n.siegfried
39b48055ff
Brings the Work Package Suite from a browser-local prototype to a multi-tenant, SQL-backed deployment hardened for customer IP. Auth & access control - Local username/password login (bcrypt + JWT in an HttpOnly cookie), admin-managed users, per-project membership, and project-scoped API access. - Admin console: change user roles, view the audit trail, manage settings. Security hardening - CSP / HSTS / X-Frame-Options / nosniff headers in nginx; Secure cookie via X-Forwarded-Proto; CSRF Origin check; attribute-safe output escaping. - Login lockout, token_version session revocation, stronger password policy, fail-closed secret loading, encrypted (AES-256) database backups. Persistence & schema - SOPs and Work Packages are now DB-backed and shared across users, written through a durable client sync outbox that queues offline edits. - Alembic migrations applied automatically on container start. New capabilities - Phase 2 dashboard (progress, gating, pagination, archive). - Phase 3 PWA "Field View" with offline caching and auth fallback. - WP owner assignment with OPTIONAL email notifications, OFF by default and toggled from the admin console. SMTP password is read only from the SMTP_PASSWORD env var (never stored); emails carry a WP number + deep link, never customer IP. Also: IBM Carbon restyle, Help section, and DEPLOYMENT.md brought up to date. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
40 lines
1.9 KiB
Plaintext
40 lines
1.9 KiB
Plaintext
# Work Package Suite — NGINX site config
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# This container sits behind an external reverse proxy that handles SSL.
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# It listens on port 80 (plain HTTP on the internal Docker network).
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server {
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listen 80;
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server_name wp.controls.dev;
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root /usr/share/nginx/html;
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index index.html;
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# ── Security response headers (defense-in-depth) ─────────────────────────
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# CSP keeps 'unsafe-inline' for now because the app uses inline handlers/styles
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# heavily; even so, connect-src/img-src/object-src/base-uri/frame-ancestors
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# sharply limit what injected script could load or exfiltrate. Tighten toward
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# nonce-based scripts once inline handlers are refactored.
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add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
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add_header X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN" always;
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add_header Referrer-Policy "no-referrer" always;
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add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains" always;
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add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: blob:; font-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; form-action 'self'" always;
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location / {
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try_files $uri $uri/ =404;
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}
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# Proxy /api/ to the FastAPI container (service name "api" on the internal network)
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location /api/ {
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proxy_pass http://api:8000;
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proxy_http_version 1.1;
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proxy_set_header Host $host;
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proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $remote_addr;
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# This container is only ever reached via the TLS-terminating external
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# proxy, so the real client scheme is HTTPS. Hard-set it (a local $scheme
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# here is always "http") so the API marks the session cookie Secure.
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proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto https;
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client_max_body_size 5m;
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}
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}
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