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Project-SDE-WP-Suite/docs/waves/decisions-2026-10-02.md
Matt Mabrey 8dd0afaba4 wave 16: planning docs for D19, D20, D21
D19 - uploaded files download safely (SEC-01, SEC-15e)
D20 - one SOP per project (SEC-02)
D21 - session decode fails closed, PyJWT 2.15.1 (SEC-07)

From the security review of 2026-10-01. Decision record and task
breakdown only in this commit - no code yet.

(cherry picked from commit 1c221a122e)
2026-10-06 13:27:46 -07:00

4.4 KiB

Decisions — October 2, 2026

Three items, from the security review of 2026-10-01 (docs/reference/security-review-2026-10-01.md). They get D ids because they are internal security calls made mid-build, the same category as D15 and D18, not features a user asked for.

Decided by Matt Mabrey, 2026-10-02.

Item Title Review finding Task
D19 Uploaded files download safely SEC-01, SEC-15e (BL-035, BL-036) T16.2
D20 One SOP per project SEC-02 (BL-048) T16.3
D21 Session decode fails closed; PyJWT upgraded SEC-07 (BL-052) T16.1

Schedule: wave 16. It is independent of waves 12 to 15: it touches server/ only, and no file in it is changed by a task in those waves except server/app.py, in functions they do not touch (get_wp_file, upsert_sop, the SOP baseline readers). Wave 16 may merge before wave 12.

Out of this round, by decision: SEC-06 (session revocation) waits for the AWS work. All other SEC findings stay as backlog drafts in docs/reference/security-review/backlog-drafts.md.


D19 — Uploaded files download safely

  • Problem: an SVG drawing can carry a script. The server sends it back inline with its own content type, on the app's origin, so the script runs as whoever opens it (SEC-01). Separately, a file name that is not Latin-1 (for example Plan é.pdf) makes the download fail with 500, and CR/LF in a name reaches the response header (SEC-15e).
  • Decision: SVG uploads stay accepted, but every file that is not a PDF or a raster image downloads as an attachment inside a sandbox: Content-Disposition: attachment and Content-Security-Policy: sandbox; default-src 'none'. PDF and raster images (PNG, JPEG, GIF, WebP, BMP, AVIF) keep opening inline. Every file name goes out in the RFC 6266 / RFC 5987 form (ASCII fallback plus filename*).
  • Why accept SVG instead of refusing it: no change for the person who uploads, and no migration for SVGs already stored. The protection is on the way out, which also covers any SVG already in the database.
  • Must not change: inline preview of PDF and images (CR-007), the Cache-Control the offline drawing cache relies on, the D8 limits, and the upload API.

D20 — One SOP per project

  • Problem: the rule "changing a completed SOP is a Project Admin action" checks only the SOP row being posted. A project_user can post a NEW SOP id with complete: true. Every reader picks "the latest complete SOP", so that row becomes the baseline every page loads and the source of PM, CM and QA mail routing (SEC-02, probe S3).
  • Decision:
    1. A project has one SOP, with the id sop__<project_id>. The browser has always written that id (pushSOP in project-data.js). A request with no id gets it. A request that would CREATE a SOP with any other id on a project is refused with 400.
    2. Existing SOP rows with other ids (for example rows seed_demo.py made) stay. They can still be updated under the old rules. Nothing is deleted.
    3. While a project has a complete SOP, writing any SOP on that project with complete: true, and changing a complete SOP, needs Project Admin on the project.
    4. The readers prefer the canonical row: project_sop_team, project_qa_group, project_summary and GET /api/sops/latest with complete=true&project_id= read sop__<project_id> when it is complete, and fall back to "latest complete" only when it is not. So a rogue row made before this fix cannot stay the baseline.
  • Must not change: a project member drafting the SOP and completing it the first time (allowed today, allowed after); admin access to project-less SOPs; the response shape of every SOP route.

D21 — Session decode fails closed; PyJWT upgraded

  • Problem: a crafted 1.6 KB cookie makes PyJWT 2.13.0 raise an error that decode_token does not catch, so an unauthenticated request gets a 500 and a stack trace in the log (SEC-07, probe S12). pip-audit lists 13 advisories for 2.13.0.
  • Decision: pin PyJWT 2.15.1 (pip-audit: no known vulnerabilities on 2026-10-02). decode_token treats ANY decode failure, and any cookie longer than 4096 characters, as "not signed in" (401). It also requires the exp and sub claims, which every token this app issues carries.
  • Must not change: every valid session, the D18 sliding refresh and ceiling, and the fake Okta test seam.