Files
Matt Mabrey f023192b74 T10.6 - deployment docs and env var reference describe Okta, not the never-shipped LDAP config
D13 never shipped, so DEPLOYMENT.md, server/.env.example and server/README.md
still described the original local-password system as of this task starting -
POST /api/auth/login, bcrypt password_hash, create-admin with a prompted
password, self-service reset-password email flow, AUTH_RESET_MINUTES /
AUTH_RESET_COOLDOWN_SECONDS. All of that is gone as of T10.4; these three files
now describe what actually runs.

server/.env.example and DEPLOYMENT.md's env block both gain the five OKTA_*
variables (ISSUER, CLIENT_ID, CLIENT_SECRET, REDIRECT_URI, IDENTITY_CLAIM),
explained the same way AUTH_SECRET_KEY already was - what it does, where to
get it, what happens if it's missing.

Also updated, not originally named in T10.6's bullet but required for the
documented vars to actually reach a running container: docker-compose.yml's
api service sets environment: as an explicit allowlist, not env_file, so the
four new OKTA_* entries had to be added there too or .env would document
something that silently does nothing. OKTA_IDENTITY_CLAIM specifically is NOT
${OKTA_IDENTITY_CLAIM:-} - compose setting an env var to an empty string is
not the same as leaving it unset, and server/okta_auth.py's own default
(preferred_username) only kicks in when the var is truly unset. Mirrored the
same default in the compose file instead, or every deployment that leaves the
optional line commented out in .env would 503 on every sign-in looking for a
claim literally named "".

server/README.md: replaced the login-portal section with the Okta flow
(access gating is Okta's job, not this app's - roles/authorization stay
local), replaced "create the first admin" with the promote-not-create
bootstrap path (D16) and its no-break-glass posture, replaced the curl-based
login example in Quick Test with a pointer to smoketest.py's own
session-minting technique (there is nothing left to curl - Okta requires a
real browser).

DEPLOYMENT.md: same treatment for its own copies of the env block, the
Portainer var list, the users table's password_hash column, the auth
endpoints summary, the smoke-test walkthrough (WP_SMOKE_USER only, must run
inside the api container or local dev sharing AUTH_SECRET_KEY/DATABASE_URL -
no longer targetable from an arbitrary remote workstation), the entire
"Self-service password reset" section (replaced with "Sign-in and admin
bootstrap (Okta)"), and the project_super_user role description / exclusive-
scope bullet, both of which named "reset passwords" as something that no
longer exists.

Left alone, logged rather than fixed here per CLAUDE.md scope discipline:
- users.failed_attempts / locked_until columns are still in the schema and
  still reset to 0/None on every Okta sign-in, but nothing increments them
  anymore since local login() is gone - vestigial, not documented as active
  lockout behavior in either doc now, but not migrated away either.
- server/README.md's "Production - Docker Compose" section (### 1-5) is a
  self-contained alternate quickstart that already duplicated and diverged
  from the real root docker-compose.yml before this task; it uses env_file
  rather than an explicit allowlist so it isn't broken by this change, but
  it's still a second source of truth nobody asked this task to reconcile.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-03 13:47:48 -07:00

12 KiB

Work Package Suite API

A small Python (FastAPI) service that stores project SOPs, Work Packages, and comments in PostgreSQL. NGINX serves the static site and proxies /api/ to this service.

browser → NGINX ──serves──> static site (index.html, …)
                └─proxy /api/─> api container (:8000) → db container (postgres)

Endpoints

Method Path Purpose
GET /api/health liveness check (unauthenticated)
GET /api/auth/okta/login redirects the browser to Okta's authorize endpoint (?next= optional)
GET /api/auth/okta/callback Okta redirects back here with the auth code; signs the person in
POST /api/auth/logout clear the session cookie
GET /api/auth/me the logged-in user
GET /api/auth/users list accounts (admin)
POST /api/auth/users pre-create an account by username (admin)
DELETE /api/auth/users/{id} delete an account (admin)
POST /api/sops create/update a SOP (upsert by id)
GET /api/sops list SOP summaries
GET /api/sops/latest?complete=true most recent (complete) SOP
GET /api/sops/{id} full SOP document
DELETE /api/sops/{id} delete a SOP
POST /api/wps create/update a Work Package (upsert by id)
GET /api/wps?sop_id=… list WPs (optionally for one SOP)
GET /api/wps/{id} full WP document
DELETE /api/wps/{id} delete a WP
POST /api/comments (and /api/feedback) add a comment
GET /api/comments?source=&sop_id=&wp_id=&step= list comments

Interactive docs once running: /api/docs.

The full client document is stored in each row's data (JSON) column; common fields (name, number, status, …) are promoted to columns for listing/filtering.


Sign-in (Okta)

There is no local password anywhere in this app (D15/D16) — Okta OIDC is the only way in. login.html is a single "Sign in with Okta" button; the actual exchange is server/okta_auth.py (the Okta client config) and the two routes in server/app.py: okta_login() sends the browser to Okta's authorize endpoint, okta_callback() exchanges the code, matches the ID token's identity claim against users.username, and signs the person in.

Sign-in still ends the same way it always did: a signed JWT in an HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax cookie (wp_session), marked Secure automatically whenever the request arrives over HTTPS (via NGINX's X-Forwarded-Proto). There is no server-side session store — each request is validated by checking the cookie's signature and expiry. Okta only confirms who someone is; this app still decides what they may do — roles, project membership, everything below stays local and unchanged by Okta.

The real security boundary is the API: every /api/ data route is refused with 401 unless a valid session cookie is present (see auth_gate in app.py). The static pages additionally include auth-guard.js, which redirects to login.html when there's no session — that's for UX, not protection.

Access gating is Okta's job, not this app's. Only accounts assigned to the app integration in Okta can complete the sign-in flow at all, so there is no required-group or claim check layered on top here. Once Okta lets someone through, this app decides their role — see below.

Roles are admin, project_super_user, project_admin, project_user (html/users.js, enforced server-side).

Set the signing secret and the Okta app integration

Add AUTH_SECRET_KEY and the five OKTA_* variables to .env — see .env.example for what each one is and where it comes from. AUTH_SECRET_KEY is required in production: without it the API uses a random per-process key, so logins reset on restart. The OKTA_* variables are not a hard-fail the same way — the API starts without them, it just refuses every sign-in and says so in the startup log (okta_auth.describe()).

python -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(48))"

The Okta app integration itself (sign-in method OIDC, Application type Web Application) needs its Sign-in redirect URI set to exactly OKTA_REDIRECT_URI's value, and the people who should have access assigned to it — that assignment IS the access control (see above).

Create the first admin

There's no create-admin command anymore — creating an account from scratch by hand-typed username risks a second, orphaned row if it doesn't exactly match what Okta actually sends (see OKTA_IDENTITY_CLAIM in .env.example). Instead, have the first admin sign in through Okta once — they land as an ordinary project_user, JIT-provisioned — then promote that existing row from a shell (run from the project root, like uvicorn):

python -m server.manage_users promote alice --role admin

In Docker:

docker compose exec api python -m server.manage_users promote alice --role admin

Other commands: list, disable <user>, enable <user>. After the first admin exists, they can promote others through the User Directory page (or keep using the CLI) — no shell access needed for anyone after the first.

No break-glass path. If Okta is unreachable or misconfigured, the app is unreachable for everyone, including admins, until Okta is restored (D16) — this is a deliberate choice, the same one the abandoned LDAPS design made, not an oversight.


Local dev

cd server
python -m venv .venv && . .venv/bin/activate      # Windows: .venv\Scripts\activate
pip install -r requirements.txt
# No DATABASE_URL → uses a local sqlite file, so you can start immediately:
uvicorn server.app:app --reload --port 8000       # run from the PROJECT ROOT

Then open http://localhost:8000/api/docs.

Run uvicorn/gunicorn from the project root (the folder that contains the server/ directory), because the import path is server.app:app.


Production — Docker Compose

This is the recommended production setup. Three containers run in an isolated internal network; only NGINX is exposed to the outside via the external proxy network.

[external proxy network]
        │
   ┌────▼────┐   internal network   ┌──────────┐   ┌────────┐
   │  nginx  │ ───────────────────> │   api    │ → │   db   │
   └─────────┘                      └──────────┘   └────────┘

1. Create the credentials file

Create .env in the project root (same directory as docker-compose.yml). This file is never committed — add it to .gitignore.

# .env  — project root
POSTGRES_DB=wpsuite
POSTGRES_USER=wpsuite
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=<strong-random-password>

# Must match POSTGRES_* above; hostname is the compose service name "db"
DATABASE_URL=postgresql+psycopg://wpsuite:<strong-random-password>@db:5432/wpsuite

Generate a strong password:

openssl rand -base64 32

2. Add the Dockerfile

Create Dockerfile in the project root:

FROM python:3.12-slim
WORKDIR /app
COPY server/requirements.txt ./server/
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r server/requirements.txt
COPY server/ ./server/
EXPOSE 8000
CMD ["gunicorn", "-k", "uvicorn.workers.UvicornWorker", \
     "-b", "0.0.0.0:8000", "--workers", "2", "server.app:app"]

3. Update the NGINX site config

The API is no longer at 127.0.0.1:8000 — it is the api container. Update the /api/ proxy block in your nginx conf (e.g. nginx/conf.d/wp-suite.conf):

location /api/ {
    proxy_pass http://api:8000;          # ← service name, not localhost
    proxy_http_version 1.1;
    proxy_set_header Host $host;
    proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $remote_addr;
    proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
    client_max_body_size 5m;
}

4. docker-compose.yml

Replace your existing docker-compose.yml with:

services:

  webserver:
    image: nginx:alpine
    container_name: nginx_webserver
    volumes:
      - ./html:/usr/share/nginx/html:ro
      - ./nginx/conf.d:/etc/nginx/conf.d:ro
      - ./nginx/nginx.conf:/etc/nginx/nginx.conf:ro
      - ./logs:/var/log/nginx
    restart: unless-stopped
    depends_on:
      api:
        condition: service_started
    networks:
      - proxy       # external — reachable by your reverse proxy / traefik
      - internal    # needs a path to the api container

  api:
    build: .
    container_name: wp_api
    env_file: .env                        # loads DATABASE_URL
    restart: unless-stopped
    depends_on:
      db:
        condition: service_healthy        # waits for postgres to accept connections
    networks:
      - internal

  db:
    image: postgres:16-alpine
    container_name: wp_db
    env_file: .env                        # loads POSTGRES_DB / USER / PASSWORD
    volumes:
      - pgdata:/var/lib/postgresql/data
    restart: unless-stopped
    healthcheck:
      test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U $${POSTGRES_USER} -d $${POSTGRES_DB}"]
      interval: 10s
      timeout: 5s
      retries: 5
    networks:
      - internal

volumes:
  pgdata:

networks:
  proxy:
    name: proxy
    external: true
  internal:
    internal: true    # no outbound internet access from api/db

5. First-time startup

# Build the api image and start all containers
docker compose up -d --build

# Confirm all three containers are running
docker compose ps

# Tail logs (Ctrl-C to stop following)
docker compose logs -f api

Tables are created automatically on first API startup — no manual CREATE TABLE needed.

Authentication notes

Postgres → API authentication is handled entirely through DATABASE_URL in .env. The db container uses POSTGRES_USER / POSTGRES_PASSWORD to initialise the database on first run; the api container uses the matching credentials in DATABASE_URL to connect. Neither credential ever appears in the compose file itself.

Network isolation: the db container is on the internal network only — it has no port exposed to the host and is unreachable from outside the compose stack. Only the api container can open a connection to it.

Changing the password: update both POSTGRES_PASSWORD and the password in DATABASE_URL in .env, then:

# Stop api first (db must keep running to accept the ALTER USER command)
docker compose stop api
docker compose exec db psql -U wpsuite -c "ALTER USER wpsuite PASSWORD 'new-password';"
docker compose start api

Day-to-day operations

# Rebuild api after a code change
docker compose up -d --build api

# View postgres data directly
docker compose exec db psql -U wpsuite -d wpsuite

# Take a database backup
docker compose exec db pg_dump -U wpsuite wpsuite > backup-$(date +%F).sql

# Restore from backup
docker compose exec -T db psql -U wpsuite -d wpsuite < backup-2025-01-01.sql

# Stop everything (data volume is preserved)
docker compose down

# Stop everything AND delete all data
docker compose down -v

Quick test

/api/health is open; every other /api/ route needs a session cookie:

curl http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/health          # {"ok":true} — no auth needed

Without a session cookie, protected routes return 401 {"detail":"Not authenticated"}.

Or via the nginx proxy (replace with your hostname):

curl https://wp-suite.company.local/api/health

There's no curl-able login anymore — Okta requires a real browser to complete, which is what login.html's "Sign in with Okta" button is for. To exercise a protected route from a script instead, use server/smoketest.py's own technique (mint a session with auth.create_token() and set it as the wp_session cookie, the same thing okta_callback() does after Okta hands back an identity) rather than reaching for curl by hand — see that script's own AUTHENTICATION section for the exact steps, and why it has to run somewhere that shares the target server's AUTH_SECRET_KEY and database.