cmd_promote() changed a user's role with no audit trail, unlike the identical change from the web Admin Console (set_user_role() -> log_event(), action "role_changed"). Not a new privilege - anyone with container-exec access already has DB access directly, D16's own trust-tier reasoning - but there was no record of who ran it or what changed. Now writes an AuditLog row matching set_user_role()'s shape, tagged via:cli (mirrors JIT provisioning's via:okta_jit) since a container shell exec carries no signed-in identity to attribute the change to. Verified against a scratch SQLite db: audit row lands correctly, role change persists, the no-such-user refusal still exits 1 clean.
Work Package Suite API
A small Python (FastAPI) service that stores project SOPs, Work Packages,
and comments in PostgreSQL. NGINX serves the static site and proxies /api/
to this service.
browser → NGINX ──serves──> static site (index.html, …)
└─proxy /api/─> api container (:8000) → db container (postgres)
Endpoints
| Method | Path | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| GET | /api/health |
liveness check (unauthenticated) |
| GET | /api/auth/okta/login |
redirects the browser to Okta's authorize endpoint (?next= optional) |
| GET | /api/auth/okta/callback |
Okta redirects back here with the auth code; signs the person in |
| POST | /api/auth/logout |
clear the session cookie |
| GET | /api/auth/me |
the logged-in user |
| GET | /api/auth/users |
list accounts (admin) |
| POST | /api/auth/users |
pre-create an account by username (admin) |
| DELETE | /api/auth/users/{id} |
delete an account (admin) |
| POST | /api/sops |
create/update a SOP (upsert by id) |
| GET | /api/sops |
list SOP summaries |
| GET | /api/sops/latest?complete=true |
most recent (complete) SOP |
| GET | /api/sops/{id} |
full SOP document |
| DELETE | /api/sops/{id} |
delete a SOP |
| POST | /api/wps |
create/update a Work Package (upsert by id) |
| GET | /api/wps?sop_id=… |
list WPs (optionally for one SOP) |
| GET | /api/wps/{id} |
full WP document |
| DELETE | /api/wps/{id} |
delete a WP |
| POST | /api/comments (and /api/feedback) |
add a comment |
| GET | /api/comments?source=&sop_id=&wp_id=&step= |
list comments |
Interactive docs once running: /api/docs.
The full client document is stored in each row's data (JSON) column; common
fields (name, number, status, …) are promoted to columns for listing/filtering.
Sign-in (Okta)
There is no local password anywhere in this app (D15/D16) — Okta OIDC is the
only way in. login.html is a single "Sign in with Okta" button; the actual
exchange is server/okta_auth.py (the Okta client config) and the two routes
in server/app.py: okta_login() sends the browser to Okta's authorize
endpoint, okta_callback() exchanges the code, matches the ID token's identity
claim against users.username, and signs the person in.
Sign-in still ends the same way it always did: a signed JWT in an HttpOnly,
SameSite=Lax cookie (wp_session), marked Secure automatically whenever
the request arrives over HTTPS (via NGINX's X-Forwarded-Proto). There is no
server-side session store — each request is validated by checking the cookie's
signature and expiry. Okta only confirms who someone is; this app still
decides what they may do — roles, project membership, everything below stays
local and unchanged by Okta.
The real security boundary is the API: every /api/ data route is refused
with 401 unless a valid session cookie is present (see auth_gate in
app.py). The static pages additionally include auth-guard.js, which redirects
to login.html when there's no session — that's for UX, not protection.
Access gating is Okta's job, not this app's. Only accounts assigned to the app integration in Okta can complete the sign-in flow at all, so there is no required-group or claim check layered on top here. Once Okta lets someone through, this app decides their role — see below.
Roles are admin, project_super_user, project_admin, project_user
(html/users.js, enforced server-side).
Set the signing secret and the Okta app integration
Add AUTH_SECRET_KEY and the five OKTA_* variables to .env — see
.env.example for what each one is and where it comes from. AUTH_SECRET_KEY
is required in production: without it the API uses a random per-process
key, so logins reset on restart. The OKTA_* variables are not a hard-fail the
same way — the API starts without them, it just refuses every sign-in and says
so in the startup log (okta_auth.describe()).
python -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(48))"
The Okta app integration itself (sign-in method OIDC, Application type Web
Application) needs its Sign-in redirect URI set to exactly
OKTA_REDIRECT_URI's value, and the people who should have access assigned to
it — that assignment IS the access control (see above).
Create the first admin
There's no create-admin command anymore — creating an account from scratch
by hand-typed username risks a second, orphaned row if it doesn't exactly match
what Okta actually sends (see OKTA_IDENTITY_CLAIM in .env.example). Instead,
have the first admin sign in through Okta once — they land as an ordinary
project_user, JIT-provisioned — then promote that existing row from a shell
(run from the project root, like uvicorn):
python -m server.manage_users promote alice --role admin
In Docker:
docker compose exec api python -m server.manage_users promote alice --role admin
Other commands: list, disable <user>, enable <user>. After the first
admin exists, they can promote others through the User Directory page (or keep
using the CLI) — no shell access needed for anyone after the first.
No break-glass path. If Okta is unreachable or misconfigured, the app is unreachable for everyone, including admins, until Okta is restored (D16) — this is a deliberate choice, the same one the abandoned LDAPS design made, not an oversight.
Local dev
cd server
python -m venv .venv && . .venv/bin/activate # Windows: .venv\Scripts\activate
pip install -r requirements.txt
# No DATABASE_URL → uses a local sqlite file, so you can start immediately:
uvicorn server.app:app --reload --port 8000 # run from the PROJECT ROOT
Then open http://localhost:8000/api/docs.
Run uvicorn/gunicorn from the project root (the folder that contains the
server/directory), because the import path isserver.app:app.
Production — Docker Compose
This is the recommended production setup. Three containers run in an isolated
internal network; only NGINX is exposed to the outside via the external proxy
network.
[external proxy network]
│
┌────▼────┐ internal network ┌──────────┐ ┌────────┐
│ nginx │ ───────────────────> │ api │ → │ db │
└─────────┘ └──────────┘ └────────┘
1. Create the credentials file
Create .env in the project root (same directory as docker-compose.yml).
This file is never committed — add it to .gitignore.
# .env — project root
POSTGRES_DB=wpsuite
POSTGRES_USER=wpsuite
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=<strong-random-password>
# Must match POSTGRES_* above; hostname is the compose service name "db"
DATABASE_URL=postgresql+psycopg://wpsuite:<strong-random-password>@db:5432/wpsuite
Generate a strong password:
openssl rand -base64 32
2. Add the Dockerfile
Create Dockerfile in the project root:
FROM python:3.12-slim
WORKDIR /app
COPY server/requirements.txt ./server/
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r server/requirements.txt
COPY server/ ./server/
EXPOSE 8000
CMD ["gunicorn", "-k", "uvicorn.workers.UvicornWorker", \
"-b", "0.0.0.0:8000", "--workers", "2", "server.app:app"]
3. Update the NGINX site config
The API is no longer at 127.0.0.1:8000 — it is the api container.
Update the /api/ proxy block in your nginx conf (e.g. nginx/conf.d/wp-suite.conf):
location /api/ {
proxy_pass http://api:8000; # ← service name, not localhost
proxy_http_version 1.1;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
client_max_body_size 5m;
}
4. docker-compose.yml
Replace your existing docker-compose.yml with:
services:
webserver:
image: nginx:alpine
container_name: nginx_webserver
volumes:
- ./html:/usr/share/nginx/html:ro
- ./nginx/conf.d:/etc/nginx/conf.d:ro
- ./nginx/nginx.conf:/etc/nginx/nginx.conf:ro
- ./logs:/var/log/nginx
restart: unless-stopped
depends_on:
api:
condition: service_started
networks:
- proxy # external — reachable by your reverse proxy / traefik
- internal # needs a path to the api container
api:
build: .
container_name: wp_api
env_file: .env # loads DATABASE_URL
restart: unless-stopped
depends_on:
db:
condition: service_healthy # waits for postgres to accept connections
networks:
- internal
db:
image: postgres:16-alpine
container_name: wp_db
env_file: .env # loads POSTGRES_DB / USER / PASSWORD
volumes:
- pgdata:/var/lib/postgresql/data
restart: unless-stopped
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U $${POSTGRES_USER} -d $${POSTGRES_DB}"]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
networks:
- internal
volumes:
pgdata:
networks:
proxy:
name: proxy
external: true
internal:
internal: true # no outbound internet access from api/db
5. First-time startup
# Build the api image and start all containers
docker compose up -d --build
# Confirm all three containers are running
docker compose ps
# Tail logs (Ctrl-C to stop following)
docker compose logs -f api
Tables are created automatically on first API startup — no manual CREATE TABLE
needed.
Authentication notes
Postgres → API authentication is handled entirely through DATABASE_URL in
.env. The db container uses POSTGRES_USER / POSTGRES_PASSWORD to
initialise the database on first run; the api container uses the matching
credentials in DATABASE_URL to connect. Neither credential ever appears in the
compose file itself.
Network isolation: the db container is on the internal network only —
it has no port exposed to the host and is unreachable from outside the compose
stack. Only the api container can open a connection to it.
Changing the password: update both POSTGRES_PASSWORD and the password
in DATABASE_URL in .env, then:
# Stop api first (db must keep running to accept the ALTER USER command)
docker compose stop api
docker compose exec db psql -U wpsuite -c "ALTER USER wpsuite PASSWORD 'new-password';"
docker compose start api
Day-to-day operations
# Rebuild api after a code change
docker compose up -d --build api
# View postgres data directly
docker compose exec db psql -U wpsuite -d wpsuite
# Take a database backup
docker compose exec db pg_dump -U wpsuite wpsuite > backup-$(date +%F).sql
# Restore from backup
docker compose exec -T db psql -U wpsuite -d wpsuite < backup-2025-01-01.sql
# Stop everything (data volume is preserved)
docker compose down
# Stop everything AND delete all data
docker compose down -v
Quick test
/api/health is open; every other /api/ route needs a session cookie:
curl http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/health # {"ok":true} — no auth needed
Without a session cookie, protected routes return 401 {"detail":"Not authenticated"}.
Or via the nginx proxy (replace with your hostname):
curl https://wp-suite.company.local/api/health
There's no curl-able login anymore — Okta requires a real browser to
complete, which is what login.html's "Sign in with Okta" button is for. To
exercise a protected route from a script instead, use server/smoketest.py's
own technique (mint a session with auth.create_token() and set it as the
wp_session cookie, the same thing okta_callback() does after Okta hands
back an identity) rather than reaching for curl by hand — see that script's
own AUTHENTICATION section for the exact steps, and why it has to run
somewhere that shares the target server's AUTH_SECRET_KEY and database.