
"insert into users (id,username,email,full_name,role,is_active,"
"failed_attempts,token_version,project_role,locale,timezone,"
"auto_add_projects,auto_add_role,created_at,updated_at) values "
"('user_root','root','','Set By Hand','admin',1,0,0,'','','',0,'',"
"datetime('now'),datetime('now'))"))
eng2.dispose()
port2 = free_port()
server2 = start(port2, db2, fake, required_group=GROUP)
if server2 is None:
print("the second test server would not start.")
return 2
try:
st, body = post(f"http://127.0.0.1:{port2}", "/api/auth/login",
{"username": "root", "password": PW})
chk("the pre-existing admin signs in", st == 200, st)
chk("...and is STILL an admin (D13 criterion 4)",
users_in(db2).get("root") == "admin", users_in(db2))
chk("...and their locally-set name was not overwritten by the directory",
(body.get("user") or {}).get("full_name") == "Set By Hand", body.get("user"))
chk("...and no duplicate account appeared",
len(users_in(db2)) == 1, users_in(db2))
finally:
server2.kill()
try:
server2.wait(timeout=10)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
pass
print("\n" + "-" * 54)
print(f"{len(_PASS)}/{len(_PASS) + len(_FAIL)} checks passed.")
for f in _FAIL:
print(" - " + f)
return 1 if _FAIL else 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
try:
sys.exit(main())
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
print(f"could not run: {type(exc).__name__}: {exc}")
sys.exit(2)