feat/wave-16-on-main #3

Merged
m.mabrey merged 8 commits from feat/wave-16-on-main into main 2026-10-06 22:40:22 +00:00

8 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
b2b3774dea T16.4: security_check skips the D18 refresh check where D18 is absent
Wave 16 rebuilt on main (feat/wave-16-on-main, 2026-10-06) so it can
ship without wave 11 and T13.1. main has no sliding refresh, so the one
D18 check now runs only when auth.maybe_refresh_token exists; on main
it instead proves a valid token near its expiry is still accepted.
security_check 36/36 on this branch; smoke 27/27.
2026-10-06 13:28:22 -07:00
cfecdca3f7 T16.4: record the production check for D20 (no duplicate complete SOPs)
(cherry picked from commit 2420c73de4)
2026-10-06 13:27:50 -07:00
be3157baf2 T16.4: browser probes pass; cdp.py starts from an elevated shell
files_check.py 36/36 (T16.2), sample_check.py 10/10 and
critical_reopen_check.py 11/11 (T16.3), run on Matt's machine with
Edge 154. T16.2 and T16.3 done; wave 16 verification complete.

tests/cdp.py: every probe first failed 'exited rc=0 without binding
the port'. The shell was elevated; Edge and Chrome de-elevate by
relaunching through Explorer and the relaunch drops the debugging
port ('Edge is running elevated: 1' in the browser log). Adds
--do-not-de-elevate on Windows and a 15 s grace for the port after an
rc=0 exit. Both inert on a normal shell and off Windows.

(cherry picked from commit f752ae3677)
2026-10-06 13:27:50 -07:00
0157b4b325 T16.4: wave 16 verification record
security_check.py 36/36 (da1325c: 20/36, the 16 failures are the
findings). sec_probe.py: only S3 and S12 change. equivalence_check
IDENTICAL vs da1325c (canonical SOP id in the scenario). Smoke test
27/27. pip-audit clean.

Open: files_check.py (T16.2), sample_check.py and
critical_reopen_check.py (T16.3) need a machine with Edge; those two
tasks stay not-done until they pass.

(cherry picked from commit f0750212ca)
2026-10-06 13:27:49 -07:00
c0b736e503 T16.3: D20 one SOP per project
- A SOP posted with no id lands on sop__<project_id>, the id pushSOP
  has always used. Creating (or moving in) a SOP under any other id on
  a project is refused with 400.
- While a project has a complete SOP, writing another complete one
  needs Project Admin (the existing rule only checked the posted row).
- New project_baseline_sop(): canonical row when complete, else the
  latest complete (pre-D20 rows). Used by /api/sops/latest with
  complete=true&project_id, project_summary, project_sop_team and
  project_qa_group, so a rogue row made before the fix cannot stay
  the baseline or the mail routing.
- Existing rows under other ids stay and keep their old rules.

Security review SEC-02 (a project_user took over the baseline and the
PM/CM/QA mail routing with one POST).

security_check.py: 36/36 with D19-D21. Against da1325c: 7 D20 checks
fail (the findings). Smoke test 27/27; seed_demo writes the canonical
id.

(cherry picked from commit 7bd5ab104d)
2026-10-06 13:27:48 -07:00
f4d74879cc T16.2: D19 uploaded files download safely
New server/files_http.py; get_wp_file uses it.
- PDF and raster images (png, jpeg, gif, webp, bmp, avif) open inline,
  as before; Cache-Control unchanged for the offline drawing cache.
- Every other type, SVG included, downloads as an attachment with
  Content-Security-Policy: sandbox; default-src 'none'.
- SVG uploads stay accepted (decided 2026-10-02: accept, download only).
- Content-Disposition: ASCII fallback + RFC 5987 filename*, control
  characters and quotes replaced. nosniff from the API too.

Security review SEC-01 (stored XSS through an SVG drawing) and SEC-15e
(non-Latin-1 names gave 500; CR/LF reached the header).

security_check.py D19: 20/20 total with D21. Against da1325c: 6 fails
(the findings); every inline/cache/access check passes on both.

(cherry picked from commit 14ecb75c88)
2026-10-06 13:27:48 -07:00
d962ab2381 T16.1: D21 session decode fails closed; PyJWT 2.15.1
decode_token treats any decode failure, and any cookie over 4096 chars,
as not signed in, and requires exp and sub. PyJWT 2.13.0 -> 2.15.1
(pip-audit: 13 advisories -> none).

Security review SEC-07: a crafted 1.6 KB cookie with no account gave
500 + stack trace; now 401.

New tests/security_check.py (no browser): D21 section 6/6. Against
da1325c with PyJWT 2.13.0 it fails 3 checks (crafted cookie 500,
token with no exp accepted, old pin) - the findings. The over-long
cookie and the two still-works checks pass on both.
Smoke test 27/27.

(cherry picked from commit 01ce7e941c)
2026-10-06 13:27:47 -07:00
8dd0afaba4 wave 16: planning docs for D19, D20, D21
D19 - uploaded files download safely (SEC-01, SEC-15e)
D20 - one SOP per project (SEC-02)
D21 - session decode fails closed, PyJWT 2.15.1 (SEC-07)

From the security review of 2026-10-01. Decision record and task
breakdown only in this commit - no code yet.

(cherry picked from commit 1c221a122e)
2026-10-06 13:27:46 -07:00