wave-10: close out claim mapping and redirect URI, live in production

Confirmed by an actual live Okta sign-in after main (cc64c88) deployed: preferred_username is the right identity claim, and the redirect URI works. Matt matched his existing pre-Okta admin account rather than getting JIT-provisioned as a duplicate. Two deploy-time snags recorded, both Case B (config, not data): OKTA_CLIENT_ID/SECRET/ISSUER left empty in Portainer at first (caught cleanly by is_configured()), then OKTA_ISSUER missing its https:// scheme (surfaced as httpx.UnsupportedProtocol, not a deliberate app error - BL-028 still stands). Neither needed the backup. BTG pilot group now includes Cody and Cameron, awaiting Adrian.

docs/waves/wave-10.md

@@ -156,6 +156,24 @@ Depends only on `main` as it stands after `D15`. Not sequenced behind any other
   Wave 10 is complete. The three items in "Still open" below are external
   (security team / Okta admin), not blocked on any task in this wave.
 
+- **T10.10 — Audit `manage_users.py promote`.** Raised in review after T10.8:
+  `cmd_promote()` changed a user's role with no audit trail at all, unlike the
+  identical role change from the web Admin Console (`app.py`'s
+  `set_user_role()` → `log_event()`, action `"role_changed"`). Not a new
+  privilege — anyone with Portainer/container-exec access to `wp_api` already
+  has shell access to the database directly, same trust tier D16 already named
+  for this command — but there was no record of who ran it or what changed.
+
+  Built: `cmd_promote()` now writes an `AuditLog` row with the same
+  `action`/`detail` shape `set_user_role()` uses (`{"from": old_role, "to":
+  role}`), tagged `"via": "cli"` (mirrors JIT provisioning's own `"via":
+  "okta_jit"` tag) and `actor="cli:manage_users"` — a container shell exec
+  carries no signed-in identity to attribute the change to a real person, so
+  it names the tool rather than guessing one. Verified end to end against a
+  scratch SQLite database: the audit row lands with the exact expected shape,
+  the role change persists, and the existing "no such user" refusal still
+  exits 1 with no partial write.
+
 - **T10.9 — Rollback-aware deploy runbook.** Raised after hazard review found
   `DEPLOY-runbook-2026-08-04.md`'s Rollback section has no case for a migration whose
   `downgrade()` cannot restore the data it drops — see `D17`. `T10.4`'s
@@ -183,10 +201,33 @@ Depends only on `main` as it stands after `D15`. Not sequenced behind any other
 
 ## Still open
 
-- The OIDC claim mapping (`T10.3`).
-- Final confirmation of the redirect/callback URI (`https://wp.controls.dev/api/auth/okta/callback`
-  proposed, pending security).
-- The `Business Technology Group` pilot assignment in Okta.
+- The `Business Technology Group` pilot assignment in Okta. Originally six names
+  (Carlee Swihart, Drew Hilliard, Matt Mabrey, Nick Siegfried, Rachel Schreiber, Terry
+  Sajan); Cody and Cameron added 2026-09-09. Adrian added only Matt at first,
+  deliberately, pending the live sign-in confirmation below — awaiting his response to
+  add the rest of the group now that it has.
 
 Closed since first written: admin bootstrap and break-glass posture, previously open
 questions, decided in `D16` (2026-09-03) and folded into `T10.4` above.
+
+**Closed 2026-09-09, live in production:** the redirect/callback URI
+(`https://wp.controls.dev/api/auth/okta/callback`) is confirmed working, and so is the
+OIDC claim mapping (`T10.3`) — `preferred_username` (the code's documented default,
+never actually confirmed by name in Request 50649's thread) is correct, no
+`OKTA_IDENTITY_CLAIM` override needed. Both settled by an actual live sign-in against
+the real Okta tenant after `main` was merged (`cc64c88`) and deployed: Matt signed in
+as himself, matched his existing pre-Okta admin account by `find_user()` rather than
+JIT-provisioning a duplicate (the account already existed — this app has ~40 real
+users, not the seeded test fixture), landed on `index.html` signed in, admin role and
+project access untouched. One real deploy-time snag on the way, worth recording since
+it's exactly the Case B scenario `DEPLOY-runbook-2026-09-03.md` anticipated: the first
+redeploy left `OKTA_CLIENT_ID`/`OKTA_CLIENT_SECRET`/`OKTA_ISSUER` as empty rows in
+Portainer (env var names added, values never filled in) — caught via
+`is_configured()`'s all-four-required check failing closed (the 503 "Sign-in is
+temporarily unavailable"), not silently. A second snag after filling those in:
+`OKTA_ISSUER` was pasted without its `https://` scheme, which surfaced as
+`httpx.UnsupportedProtocol` from Authlib's OIDC discovery fetch rather than anything
+the app's own code raises deliberately — the exact case the runbook's Notes flagged as
+having no startup-time confirmation (`okta_auth.describe()` still has no caller,
+`BL-028`). Both fixed by correcting the env var values in Portainer and redeploying;
+neither needed the backup or the database.

server/manage_users.py

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ and .env resolve the same way the API does:
 """
 import argparse
 import sys
+import uuid
 
 from .db import SessionLocal, Base, engine
 from . import models, auth
@@ -44,7 +45,24 @@ def cmd_promote(args) -> None:
                 f"No user named '{args.username}'. This promotes an existing account, it "
                 f"doesn't create one — they need to sign in through Okta at least once first."
             )
+        old_role = u.role
         u.role = role
+        # Audited the same way a role change from the web Admin Console already is
+        # (server/app.py's set_user_role() -> log_event(), action "role_changed") —
+        # this command changes the same field and previously left no record of who
+        # ran it or what it changed (T10.10). "actor" can't name a real person here:
+        # a container shell exec carries no signed-in identity to attribute it to,
+        # so it's tagged as the tool itself rather than guessing. "via" mirrors JIT
+        # provisioning's own tag on user_created events.
+        db.add(models.AuditLog(
+            id=f"ev_{uuid.uuid4().hex[:12]}",
+            actor="cli:manage_users",
+            action="role_changed",
+            entity_type="user",
+            entity_id=u.id,
+            summary=u.username,
+            detail={"from": old_role, "to": role, "via": "cli"},
+        ))
         db.commit()
         print(f"{u.username} is now {auth.ROLE_LABELS.get(role, role)}.")