server/app.py: login() now calls ldap_auth.verify(). No password is read from the database on this path any more; the column is still there and unused until T10.3 drops it, which keeps this commit revertible on its own. THE THROTTLE IS THE POINT OF THIS COMMIT, not the bind. AUTH_MAX_ATTEMPTS defaulted to 5, which is exactly this estate's AD lockout threshold. Failures are now domain binds, and the API runs 2 gunicorn workers, so that default would have let up to 10 binds reach a DC - locking the account out of Windows twice over before the app's own lockout engaged. Anyone could have done it to anyone, unauthenticated, from the login form. Now 2, so the worst case is 4 against a threshold of 5, with the arithmetic written down at the constant so the next person to raise it sees the constraint. The persistent counter on `users` cannot cover this alone: under D13 accounts are created on first login, so a real domain account can be attacked before it has a local row. Added a username-keyed pre-account window for exactly that gap - keyed by username rather than client IP, because it is the domain account being protected, not this endpoint's capacity, and IP rotation would walk straight past an IP-keyed limit. Both throttles are checked BEFORE the directory is touched. 503 is now distinct from 401. LDAP unconfigured, unreachable, untrusted, or a required group that does not resolve are OUR faults and return 503, because D13 left no password fallback: reporting "invalid username or password" would send people hunting for a password they no longer have while the real problem is a broken deploy. A rejected credential and a missing group membership both stay a single generic 401 - the useful detail goes to the log, never the response, so account existence is not disclosed. Also added a logger to app.py, which had none. An earlier draft of this commit called log.warning() in a module where `log` was undefined; compileall does not catch a NameError, so it would have surfaced as a 500 on the first failed sign-in. Named wpsuite.api to match wpsuite.auth / .ldap / .notify. Verified: app imports, the route is registered, LOGIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS is 2. An authenticated user with no local row is refused with 403 until T10.4 adds provisioning - deliberately explicit rather than silently admitted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Work Package Suite API
A small Python (FastAPI) service that stores project SOPs, Work Packages,
and comments in PostgreSQL. NGINX serves the static site and proxies /api/
to this service.
browser → NGINX ──serves──> static site (index.html, …)
└─proxy /api/─> api container (:8000) → db container (postgres)
Endpoints
| Method | Path | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| GET | /api/health |
liveness check (unauthenticated) |
| POST | /api/auth/login |
sign in ({username, password}) — sets the session cookie |
| POST | /api/auth/logout |
clear the session cookie |
| GET | /api/auth/me |
the logged-in user |
| POST | /api/auth/password |
change your own password |
| GET | /api/auth/users |
list accounts (admin) |
| POST | /api/auth/users |
create an account (admin) |
| DELETE | /api/auth/users/{id} |
delete an account (admin) |
| POST | /api/sops |
create/update a SOP (upsert by id) |
| GET | /api/sops |
list SOP summaries |
| GET | /api/sops/latest?complete=true |
most recent (complete) SOP |
| GET | /api/sops/{id} |
full SOP document |
| DELETE | /api/sops/{id} |
delete a SOP |
| POST | /api/wps |
create/update a Work Package (upsert by id) |
| GET | /api/wps?sop_id=… |
list WPs (optionally for one SOP) |
| GET | /api/wps/{id} |
full WP document |
| DELETE | /api/wps/{id} |
delete a WP |
| POST | /api/comments (and /api/feedback) |
add a comment |
| GET | /api/comments?source=&sop_id=&wp_id=&step= |
list comments |
Interactive docs once running: /api/docs.
The full client document is stored in each row's data (JSON) column; common
fields (name, number, status, …) are promoted to columns for listing/filtering.
Login portal (user accounts)
The suite is gated by a username/password login. Sign-in issues a signed JWT
that rides in an HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax cookie (wp_session); the cookie is
marked Secure automatically whenever the request arrives over HTTPS (via
NGINX's X-Forwarded-Proto). There is no server-side session store — each
request is validated by checking the cookie's signature and expiry.
The real security boundary is the API: every /api/ data route is refused
with 401 unless a valid session cookie is present (see auth_gate in
app.py). The static pages additionally include auth-guard.js, which redirects
to login.html when there's no session — that's for UX, not protection.
Passwords are stored only as bcrypt hashes (server/auth.py). Roles are
admin (may manage users) and user.
Set the signing secret
Add AUTH_SECRET_KEY to .env (see .env.example). Required in production —
without it the API uses a random per-process key, so logins reset on restart.
python -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(48))"
Create the first admin
The /api/auth/users endpoint needs an existing admin, so bootstrap one from a
shell (run from the project root, like uvicorn):
python -m server.manage_users create-admin alice --name "Alice Smith"
# prompts for a password (min 8 chars)
In Docker:
docker compose exec api python -m server.manage_users create-admin alice --name "Alice Smith"
Other commands: create <user> --role user, list, reset-password <user>,
disable <user>, enable <user>. After that, admins can add users through the
API (or you can keep using the CLI).
Local dev
cd server
python -m venv .venv && . .venv/bin/activate # Windows: .venv\Scripts\activate
pip install -r requirements.txt
# No DATABASE_URL → uses a local sqlite file, so you can start immediately:
uvicorn server.app:app --reload --port 8000 # run from the PROJECT ROOT
Then open http://localhost:8000/api/docs.
Run uvicorn/gunicorn from the project root (the folder that contains the
server/directory), because the import path isserver.app:app.
Production — Docker Compose
This is the recommended production setup. Three containers run in an isolated
internal network; only NGINX is exposed to the outside via the external proxy
network.
[external proxy network]
│
┌────▼────┐ internal network ┌──────────┐ ┌────────┐
│ nginx │ ───────────────────> │ api │ → │ db │
└─────────┘ └──────────┘ └────────┘
1. Create the credentials file
Create .env in the project root (same directory as docker-compose.yml).
This file is never committed — add it to .gitignore.
# .env — project root
POSTGRES_DB=wpsuite
POSTGRES_USER=wpsuite
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=<strong-random-password>
# Must match POSTGRES_* above; hostname is the compose service name "db"
DATABASE_URL=postgresql+psycopg://wpsuite:<strong-random-password>@db:5432/wpsuite
Generate a strong password:
openssl rand -base64 32
2. Add the Dockerfile
Create Dockerfile in the project root:
FROM python:3.12-slim
WORKDIR /app
COPY server/requirements.txt ./server/
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r server/requirements.txt
COPY server/ ./server/
EXPOSE 8000
CMD ["gunicorn", "-k", "uvicorn.workers.UvicornWorker", \
"-b", "0.0.0.0:8000", "--workers", "2", "server.app:app"]
3. Update the NGINX site config
The API is no longer at 127.0.0.1:8000 — it is the api container.
Update the /api/ proxy block in your nginx conf (e.g. nginx/conf.d/wp-suite.conf):
location /api/ {
proxy_pass http://api:8000; # ← service name, not localhost
proxy_http_version 1.1;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
client_max_body_size 5m;
}
4. docker-compose.yml
Replace your existing docker-compose.yml with:
services:
webserver:
image: nginx:alpine
container_name: nginx_webserver
volumes:
- ./html:/usr/share/nginx/html:ro
- ./nginx/conf.d:/etc/nginx/conf.d:ro
- ./nginx/nginx.conf:/etc/nginx/nginx.conf:ro
- ./logs:/var/log/nginx
restart: unless-stopped
depends_on:
api:
condition: service_started
networks:
- proxy # external — reachable by your reverse proxy / traefik
- internal # needs a path to the api container
api:
build: .
container_name: wp_api
env_file: .env # loads DATABASE_URL
restart: unless-stopped
depends_on:
db:
condition: service_healthy # waits for postgres to accept connections
networks:
- internal
db:
image: postgres:16-alpine
container_name: wp_db
env_file: .env # loads POSTGRES_DB / USER / PASSWORD
volumes:
- pgdata:/var/lib/postgresql/data
restart: unless-stopped
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U $${POSTGRES_USER} -d $${POSTGRES_DB}"]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
networks:
- internal
volumes:
pgdata:
networks:
proxy:
name: proxy
external: true
internal:
internal: true # no outbound internet access from api/db
5. First-time startup
# Build the api image and start all containers
docker compose up -d --build
# Confirm all three containers are running
docker compose ps
# Tail logs (Ctrl-C to stop following)
docker compose logs -f api
Tables are created automatically on first API startup — no manual CREATE TABLE
needed.
Authentication notes
Postgres → API authentication is handled entirely through DATABASE_URL in
.env. The db container uses POSTGRES_USER / POSTGRES_PASSWORD to
initialise the database on first run; the api container uses the matching
credentials in DATABASE_URL to connect. Neither credential ever appears in the
compose file itself.
Network isolation: the db container is on the internal network only —
it has no port exposed to the host and is unreachable from outside the compose
stack. Only the api container can open a connection to it.
Changing the password: update both POSTGRES_PASSWORD and the password
in DATABASE_URL in .env, then:
# Stop api first (db must keep running to accept the ALTER USER command)
docker compose stop api
docker compose exec db psql -U wpsuite -c "ALTER USER wpsuite PASSWORD 'new-password';"
docker compose start api
Day-to-day operations
# Rebuild api after a code change
docker compose up -d --build api
# View postgres data directly
docker compose exec db psql -U wpsuite -d wpsuite
# Take a database backup
docker compose exec db pg_dump -U wpsuite wpsuite > backup-$(date +%F).sql
# Restore from backup
docker compose exec -T db psql -U wpsuite -d wpsuite < backup-2025-01-01.sql
# Stop everything (data volume is preserved)
docker compose down
# Stop everything AND delete all data
docker compose down -v
Quick test
/api/health is open; data routes now require a session, so log in first and
reuse the cookie jar:
curl http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/health # {"ok":true} — no auth needed
# Sign in, saving the session cookie to a jar
curl -c jar.txt -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/auth/login \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"alice","password":"<password>"}'
# Reuse the cookie on protected routes
curl -b jar.txt http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/comments
Without the cookie, protected routes return 401 {"detail":"Not authenticated"}.
Or via the nginx proxy (replace with your hostname):
curl https://wp-suite.company.local/api/health