New server/files_http.py; get_wp_file uses it.
- PDF and raster images (png, jpeg, gif, webp, bmp, avif) open inline,
as before; Cache-Control unchanged for the offline drawing cache.
- Every other type, SVG included, downloads as an attachment with
Content-Security-Policy: sandbox; default-src 'none'.
- SVG uploads stay accepted (decided 2026-10-02: accept, download only).
- Content-Disposition: ASCII fallback + RFC 5987 filename*, control
characters and quotes replaced. nosniff from the API too.
Security review SEC-01 (stored XSS through an SVG drawing) and SEC-15e
(non-Latin-1 names gave 500; CR/LF reached the header).
security_check.py D19: 20/20 total with D21. Against da1325c: 6 fails
(the findings); every inline/cache/access check passes on both.
67 lines
3.1 KiB
Python
67 lines
3.1 KiB
Python
"""Safe HTTP responses for uploaded drawings — D19 (T16.2).
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Security review 2026-10-01, SEC-01 and SEC-15e.
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WHY THIS EXISTS
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Uploads accept `image/*`, which includes `image/svg+xml`. An SVG is a
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document, not a picture: it can carry <script>. GET /api/files/{id} used to
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return every file `inline` with the uploader's content type, on the app's own
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origin, so a script inside an SVG ran as whoever opened the drawing - with
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their session, and with an admin's power if an admin opened it.
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The download name was built by hand with only `"` removed. A name outside
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Latin-1 (`Plan é.pdf`) made the header unencodable, so the download failed
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with 500; CR/LF in a name went into the header as typed.
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THE RULE (D19, decided 2026-10-02)
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* PDF and raster images open INLINE, exactly as before. That is what the
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creator's drawing list, the printed package and Field View link to
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(CR-007), and the offline drawing cache in sw.js stores.
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* Every other type, SVG included, is an ATTACHMENT inside a sandbox: the
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browser saves it instead of rendering it on our origin, and
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`Content-Security-Policy: sandbox` strips script and same-origin access
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even if someone opens the saved response directly.
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* SVG UPLOADS STAY ACCEPTED (decided: accept, download only). The fix is on
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the way out, so SVGs already in the database are covered too.
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* `Cache-Control` is unchanged - the offline drawing cache depends on it.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import re
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from urllib.parse import quote
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from fastapi.responses import Response
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# Formats a browser shows as inert pixels, or in its own PDF viewer.
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INLINE_SAFE_MIME = frozenset({
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"application/pdf",
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"image/png", "image/jpeg", "image/gif", "image/webp", "image/bmp", "image/avif",
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})
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# Control characters, and the characters that end or escape a quoted
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# header parameter. Replaced, never passed through.
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_UNSAFE_NAME = re.compile(r'[\x00-\x1f\x7f"\\;]')
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def content_disposition(disposition: str, name: str) -> str:
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"""A header value that is valid for ANY user-supplied file name: an ASCII
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fallback for old clients plus RFC 5987 `filename*` with the real name."""
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name = _UNSAFE_NAME.sub("_", name or "file").strip() or "file"
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ascii_name = name.encode("ascii", "replace").decode("ascii").replace("?", "_")
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return f"{disposition}; filename=\"{ascii_name}\"; filename*=UTF-8''{quote(name, safe='')}"
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def file_response(row) -> Response:
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"""The response for GET /api/files/{id}. `row` is a models.WpFile."""
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mime = (row.mime or "application/octet-stream").lower()
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headers = {
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"Cache-Control": "private, max-age=86400", # unchanged: sw.js caches drawings offline
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"X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff", # NGINX adds it too; the dev server did not
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}
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if mime in INLINE_SAFE_MIME:
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headers["Content-Disposition"] = content_disposition("inline", row.name)
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else:
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headers["Content-Disposition"] = content_disposition("attachment", row.name)
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headers["Content-Security-Policy"] = "sandbox; default-src 'none'"
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return Response(content=row.data, media_type=mime, headers=headers)
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