Files
Matt Mabrey cc64c88c3e T10.10: audit manage_users.py promote
cmd_promote() changed a user's role with no audit trail, unlike the
identical change from the web Admin Console (set_user_role() ->
log_event(), action "role_changed"). Not a new privilege - anyone
with container-exec access already has DB access directly, D16's own
trust-tier reasoning - but there was no record of who ran it or what
changed.

Now writes an AuditLog row matching set_user_role()'s shape, tagged
via:cli (mirrors JIT provisioning's via:okta_jit) since a container
shell exec carries no signed-in identity to attribute the change to.

Verified against a scratch SQLite db: audit row lands correctly, role
change persists, the no-such-user refusal still exits 1 clean.
2026-09-03 16:27:13 -07:00
..

Work Package Suite API

A small Python (FastAPI) service that stores project SOPs, Work Packages, and comments in PostgreSQL. NGINX serves the static site and proxies /api/ to this service.

browser → NGINX ──serves──> static site (index.html, …)
                └─proxy /api/─> api container (:8000) → db container (postgres)

Endpoints

Method Path Purpose
GET /api/health liveness check (unauthenticated)
GET /api/auth/okta/login redirects the browser to Okta's authorize endpoint (?next= optional)
GET /api/auth/okta/callback Okta redirects back here with the auth code; signs the person in
POST /api/auth/logout clear the session cookie
GET /api/auth/me the logged-in user
GET /api/auth/users list accounts (admin)
POST /api/auth/users pre-create an account by username (admin)
DELETE /api/auth/users/{id} delete an account (admin)
POST /api/sops create/update a SOP (upsert by id)
GET /api/sops list SOP summaries
GET /api/sops/latest?complete=true most recent (complete) SOP
GET /api/sops/{id} full SOP document
DELETE /api/sops/{id} delete a SOP
POST /api/wps create/update a Work Package (upsert by id)
GET /api/wps?sop_id=… list WPs (optionally for one SOP)
GET /api/wps/{id} full WP document
DELETE /api/wps/{id} delete a WP
POST /api/comments (and /api/feedback) add a comment
GET /api/comments?source=&sop_id=&wp_id=&step= list comments

Interactive docs once running: /api/docs.

The full client document is stored in each row's data (JSON) column; common fields (name, number, status, …) are promoted to columns for listing/filtering.


Sign-in (Okta)

There is no local password anywhere in this app (D15/D16) — Okta OIDC is the only way in. login.html is a single "Sign in with Okta" button; the actual exchange is server/okta_auth.py (the Okta client config) and the two routes in server/app.py: okta_login() sends the browser to Okta's authorize endpoint, okta_callback() exchanges the code, matches the ID token's identity claim against users.username, and signs the person in.

Sign-in still ends the same way it always did: a signed JWT in an HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax cookie (wp_session), marked Secure automatically whenever the request arrives over HTTPS (via NGINX's X-Forwarded-Proto). There is no server-side session store — each request is validated by checking the cookie's signature and expiry. Okta only confirms who someone is; this app still decides what they may do — roles, project membership, everything below stays local and unchanged by Okta.

The real security boundary is the API: every /api/ data route is refused with 401 unless a valid session cookie is present (see auth_gate in app.py). The static pages additionally include auth-guard.js, which redirects to login.html when there's no session — that's for UX, not protection.

Access gating is Okta's job, not this app's. Only accounts assigned to the app integration in Okta can complete the sign-in flow at all, so there is no required-group or claim check layered on top here. Once Okta lets someone through, this app decides their role — see below.

Roles are admin, project_super_user, project_admin, project_user (html/users.js, enforced server-side).

Set the signing secret and the Okta app integration

Add AUTH_SECRET_KEY and the five OKTA_* variables to .env — see .env.example for what each one is and where it comes from. AUTH_SECRET_KEY is required in production: without it the API uses a random per-process key, so logins reset on restart. The OKTA_* variables are not a hard-fail the same way — the API starts without them, it just refuses every sign-in and says so in the startup log (okta_auth.describe()).

python -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(48))"

The Okta app integration itself (sign-in method OIDC, Application type Web Application) needs its Sign-in redirect URI set to exactly OKTA_REDIRECT_URI's value, and the people who should have access assigned to it — that assignment IS the access control (see above).

Create the first admin

There's no create-admin command anymore — creating an account from scratch by hand-typed username risks a second, orphaned row if it doesn't exactly match what Okta actually sends (see OKTA_IDENTITY_CLAIM in .env.example). Instead, have the first admin sign in through Okta once — they land as an ordinary project_user, JIT-provisioned — then promote that existing row from a shell (run from the project root, like uvicorn):

python -m server.manage_users promote alice --role admin

In Docker:

docker compose exec api python -m server.manage_users promote alice --role admin

Other commands: list, disable <user>, enable <user>. After the first admin exists, they can promote others through the User Directory page (or keep using the CLI) — no shell access needed for anyone after the first.

No break-glass path. If Okta is unreachable or misconfigured, the app is unreachable for everyone, including admins, until Okta is restored (D16) — this is a deliberate choice, the same one the abandoned LDAPS design made, not an oversight.


Local dev

cd server
python -m venv .venv && . .venv/bin/activate      # Windows: .venv\Scripts\activate
pip install -r requirements.txt
# No DATABASE_URL → uses a local sqlite file, so you can start immediately:
uvicorn server.app:app --reload --port 8000       # run from the PROJECT ROOT

Then open http://localhost:8000/api/docs.

Run uvicorn/gunicorn from the project root (the folder that contains the server/ directory), because the import path is server.app:app.


Production — Docker Compose

This is the recommended production setup. Three containers run in an isolated internal network; only NGINX is exposed to the outside via the external proxy network.

[external proxy network]
        │
   ┌────▼────┐   internal network   ┌──────────┐   ┌────────┐
   │  nginx  │ ───────────────────> │   api    │ → │   db   │
   └─────────┘                      └──────────┘   └────────┘

1. Create the credentials file

Create .env in the project root (same directory as docker-compose.yml). This file is never committed — add it to .gitignore.

# .env  — project root
POSTGRES_DB=wpsuite
POSTGRES_USER=wpsuite
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=<strong-random-password>

# Must match POSTGRES_* above; hostname is the compose service name "db"
DATABASE_URL=postgresql+psycopg://wpsuite:<strong-random-password>@db:5432/wpsuite

Generate a strong password:

openssl rand -base64 32

2. Add the Dockerfile

Create Dockerfile in the project root:

FROM python:3.12-slim
WORKDIR /app
COPY server/requirements.txt ./server/
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r server/requirements.txt
COPY server/ ./server/
EXPOSE 8000
CMD ["gunicorn", "-k", "uvicorn.workers.UvicornWorker", \
     "-b", "0.0.0.0:8000", "--workers", "2", "server.app:app"]

3. Update the NGINX site config

The API is no longer at 127.0.0.1:8000 — it is the api container. Update the /api/ proxy block in your nginx conf (e.g. nginx/conf.d/wp-suite.conf):

location /api/ {
    proxy_pass http://api:8000;          # ← service name, not localhost
    proxy_http_version 1.1;
    proxy_set_header Host $host;
    proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $remote_addr;
    proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
    client_max_body_size 5m;
}

4. docker-compose.yml

Replace your existing docker-compose.yml with:

services:

  webserver:
    image: nginx:alpine
    container_name: nginx_webserver
    volumes:
      - ./html:/usr/share/nginx/html:ro
      - ./nginx/conf.d:/etc/nginx/conf.d:ro
      - ./nginx/nginx.conf:/etc/nginx/nginx.conf:ro
      - ./logs:/var/log/nginx
    restart: unless-stopped
    depends_on:
      api:
        condition: service_started
    networks:
      - proxy       # external — reachable by your reverse proxy / traefik
      - internal    # needs a path to the api container

  api:
    build: .
    container_name: wp_api
    env_file: .env                        # loads DATABASE_URL
    restart: unless-stopped
    depends_on:
      db:
        condition: service_healthy        # waits for postgres to accept connections
    networks:
      - internal

  db:
    image: postgres:16-alpine
    container_name: wp_db
    env_file: .env                        # loads POSTGRES_DB / USER / PASSWORD
    volumes:
      - pgdata:/var/lib/postgresql/data
    restart: unless-stopped
    healthcheck:
      test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U $${POSTGRES_USER} -d $${POSTGRES_DB}"]
      interval: 10s
      timeout: 5s
      retries: 5
    networks:
      - internal

volumes:
  pgdata:

networks:
  proxy:
    name: proxy
    external: true
  internal:
    internal: true    # no outbound internet access from api/db

5. First-time startup

# Build the api image and start all containers
docker compose up -d --build

# Confirm all three containers are running
docker compose ps

# Tail logs (Ctrl-C to stop following)
docker compose logs -f api

Tables are created automatically on first API startup — no manual CREATE TABLE needed.

Authentication notes

Postgres → API authentication is handled entirely through DATABASE_URL in .env. The db container uses POSTGRES_USER / POSTGRES_PASSWORD to initialise the database on first run; the api container uses the matching credentials in DATABASE_URL to connect. Neither credential ever appears in the compose file itself.

Network isolation: the db container is on the internal network only — it has no port exposed to the host and is unreachable from outside the compose stack. Only the api container can open a connection to it.

Changing the password: update both POSTGRES_PASSWORD and the password in DATABASE_URL in .env, then:

# Stop api first (db must keep running to accept the ALTER USER command)
docker compose stop api
docker compose exec db psql -U wpsuite -c "ALTER USER wpsuite PASSWORD 'new-password';"
docker compose start api

Day-to-day operations

# Rebuild api after a code change
docker compose up -d --build api

# View postgres data directly
docker compose exec db psql -U wpsuite -d wpsuite

# Take a database backup
docker compose exec db pg_dump -U wpsuite wpsuite > backup-$(date +%F).sql

# Restore from backup
docker compose exec -T db psql -U wpsuite -d wpsuite < backup-2025-01-01.sql

# Stop everything (data volume is preserved)
docker compose down

# Stop everything AND delete all data
docker compose down -v

Quick test

/api/health is open; every other /api/ route needs a session cookie:

curl http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/health          # {"ok":true} — no auth needed

Without a session cookie, protected routes return 401 {"detail":"Not authenticated"}.

Or via the nginx proxy (replace with your hostname):

curl https://wp-suite.company.local/api/health

There's no curl-able login anymore — Okta requires a real browser to complete, which is what login.html's "Sign in with Okta" button is for. To exercise a protected route from a script instead, use server/smoketest.py's own technique (mint a session with auth.create_token() and set it as the wp_session cookie, the same thing okta_callback() does after Okta hands back an identity) rather than reaching for curl by hand — see that script's own AUTHENTICATION section for the exact steps, and why it has to run somewhere that shares the target server's AUTH_SECRET_KEY and database.