Nothing configures Python logging and gunicorn only configures its own loggers,
so INFO lines from wpsuite.* were dropped: with the production launch command a
healthy start printed no Okta lines, and an operator could not tell the sync was
off from on-and-quiet. okta_sync's logger now has its own stderr handler, only
when the root logger has none. Verified with real gunicorn, 2 workers, with and
without a token. Other modules' output is unchanged.
T13.1 shipped with its done-when list unchecked and no test of its own. Adds
tests/session_idle_check.py (28 checks): continuous activity survives 30 minutes
but not the ceiling, an idle session gets 401, the cookie is not rewritten per
request, a pre-D18 token still gets a ceiling via iat, identity carries forward,
both variables are documented. Mutation-tested (no throttle, no ceiling, a fresh
ceiling for legacy tokens each fail it).
Notes in wave-13.md: /api/auth/* is exempt from the refresh, and the wave exit
criteria say AUTH_SESSION_HOURS 2 while T13.1 and the code say 8.
No UI change. The existing Activity log card already renders a sync disable
legibly: system:okta_sync / user deprovisioned by sync / user / <name> /
okta_status: SUSPENDED|MISSING. tests/okta_sync_ui_check.py runs the real sync
on a throwaway database and reads the real page at 1440px and 390px (28/28):
rows, search, filter, no sideways scroll, no JS errors, and the disabled
account refused on its next request. Does not depend on CR-019's usage card.
A daemon timer thread starts from a new lifespan hook in app.py and calls the
T13.3 sync every OKTA_SYNC_INTERVAL_SECONDS (default 900, minimum 300). With no
OKTA_API_TOKEN it starts nothing and the startup log says so.
The api runs 2 gunicorn workers, so each starts its own timer. A single atomic
conditional UPDATE on one app_settings row (key okta_sync) is the gate: exactly
one worker wins each cycle, on SQLite and Postgres, with no lock held. The row
survives a restart, so a restart inside the interval starts no second run. A
fetch is now capped at 120 s in total, so a run is always shorter than the
minimum interval and cannot overlap the next. No migration needed.
docker-compose.yml passes OKTA_API_TOKEN, OKTA_ORG_URL,
OKTA_SYNC_PROFILE_ATTRIBUTE and OKTA_SYNC_INTERVAL_SECONDS to the api service.
tests/okta_sync_schedule_check.py: 38 checks including an 8-worker race on a
file database (exactly one winner, 16 rounds) and fail-closed through the
scheduled path. okta_auth_check.py still 22/22.
run_sync() compares the Okta user list (T13.2) to active local accounts and
disables the ones Okta no longer vouches for. One AuditLog row per change,
actor system:okta_sync, action user_deprovisioned_by_sync.
Fail closed: any exception from the fetch, an empty or untrusted answer, or a
failed save changes nothing and writes nothing. The fetch runs before the
database is read, so a failed fetch has no path to a change. It only ever
disables; an already-disabled account is untouched and gets no new row.
Decided with Matt 2026-10-16: disable on missing, SUSPENDED or DEPROVISIONED.
PASSWORD_EXPIRED, LOCKED_OUT and RECOVERY do not disable (the job never
re-enables, so a literal "not ACTIVE" would lock people out for good).
Added a guard: no match between any active local account and any Okta user is
refused as a wrong identity attribute, not read as a mass offboarding.
tests/okta_sync_job_check.py: 71 checks; removing the fail-closed branch and the
guard fails 28 of them. BL-069 logs the missing per-run cap.
New server/okta_sync.py: lists every Okta user and status with its own
read-only credential (OKTA_API_TOKEN, SSWS), separate from the OIDC client.
Follows pagination. Every failure raises OktaSyncError; an error is never an
empty list, because T13.3 reads an empty list as "nobody is active".
Also refuses: a next-page link to another host (token never leaves the org),
a redirect, a chain over 50 pages (a cut-off list looks like missing users),
a bad item among good ones (never skipped), and an empty list.
tests/okta_sync_check.py: 52 checks, self-contained (httpx MockTransport).
Not wired into app.py yet. T13.3 uses it; T13.4 starts it on a schedule.
Matt reran tests/browser_check.py on the re-pointed probe: all
passed. Every T12 done-when and every wave 12 exit criterion is now
checked in wave-12.md.
files_check.py 36/36 (T16.2), sample_check.py 10/10 and
critical_reopen_check.py 11/11 (T16.3), run on Matt's machine with
Edge 154. T16.2 and T16.3 done; wave 16 verification complete.
tests/cdp.py: every probe first failed 'exited rc=0 without binding
the port'. The shell was elevated; Edge and Chrome de-elevate by
relaunching through Explorer and the relaunch drops the debugging
port ('Edge is running elevated: 1' in the browser log). Adds
--do-not-de-elevate on Windows and a 15 s grace for the port after an
rc=0 exit. Both inert on a normal shell and off Windows.
(cherry picked from commit f752ae3677)
security_check.py 36/36 (da1325c: 20/36, the 16 failures are the
findings). sec_probe.py: only S3 and S12 change. equivalence_check
IDENTICAL vs da1325c (canonical SOP id in the scenario). Smoke test
27/27. pip-audit clean.
Open: files_check.py (T16.2), sample_check.py and
critical_reopen_check.py (T16.3) need a machine with Edge; those two
tasks stay not-done until they pass.
(cherry picked from commit f0750212ca)
D19 - uploaded files download safely (SEC-01, SEC-15e)
D20 - one SOP per project (SEC-02)
D21 - session decode fails closed, PyJWT 2.15.1 (SEC-07)
From the security review of 2026-10-01. Decision record and task
breakdown only in this commit - no code yet.
(cherry picked from commit 1c221a122e)
Matt's run (Edge/Chrome, one at a time): bulk_users_ui_check 19/19,
console_dialogs_check 16/16, mobile_check 24/24, a11y_check 22/22.
browser_check 67/71: its four failures asserted column POSITIONS
(9 columns; r.cells[3]/[4] for Permissions/Project role). CR-020's
selection column comes first, so those read Username and Email. The
probe now expects 10 columns with the selection column first, finds
the cells by header name, and checks your own row has no selection
box. Verified on the real page in the DOM harness; rerun to close.
After-screenshots committed in docs/reference/baseline/wave-12/.
BL-061 logged: the pre-existing sync badge covers a control for ~2 s
after load (pointer-events:none, so never blocks a click); belongs
with wave 14's badge work.
- tests/bulk_users_ui_check.py (new): selection, keyboard Space on a
row box, toolbar role change, super-user CSV with good and bad lines,
add-to-project with a role, typed DELETE, all end to end against a
real server; 390px bar layout; writes after-screenshots to
docs/reference/baseline/wave-12/. Needs a browser: to be run on
Matt's machine.
- tests/cdp.py: --do-not-de-elevate and the rc=0 grace, the same
change as wave 16 T16.4 (identical content, merges cleanly), so the
probes start from an elevated shell on this branch too.
- Verification record in wave-12.md: bulk_users_check 61/61 (main
7/18), single-user routes identical before/after on 16 calls, DOM
harness 48/48, jsdom against a real server 13/13, smoke 27/27,
seed_demo OK. Server-checkable done-when boxes ticked; the browser,
screenshot and full-suite boxes stay open until run on Edge.
- BL-060 logged: a super user's refusal reason promises a project
access change neither the dialog nor the bulk route allows. Needs
Nick; not fixed here (scope).
- file-map.md: wave 12's two new checks.
Brings docs/waves/wave-12.md and decisions-2026-09-17.md across from
feat/waves-11-13 (planning docs only, no wave 11 or 13 code), so the
PR into main is wave 12 alone.
Confirmed 2026-10-06 by Matt Mabrey: typed DELETE for bulk delete;
project assignment is add/remove per project; changing the filter
clears the selection; the CSV holds usernames only.
Removes the old "Usage logs" card from admin.html/admin.js (the
usage-admin panel + loadUsage(), D5/T7.10) now that T11.5's real,
server-side Activity & usage card exists and reads real per-user data
instead of per-browser localStorage.
wp-usage.js is deleted outright, along with its three <script> includes
(admin.html, wp-creation-index.html, work-package-suite.html) - it had
no reader left once the panel above it was removed (the "download the
full event log" button lived only in that panel), and per the original
CR-019 decision record it was never reliably tied to a real identity,
so it was never a candidate data source for the new report either.
Its two call sites (wp-creation-app.js, work-package-suite-app.js) keep
a local track() function as a documented no-op rather than having each
of their ~45 individual track('event', ...) call sites deleted one at a
time - that would be a much larger, riskier diff for the same outcome
(no data is recorded either way), and each call site still marks what
was worth recording if usage analytics are ever rebuilt server-side.
work-package-suite-app.js's dwell-timer plumbing (_stepEnter /
trackStepDwell), which only ever fed track(), was left in place for the
same reason: inert, not broken.
Also removes tests/usage_check.py, which tested exactly the retired
feature, and updates its line in docs/reference/file-map.md to point at
the 2026-09-17 decision record instead.
Verified:
- grep across the whole repo for WPUsage / wp-usage.js / usage-admin /
usage_check: no live references remain, only explanatory comments
and planning docs (decisions-2026-09-17.md, wave-11.md) that
describe the removal itself
- node --check on all three touched .js files: no syntax errors
- full backend smoke test (27/27) and seed_demo.py still pass
- tests/baseline_shots.py --pages admin,creator,sop at 390px/1440px,
run locally: all three pages render with no new JS errors (the one
"beforeunload" log line on sop/creator at 1440px is pre-existing
harness noise from wp-autosave.js's unsaved-work guard, unrelated
to this change) and no horizontal overflow; refreshed baseline
screenshots committed alongside this change
Matt asked whether idle time would be a better fit than a flat session
length. It is, but idle-alone weakens D18's own purpose - a continuously
active session would never force a fresh Okta recheck on its own. Decided:
both. AUTH_IDLE_MINUTES (new, default 30) slides the session on activity;
AUTH_SESSION_HOURS (existing var, meaning changes to an absolute ceiling,
default 12 -> proposed 8) caps it regardless of activity.
Docs only in this commit - implementation is T13.1, next.
CR-019 - usage/activity metrics (admin console), wave 11
CR-020 - bulk editing of users, wave 12
D18 - Okta/AD deprovisioning detection and auto-disable, wave 13
Raised by Matt Mabrey 2026-09-17. Decision record and task breakdowns
only in this commit - no feature code yet.
Confirmed by an actual live Okta sign-in after main (cc64c88) deployed: preferred_username is the right identity claim, and the redirect URI works. Matt matched his existing pre-Okta admin account rather than getting JIT-provisioned as a duplicate. Two deploy-time snags recorded, both Case B (config, not data): OKTA_CLIENT_ID/SECRET/ISSUER left empty in Portainer at first (caught cleanly by is_configured()), then OKTA_ISSUER missing its https:// scheme (surfaced as httpx.UnsupportedProtocol, not a deliberate app error - BL-028 still stands). Neither needed the backup. BTG pilot group now includes Cody and Cameron, awaiting Adrian.
cmd_promote() changed a user's role with no audit trail, unlike the
identical change from the web Admin Console (set_user_role() ->
log_event(), action "role_changed"). Not a new privilege - anyone
with container-exec access already has DB access directly, D16's own
trust-tier reasoning - but there was no record of who ran it or what
changed.
Now writes an AuditLog row matching set_user_role()'s shape, tagged
via:cli (mirrors JIT provisioning's via:okta_jit) since a container
shell exec carries no signed-in identity to attribute the change to.
Verified against a scratch SQLite db: audit row lands correctly, role
change persists, the no-such-user refusal still exits 1 clean.
Walked T10.1-T10.5's claims against the actual code (env vars, routes,
JIT provisioning, the password-removal sweep, login.html) rather than
re-trusting this file's own prose. No drift found.
Full suite via the Docker runner: 39/41 files clean. token_check.py's
exit 2 is a harness mismatch (needs --out/--compare, not a bare run),
not a failure. generalinfo_check.py is 48/49 - the one failure is a
pre-existing rgba() shadow literal from the D11 Micron-assets merge,
confirmed via git show HEAD to predate this wave; logged as BL-031,
not fixed here. okta_auth_check.py re-run fresh: 22/22.
390px/1440px: baseline_shots.py captured all fourteen shots. Visually
confirmed login.html and users.html show the Okta-only sign-in and the
password-free admin UI at both widths.
Wave 10 complete.
New DEPLOY-runbook-2026-09-03.md, separate from the 2026-08-04 runbook.
Names the five new OKTA_* env vars, treats the pre-deploy backup as the
only way back once 1d60a608bb51 (drop_local_password) commits since its
downgrade() restores the column but not the data, and splits Rollback
into the fixable case (Okta app integration misconfigured, fix and
redeploy api, no data at risk) versus the severe case (abandoning Okta
for local-password code, which only a destructive backup restore can
reach). States D16's no-break-glass posture plainly.
D17 records the decision and why: staged-deploy-sequence docs and
backlog-only were both considered and declined in favor of the runbook.
Logged to backlog.md rather than fixed here: okta_auth.describe() has
no caller (BL-028), users.failed_attempts/locked_until are vestigial
(BL-029), DEPLOY-login-portal.md is fully stale (BL-030).
url_state_check.py and browser_check.py both need a real headless browser via
tests/cdp.py, which the dev sandbox T10.7 was built in does not have and
cannot install (no sudo, network egress allowlisted against every route tried
- apt, a user-space Playwright Chromium download, Docker Hub). Documented as
an open gap in that commit rather than claimed as done.
Run for real since, on a machine with Docker, through a small general-purpose
tool kept deliberately outside this repo (headless-py-test-runner - it has no
idea what repo it is pointed at, so it does not belong in a Work Package Suite
PR). url_state_check.py 26/26, including scenario 2's actual click-through of
the fake-Okta round trip this task built; browser_check.py 71/71. Gap closed -
wave-10.md now says so instead of leaving the question open.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Only two calls actually touch the network: Authlib's authorize_redirect and
authorize_access_token. server/okta_fake.py stands in for both, dispatched from
okta_auth._build_oauth() before the real Okta config is even considered, and
production-refusing the same way ldap_fake.is_active() does - a non-SQLite
DATABASE_URL means production, full stop, no matter what WP_OKTA_FAKE_DIRECTORY
says. Everything this app itself decides stays real: the ?next= open-redirect
guard, the disabled-account check, JIT provisioning, and which claim carries
identity all run unmodified in app.py's okta_login()/okta_callback().
The fake needed one thing ldap_fake.py never did: something to actually redirect
the browser to and back, since Okta's real flow leaves the site and LDAP's never
did. Two routes stand in for Okta's own sign-in screen - a plain picker listing
whatever WP_OKTA_FAKE_DIRECTORY defines, and a consent step that hands back an
authorization code (or an error) at okta_callback, exactly the shape a real Okta
redirect would carry. Both are registered in app.py only when the fake is active
at import time, so in production they do not exist at all, not merely refuse a
request - confirmed by starting the app with the env var unset and checking
app.routes directly.
tests/browser_check.py's start_server() takes an optional extra_env now (no
existing caller passes a third positional arg, so none of the ~40 files that
import it needed touching) and sets WP_OKTA_FAKE_DIRECTORY unconditionally,
same reasoning the LDAP predecessor used: almost nothing signs in (seed() mints
tokens directly), but the one check that does should not fail mysteriously.
tests/url_state_check.py scenario 2, SKIPPED since T10.4, is un-skipped and now
drives the real round trip: login.html's own button, the fake picker page, the
fake consent redirect, okta_callback(). Carries forward the LDAP predecessor's
own bug fix too - asserting the app actually LEFT login.html, not just that
wp-creation-index.html appears somewhere in the URL (which the ?next= parameter
alone would satisfy).
tests/okta_auth_check.py is new, mirroring ldap_auth_check.py's two-layer shape:
guards that need no server (the production refusal, single-use/replay on the
authorization code), then a real running app for sign-in itself - an existing
admin surviving unchanged, JIT provisioning at the lowest role, a disabled
account refused despite Okta approving it, an unsolicited callback hit refused
without a 500, a tampered state refused, a denied consent refused, an unknown
identity refused BY THE SERVER (not just absent from the picker), a same-site
next= surviving and an off-site one ignored, and OKTA_IDENTITY_CLAIM genuinely
working under a non-default claim name. 22/22.
One thing this could not verify in this environment: url_state_check.py and
browser_check.py both need a headless Edge/Chrome via cdp.py, and this sandbox
has neither installed and no way to install one (no sudo). Confirmed the failure
is the tests' own designed-for exit 2 ("no headless-capable browser found; set
WP_BROWSER"), not a crash, and separately confirmed start_server() itself boots
cleanly with the fake wired in - health check, the picker page rendering with
the seeded identities, login.html all responding correctly - so the only gap is
the DOM-level click-through, not the server-side mechanism url_state_check
exercises (which okta_auth_check.py covers directly via HTTP instead).
wave-10.md's T10.7 bullet records the shape of what got built and the 22/22
result.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Decision, raised during T10.4 hazard review:
- Admin bootstrap: manage_users.py moves from creating an admin account to
promoting an existing one, by username, on a row Okta's JIT provisioning
(T10.3) already created. Rejected blind account creation — the exact
OKTA_IDENTITY_CLAIM format is still unconfirmed by security, and a
hand-typed username that doesn't match it produces an orphaned second
account instead of promoting the real one. Ongoing (non-bootstrap) admin
naming needs no new work: html/users.js's existing role dropdown already
handles it.
- Break glass: none, by design, matching the precedent already on record
for the abandoned LDAPS design (D13/D14) rather than assumed to carry
over untested. If Okta is unreachable, the app is unreachable for
everyone until Okta is restored. Rejected a toggleable emergency local
login — it would reintroduce the stored credential D15 exists to
eliminate.
Also corrects T10.4's scope in wave-10.md: hazard review found real call
sites of hash_password/verify_password/password_problem the original
bullet didn't name (create_user(), admin_reset_password(), users.js's
admin forms, browser_check.py/launcher_check.py fixtures), plus a
verification-gate ordering problem (smoketest.py and seed_demo.py
authenticate via POST /api/auth/login, which T10.4 removes, and both are
named explicitly in CLAUDE.md's verification section). Fixed by having
T10.4 switch both scripts to mint a session with auth.create_token()
directly, the same technique browser_check.py already uses, rather than
waiting on T10.7.
D16
Nick's real location list hit the production import and got 'Internal Server
Error' with no line number - BL-027's class again, three days after the
migration outage: Postgres enforces VARCHAR lengths and refuses control
bytes, SQLite shrugs at both, and the importers were only ever rehearsed on
SQLite. Reproduced both hazards locally (an over-long value and a NUL byte
import cleanly on SQLite; either 500s Postgres wholesale).
Both importers now validate per row, before any INSERT, so every dialect
answers the same way - with the line number and a reason:
- locations: control characters; names over 200; codes over 60; combined
paths over 200 (checked where the path exists, with read-counts taken
before the loop so a mid-loop rejection is not counted twice)
- materials: control characters; description/unit/code over 300/20/80
And the client stops lying about it: wp-list-import.js read every response
with r.json(), so a plain-text 500 threw mid-parse and surfaced as 'Could not
reach the server' while the server was answering fine. One tolerant reader
(text -> parse if it parses -> keep status) now serves import, add and patch;
a real error reads 'Import refused - HTTP 500'.
Pins: materials_check +2 (over-long and control-byte rows reject at line,
20/20), locations_check +1 (over-long name rejects at line, 59/59).
Items: CR-005, D6, BL-027 (second instance of its class; the probe-side
dialect guard it proposes is still open).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
BL-026: no version stamp - 'is live current?' took mid-outage fingerprinting;
the fix shape is a git SHA baked at build, served by /api/health, shown on
the admin diagnostics card (D13 candidate).
BL-027: migrations rehearsed on SQLite only - the dialect drift class behind
the outage stays unguarded beyond the one pinned instance; the fix shape is
an offline postgresql-dialect render in the runbook and/or a probe.
Items: backlog only, no code.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The housekeeping list carried S13 ('seed_demo.py does not sign in') from
completion.md and CLAUDE.md. It is not true and has not been since wave 1:
T1.6 (357712e) rewired seed_demo.py onto smoketest's opener - one cookie jar,
one login flow - and the file's own docstring says so. What actually happened:
the wave-1 exit checkbox was never ticked, and every later document inherited
the unticked box as fact.
Verified live before correcting anything, per the working rules: against a
throwaway server, seed_demo.py signs in as an admin, seeds the DEMO project
(7+ packages visible via the API), and --clean removes it, exit 0 both ways.
Corrected: the wave-1 exit box (ticked, with the reason), completion.md's S13
row (open -> built at T1.6, records error named), and CLAUDE.md's
verification step 4, which taught every future session the stale claim.
Item: S13 (closed as already-built; records corrected).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
help.js's search-focus ring was rgba(37,99,214,.15) - the banned #2563d6 as a
space-free rgb triple, which slid past color_check's spaced grep ('37, 99,
214') from the day BL-008 removed the colour. C4's recorded exception
legitimately allows rgba ALPHAS as opacity recipes; the defect was the base
colour under the alpha. Rebased onto THE blue: rgba(15,98,254,.15).
color_check compares space-free and case-insensitive now, in both the theme
check and the consumer sweep, so no spelling of the dead blue can return.
Items: BL-025 (closed), C4, BL-008 lineage.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
S1 counted 79 native dialogs app-wide and its tasks removed 58; the audit
found the rest on surfaces no S1 task named: admin.js (6), users.js (10), the
launcher's inline script (5). All 21 now go through wp-dialog.js - the T7.9
kit extracted as a self-injecting shared component: markup and styles land on
first use, styles are theme tokens only with its own wp-dlg-* class names (the
consoles' existing .modal styles are untouched), 44px targets on coarse
pointers, and the whole file is guarded so the creator's inline copy - which
owns the same-id markup in its HTML - still wins on its own page. The kit's
toast comes along (S10 role rules), since none of the three pages had one.
Conversion follows the T7.9 precedent: confirms -> wpConfirmDialog with named
ok-labels, the password prompt -> wpPromptDialog whose validate() finally
enforces min-12 AT the input (it was label-text-only before, server-enforced),
API failures with detail -> wpAlertDialog, small info/validation messages ->
the announced toast.
New probe console_dialogs_check (17): counts pinned at 0, kit guarded and
loaded by all three pages, and the users console driven live with natives
poisoned - reset a password end to end (short refused inline, good one accepted
by the server and announced), cancel a delete and prove nothing died.
Items: BL-024 (closed), S1 completed to zero app-wide, C1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
project_sop_team() read sop.data['project']; pushSOP stores every row as
data={sop, state}, so the project block is one level deeper. The lookup
returned [] for every real row, silently, and the on-hold email promised to
'Owner + PM + CM + distribution' has reached only owner + distribution since
the day it shipped. One line: the same nested-first tolerant read
project_qa_group has used all along (whose docstring logged this very bug).
New probe critical_reopen_check (11): the fixture writes the PRODUCTION shape
- a hand-built flat row would have passed against the bug, which is exactly
how it went unverified this long. Sink-verified end to end: assignee + PM +
CM and nobody else; constraint name, title, location, deep link and the house
footer in the body (the footer this body alone used to lack, fixed at CR-014).
Items: BL-021 (closed), CR-011 recipients.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Nick's decision: 'find a spot on the dashboard.' The spot: an eighth metric
card beside Est./Actual hrs - actual/estimated to two decimals, green at or
under 1.0, red over. Both hour fields are optional (CR-017), so with nothing
to divide the card shows an em dash rather than vanishing: a metric that
disappears reads as 'no such measure', not 'nothing logged yet'. Server sums
(B4), the same m.est_hours/actual_hours its neighbours already render - zero
new fetches, and the card stays inside the block the metrics-failure path
skips, so an outage still shows the error panel and no cards.
aggregates_check gains the pin (16 -> 17): the card must equal the quotient
of the SERVER's sums, or the em dash when either sum is zero - derived, not
hardcoded. Backlog entry corrected in passing where it credited
/api/projects/{id}/summary with hour sums it never carried.
Items: D12 (decisions-2026-08-20.md), CR-017 read, B4 discipline.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Nick's decision, 2026-08-20: 'email bodies provide links back to the system.
we can talk about customers we just cant exposed their confidential
documents.' The T7.6-era rule (no customer IP at all, so number + link only)
is refined: context IN, content OUT.
- wp_titled() and wp_where() compose 'number - title' and the CR-004
location (structured paths first, legacy free text second); the where-line
is dropped entirely when unset rather than mailing 'Where: '.
- assign, qa-ready, qa-reject and hold bodies gain title + location. The
scope summary the original CR asked for stays OUT - scope text is document
content; the link is its summary. Rejection comments stay on the package.
- hold_body gains the house footer it alone lacked.
- kitting and material-request bodies adopt wp_titled for the same identity
line (their delivery-location rule is unchanged).
- notify.py's docstring states the new rule where the transport documents it.
Pins flipped WITH the rule, reasons in code: qa_gate_check's location canary
is now asserted PRESENT in QA bodies; a new DESC_CANARY (document content) is
asserted absent from every message (40 -> 41 checks). The sink also gains a
decoded-body view: the em-dash switches smtplib to quoted-printable, whose
column-76 soft breaks made raw-payload substring pins pass or fail on luck of
line position - content pins now read the decoded body, header pins still
read the wire payload.
Battery: qa_gate_check 41/41, kitting_notify_check 17/17, mreq_check 19/19.
Items: CR-014 (rule per decisions-2026-08-20.md), CR-011 pins.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Nick's answer: 'strict 2.0'. The 154px overage was chrome, and every trim
densifies rather than deletes - A2's one-warning banner and the SOP identity
strip both stay:
- collapsed section rows 46 -> 36px on fine pointers (13 rows at rest was
~130px of the overage); coarse pointers keep the 44px tablet row (C1)
- ctx-bar 12 -> 7px padding; banner margin 14 -> 8, padding 11 -> 8
- .main top pad 22 -> 14 (bottom stays clear of the sticky bar)
- nav-row 24/24 -> 14/14
Measured at 1440x900: 1,954 -> 1,784px = 1.98 screens. form_structure_check
is 51/51 for the first time - the check never moved, the page now fits it.
mobile_check 24/24 (the coarse-pointer targets held).
Items: F6, BL-022 (closed), C1 preserved.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Six answers from Nick: F6 is a strict 2.0 screens (build task, chrome
compresses); hold stays reachable from any status (T7.3 question closed);
CR-014 bodies get deep links and may name customer context but never embed
confidential document content; CR-008 merged-PDF becomes KNOWN-ISSUES 3
(decided, not deferred by accident); BL-023 becomes D12, the productivity
factor on the dashboard; BL-020 closed as decided-keep. Housekeeping
(BL-021, BL-024, BL-025, S13) approved to build on this branch.
Items: F6, CR-008, CR-014, D12, BL-020, BL-022, BL-023.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
help.js injects its stylesheet on every page, and its glossary pills used bare
class selectors (.pill-draft ... .pill-hold). The creator's Issue (hold) status
radio also carries the class pill-hold, so the injected rule painted that radio
error-red at ALL times - selected or not. Reported by Nick ('why is the issues
(hold) button illuminated at all times'), 2026-08-20.
Pre-existing, not from this branch: help.js has had the bare selectors since
the login-portal commit, and the creator's pill-hold class predates the R2
branch. Every glossary rule is now scoped to .ui-help-pill.pill-*, which the
glossary markup already carries. Verified live: unselected, the hold pill's
computed style now matches its neighbours exactly; selected, it is still the
red fill; the glossary's own Hold pill keeps its tint. helptip_check gains the
pin (13 -> 14): no bare .pill-* selector in help.js, ever again.
Item: S8 (the help component's app-wide surface).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>