28 KiB
Wave 13 — Okta/AD deprovisioning sync
Items: D18
Depends on: wave 10 merged (it is). Not blocked by wave 11 or wave 12, but
shares server/app.py account-state surface with wave 12 (CR-020) — sequence
commits to avoid an avoidable conflict.
Decision record: docs/waves/decisions-2026-09-17.md
Six tasks, in build order. T13.3's fail-closed behavior is the most important done-when list in this wave — do not relax it to ship faster.
T13.1 — D18: idle timeout with an absolute ceiling
- Items:
D18 - Depends on: nothing (first task, independent of the rest)
- Blocks: nothing
- Surface:
server/ - Files:
server/auth.py,server/app.py(auth_gatemiddleware),server/.env.example,DEPLOYMENT.md
Revised 2026-09-23 — originally just "shrink AUTH_SESSION_HOURS". Matt
asked whether an idle timeout would be a better fit than a flat session
length. It is, but not by itself — see the decision record's reasoning on why
idle-with-no-ceiling is actually a worse fit for this item's own threat model
than a flat expiry would have been. Build both.
Do:
- Add
login_atto the JWT payload increate_token()— the original sign-in time, distinct fromiat, which becomes "when THIS token was issued" once tokens start getting reissued.login_atnever changes across reissues; it's what the absolute ceiling is measured from. - Add
AUTH_IDLE_MINUTES(default 30).AUTH_SESSION_HOURSstays the name for the absolute ceiling, default changing from 12 to a proposed 8 — update its docstring/comment inauth.pyand.env.example, since its MEANING is changing (session length -> hard ceiling on top of a sliding idle window), not just its value. - In
auth_gate(server/app.py), after confirming a request is authenticated: ifnow < login_at + AUTH_SESSION_HOURS(the ceiling hasn't passed), computenew_exp = min(now + AUTH_IDLE_MINUTES, login_at + AUTH_SESSION_HOURS). Ifnew_expis meaningfully later than the current token'sexp(throttle this — do not reissue on every single request, only when enough time has passed to be worth a new cookie; a few minutes of slack is fine), mint a refreshed token carrying forwardsub/username/role/ver/login_atunchanged, and set it on the response. - If the ceiling HAS passed, do not refresh — let the existing token expire on its own terms (it may already be invalid, or may tick over within the idle window; either way, no new one is issued past the ceiling).
- The middleware should not need a DB round trip to do this — everything
needed (
sub,username,role,ver,login_at) is already in the validated claims.get_current_user's existing per-requestis_active/token_versioncheck is unaffected and still runs separately.
Do not: reissue the cookie on every request unconditionally — that's a
Set-Cookie header on every API call for no benefit over a coarser refresh.
Do not let the ceiling check silently vanish for tokens issued before this
change ships — a token with no login_at claim should fall back to treating
its own iat as login_at, not bypass the ceiling entirely.
Done when:
- a session with continuous activity stays alive past 30 minutes but is
cut off at the
AUTH_SESSION_HOURSceiling regardless (2026-10-16, T13.6: a request every minute for 10 hours: alive well past 30 minutes, never extended past login + 8 h, cut off at the ceiling, originallogin_atkept.) - a session with no activity for 30+ minutes is rejected on its next request (2026-10-16, T13.6: an idle token gets 401 on a gated route; one inside the window gets 200.)
- the cookie is not rewritten on every single request — verify the refresh is throttled, not unconditional (2026-10-16, T13.6: 20 rapid requests on a fresh session: 0 rewrites; 480 requests over 8 h: about one rewrite per 10 minutes; a refreshed cookie is not rewritten again on the next request. Mutation test: removing the throttle fails 3 checks.)
- a pre-existing token with no
login_atclaim (simulating a session issued before this shipped) still gets a hard ceiling, via theiatfallback (2026-10-16, T13.6: a token with iat 9 h ago and a still-valid old exp is not extended; one with iat 1 h ago is refreshed withlogin_attaken fromiat; nologin_atand noiatis not refreshed and does not crash. Mutation test: giving it a fresh ceiling fails.) .env.exampleandDEPLOYMENT.mdexplain both variables and flag both defaults as proposed, not confirmed against Okta's own session policy (2026-10-16, T13.6: both variables are in both files, and both call the defaults proposed.)- existing session/auth tests updated for the new mechanism, not just a
new number
(2026-10-16, T13.6: there were none. T13.1 shipped with no test of its own.
tests/session_idle_check.pyis that test (T13.6 added it).)
Found while writing that test (T13.6, 2026-10-16):
- Nothing under
/api/auth/slides the session.auth._EXEMPT_PREFIXEScovers that whole prefix, soauth_gatenever refreshes there (including/api/auth/me). A page that only called/api/auth/mewould not extend its session. The spec says "after confirming a request is authenticated", and these routes are not confirmed by the gate, so this is as written. Noted, not changed. - The wave's exit criteria below say
AUTH_SESSION_HOURSdefaults to 2. T13.1 (this section),auth.py,.env.exampleandDEPLOYMENT.mdall say 8. The code and the T13.1 text agree, so the exit line looks like a leftover from before the 2026-09-23 revision. Not changed here: it is a product number. Needs Matt to say which one he means.
T13.2 — D18: Okta Management API client
- Items:
D18 - Depends on: nothing (independent of T13.1)
- Blocks: T13.3
- Surface:
server/ - Files: new
server/okta_sync.py(or extendserver/okta_auth.py— task's call),server/.env.example
Do: A small client for Okta's user-list endpoint, authenticated with a new,
separate credential (e.g. OKTA_API_TOKEN) — not the OIDC client secret used
for sign-in. Fetch the full user list (paginated per Okta's API) rather than
one-by-one lookups per local user; this app has ~20-odd accounts today, and a
list-and-diff is simpler and cheaper than N calls. Return each Okta user's
identity-claim value (matching OKTA_IDENTITY_CLAIM, already confirmed live
per wave 10) and status.
Follow the existing pattern for external credentials in this repo (MICRON_DB_URL,
SMTP_PASSWORD): env-only, never logged, never returned to the browser in an
error message.
Do not: reuse OKTA_CLIENT_ID/OKTA_CLIENT_SECRET for this. Sign-in and
the management API are different trust boundaries with different scopes;
conflating them means a compromise or rotation of one affects the other
unnecessarily.
Done when:
- the client authenticates with its own credential, distinct from the OIDC
client
(2026-10-16:
OKTA_API_TOKEN, sent asAuthorization: SSWS.tests/okta_sync_check.pysets a different OIDC client secret and asserts it is never sent.) - it fetches the complete Okta user list, handling pagination
(2026-10-16: follows
Link: rel="next", 200 per page, 2-page case checked. A next link to another host is refused, a chain longer than 50 pages raises instead of cutting the list off, redirects are never followed.) - an auth failure or malformed response raises a clear, specific error
rather than returning an empty list indistinguishable from "everyone was
deprovisioned" — this distinction is what T13.3 depends on
(2026-10-16:
OktaSyncErrorfor HTTP 401/403/404/429/5xx, redirects, network errors, timeouts, non-JSON, non-list, a bad item (never skipped), and an empty list. 31 failure checks. Mutation test: making the client return[]on an error fails 10 of them.) - the credential is never logged or surfaced in any API response
(2026-10-16: error messages carry the class name and HTTP status only, never the URL or a header.
describe()has no token. Nothing is wired to an API response yet; T13.4 wires the startup log.)
T13.3 — D18: the sync job
- Items:
D18 - Depends on: T13.2
- Blocks: T13.4
- Surface:
server/ - Files:
server/okta_sync.py,server/app.py(or whereverlog_eventlives)
Do: Compare the Okta user list (T13.2) against local users rows. For any
local is_active=True user whose Okta identity is missing from the list, or
present with a non-active status, set is_active=False and write an
AuditLog row (actor="system:okta_sync", action e.g.
user_deprovisioned_by_sync, detail naming the Okta status found). Never
touch a user already is_active=False. Never re-enable anyone.
The fail-closed rule, non-negotiable: if T13.2's client raises an error of
any kind (network, auth, malformed response, timeout), this task takes no
action on any account for that run and logs the failure clearly (server log,
at minimum). An error is never treated as "Okta returned zero active users."
Write a test that asserts this directly: feed the sync a failing client and
assert zero rows changed and zero AuditLog entries written.
Done when:
- a user missing from Okta's list, or present but not active, is disabled
with a correctly-detailed audit row
(2026-10-16: see "Decided 2026-10-16" below for which statuses count as "not active". Audit row: actor
system:okta_sync, actionuser_deprovisioned_by_sync,entity_typeuser,detail{okta_status, via}; a missing user is recorded asMISSING.) - a user already disabled is left alone (no duplicate audit row each run) (2026-10-16: a second run over the same data writes no new rows.)
- an active Okta user already active locally produces no audit row (only
changes are logged, not a clean bill of health every cycle)
(2026-10-16: verified in
tests/okta_sync_job_check.py.) - a simulated Okta API failure results in zero account changes and zero
audit rows — this is the one check that must never be skipped or
weakened
(2026-10-16: 10 stand-in failures (OktaSyncError, RuntimeError, ConnectionError, TimeoutError, ValueError, KeyError, empty list, None, two kinds of garbage), 4 through the real client (HTTP 401/403/429/500), the default path with no token, a failed commit, and a wrong identity attribute. Each:
okis False, zero accounts changed, zero audit rows. Mutation test: removing the fail-closed branch and the zero-match guard fails 28 of these.) - the job never re-enables an account under any input
(2026-10-16: a disabled account that is ACTIVE in Okta stays disabled, and
okta_sync.pycontains no assignment ofis_activeto True.)
Decided 2026-10-16 (Matt, in chat): which Okta statuses disable an account.
The spec says "a non-active status". Read literally, that also catches
PASSWORD_EXPIRED, LOCKED_OUT and RECOVERY, which people leave on their
own, and this job never re-enables, so one AD password expiry would lock someone
out of the app until an admin stepped in. Decided: an account disables when it is
missing from Okta's list, or every Okta entry for it is SUSPENDED or
DEPROVISIONED (DISABLING_STATUSES in server/okta_sync.py). Okta's default
user list already leaves out DEPROVISIONED users, so those arrive as "missing".
Added 2026-10-16, inside decision 4's "anything the sync can't confidently
parse": if there are active local accounts and none of them matches any
Okta user, the run is refused and nothing changes. That pattern means the
identity attribute is wrong (OKTA_SYNC_PROFILE_ATTRIBUTE), not that the whole
company left. It is a guard, not a new feature. Raise it in the PR.
Open, for the PR / Nick: which Okta profile attribute equals the
preferred_username claim in this tenant. The client assumes profile.login,
Okta's default. Confirm before the first live run. A wrong value is caught by the
zero-match guard above only when it matches nobody at all; a value that matches
some accounts and not others would disable the rest. See BL-069.
T13.4 — D18: run it on a schedule
- Items:
D18 - Depends on: T13.3
- Blocks: T13.6
- Surface:
server/,docker-compose.yml - Files:
server/app.py(startup hook) or a new sidecar per thebackupcontainer's pattern — task's call, per the decision record's noted alternative
Do: Wire T13.3 to run on an interval (proposed 15 minutes, env-overridable
— e.g. OKTA_SYNC_INTERVAL_SECONDS, matching BACKUP_INTERVAL_SECONDS's
naming). Default choice is an in-process background task in the api
container; if a separate container is chosen instead, follow the backup
service's shape (own Dockerfile or script, internal network plus whatever
egress reaching Okta requires — check whether outbound as currently defined
is sufficient or Okta needs a distinct allowance).
Done when:
- the job runs automatically on the configured interval without manual
invocation
(2026-10-16: a daemon timer thread starts from the app's lifespan hook (
server/app.py), checks once a minute, and ran the sync on its own intests/okta_sync_schedule_check.py. WithOKTA_API_TOKENunset it starts nothing and the startup log saysOkta sync DISABLED. Booted the real app both ways; the thread starts and ends with the app.) - interval is env-configurable with a sane default
(2026-10-16:
OKTA_SYNC_INTERVAL_SECONDS, default 900. A non-number uses the default. A value under 300 is raised to 300. Passed throughdocker-compose.yml.) - a container restart does not produce a duplicate/overlapping run, and a
slow cycle does not stack with the next one
(2026-10-16: the api runs 2 gunicorn workers, so each starts its own timer. One row in
app_settings(keyokta_sync) is the gate: a worker claims a cycle with one atomic conditional UPDATE, so exactly one wins. Checked with 8 racing workers on a file database, 15 rounds plus the first-insert race: exactly 1 winner every time. The row outlives a restart, so a restart inside the interval starts nothing. A slow run cannot overlap the next: a fetch is capped at 120 s in total and the interval cannot go below 300 s. Inside one process the thread runs one cycle at a time. This needed no migration:app_settingsalready exists.)
Decided 2026-10-16 (task's call, per this task's "Do"): in-process timer in the
api container, as D18 proposed, not a sidecar. The backup pattern was the
alternative; it would need its own image and would not remove the 2-worker
duplicate question, because the sync reads the application database anyway.
Network check, as the task asked: the outbound network the api service
already joins is an ordinary bridge with a gateway, so Okta is reachable with no
network change. The host firewall must allow https to the Okta org.
One change to T13.2's code: fetch_users() now also stops after 120 seconds in
total (TOTAL_DEADLINE_SECONDS), which is what lets the scheduler promise no
overlap. Tested in tests/okta_sync_check.py section 8.
T13.4 follow-up, 2026-10-16: the sync's INFO log lines did not appear in
docker compose logs api. Nothing in the app configures Python logging, and
gunicorn configures only its own loggers, so INFO from any wpsuite.* logger is
dropped. The T13.4 check booted the app in-process with logging switched on,
which hid it. With the exact Dockerfile launch (2 gunicorn workers), a healthy
start printed zero Okta lines. okta_sync.py now gives its own logger one stderr
handler (only when the root logger has none). Re-run with the real gunicorn
command: configured and scheduled (or DISABLED) now print once per worker.
No other module's output changed. App-wide logging stays a separate question
(BL-028 is the same family).
T13.5 — D18: admin visibility
- Items:
D18 - Depends on: T13.3
- Blocks: T13.6
- Surface:
html/ - Files:
html/users.js/html/admin.js(wherever audit history is already surfaced)
Do: Confirm an auto-disable reads clearly wherever admins already look at
account history — the actor string (system:okta_sync) should be
self-explanatory in context, not require reading server logs to understand.
Do not build new UI beyond making sure the existing audit surface renders this
actor sensibly. Email/notification to admins on auto-disable is a noted
fast-follow (the decision record flags it as open, not required here) — do not
build it in this task; log it instead if it's tempting to add.
Done when:
- an auto-disabled account's audit entry is visible and legible in the
existing admin UI without special-casing
(2026-10-16: run on the PC against the real page, 1440px and 390px,
tests/okta_sync_ui_check.py28/28. The admin Activity log card reads: Whosystem:okta_sync, Actionuser deprovisioned by sync, Typeuser, Item the username, Detailokta_status: SUSPENDED, via: okta_sync(a person missing from Okta readsokta_status: MISSING). Search forokta_syncand the User accounts filter both find the rows. No sideways scroll, no JavaScript errors. The disabled account is refused on its very next request; an account still active in Okta is not. A project super user does not see these rows: they belong to no project, so only admins do, the same as other user-management events. No code inhtml/changed.) - nothing here silently assumes
CR-019's activity view exists yet — this must work standalone (2026-10-16: the check reads only the Activity log (AuditLog) card. The new Activity & usage card is on the page but is not read.)
No UI was built. The existing card renders the new rows legibly as is. Two things you might expect and did not get, both on purpose: no admin email on an auto-disable (D18 calls it a fast-follow; not built, not logged as a new item because D18 already names it), and no per-user history view in the User Directory (it has none today, and the task says not to build one).
T13.6 — D18: verification
- Items:
D18 - Depends on: T13.4, T13.5
- Blocks: nothing
- Surface:
server/ - Files: as touched above
Do: Full verification per CLAUDE.md. Beyond the usual run: specifically
re-run T13.3's fail-closed test in isolation and confirm it still passes after
T13.4's scheduling wrapper is in place — the scheduling layer must not
introduce a path that swallows the client's error and proceeds anyway.
Done when:
- all
D18acceptance criteria indecisions-2026-09-17.mdare met or a failure is stated with a reason - the fail-closed behavior is verified end to end through the scheduled wrapper, not just the bare sync function
- smoke test and
seed_demo.pyboth still pass - full test suite passes (48 of 50; the two failures are the known ones, see the result note below)
Wave 13 exit criteria
AUTH_SESSION_HOURSdefaults to 2, documented- the sync job runs on a schedule and correctly disables accounts Okta no longer shows as active
- every auto-disable is individually audited with a clearly non-human actor
- an Okta API failure of any kind changes zero accounts — verified, not assumed
- the sync never re-enables an account
D18fully accounted for, no open acceptance criteria
Release note (2026-10-16)
T13.1 (commit 6cde6e3) is held back from main until T14.1 lands, per the merge
rule in wave-12.md. The release branch contains wave 11 and T13.2 to T13.5.
tests/session_idle_check.py skips (exit 0) when auth.maybe_refresh_token is absent.
Sessions keep the flat AUTH_SESSION_HOURS lifetime (default 12) until T13.1 lands.
T13.6 result (2026-10-16, merged release tree, Edge on the PC): 47 test scripts, 45 pass.
The two failures are not regressions. token_check.py exits 2 (CLI usage detail).
generalinfo_check.py finds an old color-literal gap in wp-creation-styles.css.
Alembic upgrade, downgrade, upgrade passed. Import check passed.
T13.7: D22 dry run for the Okta sync
Item: D22 (docs/waves/decisions-2026-10-16.md). Extends T13.3 and T13.4.
Done when:
OKTA_SYNC_DRY_RUNon: the sync fetches and matches, logs the accounts it would disable, and changes no account and writes no audit row (tests/okta_sync_dry_run_check.py)- both guards (zero match, fail closed) still apply in a dry run
- flag off or unset: behavior is unchanged (
okta_sync_job_check.pystill passes) - the startup line names the mode
.env.example,docker-compose.ymlandDEPLOYMENT.mddescribe the flag and the first-deploy steps- mutation check: if the dry-run guard is removed, the new test fails
Result 2026-10-16: all Okta sync tests and security_check.py pass in the sandbox.
This task changes no frontend file.
T13.8: run the stack in Docker on a PC
Item: D22 (docs/waves/decisions-2026-10-16.md), as a way to check T13.7 and later builds before a deploy.
Done when:
- one command starts the api, the database and the web server from the shipped compose file plus
docker-compose.local.yml http://localhost:8080/api/healthanswers 200 and/api/projectsanswers 401 without a session- every migration runs on Postgres (head
8e2cb3003f8a) - the api log shows the
Okta syncstartup line - the steps are in
DEPLOYMENT.md, "Run the stack on your own PC" - the shipped
docker-compose.ymland nginx config are not changed
Result 2026-10-16 (Docker Desktop 29.7.2, Compose 5.4.0, Windows): passed. Three things in the shipped files stop a local run. The override handles the first two and the third is logged:
- The web server publishes no port (the host's reverse proxy reaches it). The override publishes 8080 on loopback.
- An existing
proxynetwork on a PC can have no gateway, and Docker then does not publish ports. The override uses its own bridge. The stock nginxdefault.confalso answers "localhost" first and the app server answers only wp.controls.dev, so the override removes the stock file and makes the app server the default. - The backup container cannot start on Windows:
scripts/entrypoint.shhas CRLF line endings (BL-070). The override turns the backup service off.
T13.9: D23 sign in as an OAuth service app (private_key_jwt)
Item: D23 (docs/waves/decisions-2026-10-16.md). Extends T13.2.
Done when:
- with
OKTA_SYNC_CLIENT_IDandOKTA_SYNC_PRIVATE_KEY, the sync gets an access token and lists users withBearer(tests/okta_sync_oauth_check.py) - the assertion verifies against the public key:
iss,sub,aud,kid, life,jti - RSA and EC keys; JSON and base64 forms
- a failed token request, a missing token, a DPoP token, a public key, or an unreadable key raises, and the users endpoint is never called
OKTA_API_TOKENstill works and wins when both are set- the startup line names the credential and holds no secret; no error message holds key text
- mutation checks: Bearer to SSWS, wrong
aud, DPoP accepted, public-key check removed: each makes the test fail .env.example,docker-compose.yml,DEPLOYMENT.mddescribe the variables and the Okta app setup
Result 2026-10-16: sandbox, fake Okta. Not yet run against the real tenant.
No new dependency: PyJWT signs with cryptography, which Authlib already installs.
T13.9 follow-up (2026-10-16): the first live deploy failed with "OKTA_SYNC_PRIVATE_KEY is not a
JWK as JSON or as base64 of JSON". The first loader used strict base64, which rejects any
space or line break, and it gave one message for every failure. The loader now forgives quote
marks, spaces, line breaks, missing padding, the URL-safe alphabet, a byte-order mark and a
one-key JWK Set, and each failure names its step (counts only, no key text). The new checks
in tests/okta_sync_oauth_check.py fail against the first loader and pass now.
T13.9 follow-up 2 (2026-10-16): the second deploy decoded the value but the text was not JSON. The loader now also names a PEM key, adds missing outer braces, unwraps a value that was encoded twice, and its "not JSON" message gives the length and the kind of first character (counts only).
T13.9 follow-up 3 (2026-10-16): the third deploy decoded the base64 to 1,760 characters that start with a brace, but Python's strict JSON reader refused them (PowerShell accepted the same text). The loader now accepts control characters such as line breaks inside a string, curly quote marks and a trailing comma, removes spaces inside the key's number fields, and a real syntax error reports the line and column (position and rule only, never key text).
T13.10: D24 DPoP for the Okta Management API
Item: D24 (docs/waves/decisions-2026-10-16.md). Extends T13.9.
Done when:
- auto mode: a plain Bearer token is tried first;
invalid_dpop_proofmakes the sync retry with DPoP (tests/okta_sync_dpop_check.py) - each proof verifies: header (
dpop+jwt, ES256, public jwk only), signature,htm,htuwithout query, currentiat, one-timejti,athon API calls, same key for token and API calls - nonce challenges at the token endpoint and at the API are answered once, and the retries are bounded
- paging: a new proof for every page
- mode
onand modeoff; a DPoP-bound token with mode off is refused; each run makes a new key - no secret in any message or the startup line; the SSWS path is unchanged
- mutation checks: query kept in
htu,athomitted,jtireused, nonce not retried (token and API), private key in the proof header, and auto detection removed each make a test fail .env.example,docker-compose.yml,DEPLOYMENT.mdupdated
Result 2026-10-16: sandbox, strict fake Okta. Not yet run against the real tenant.
Live run and final verification (2026-10-17)
Live deploy. The api container runs the build from main (1a3468e) in Portainer. It signs in with the
service-app key (private_key_jwt) and DPoP. The first dry run (2026-10-17 18:31) fetched 2,564 Okta users and
checked 42 active local accounts. 41 matched (so profile.login is the right attribute) and 1 would be disabled:
admin, Okta status MISSING. Matt confirmed that admin is a leftover account, and switched the dry run off.
Live run log lines (api log):
- 18:46:21
Okta sync disabled 'admin' (Okta status: MISSING), thendone: 2564 Okta user(s), 42 active local account(s) checked, 1 disabled - 19:01:50
done: ... 41 active local account(s) checked, 0 disabled - 19:16:30
done: ... 41 active local account(s) checked, 0 disabled
This shows: the job runs on its schedule (every 900 seconds), it disables an account that Okta no longer lists, a
disabled account is not touched again and gets no new row, and the account count fell from 42 to 41.
The first session logs of fail-closed behavior are in the earlier runs: with a rejected token, a bad key, and an
unreadable key, the sync logged SKIPPED, no account was changed every time and no account changed.
Admin recovery. python -m server.manage_users list | promote | enable | disable works from the Portainer
console of wp_api (no docker compose exec prefix). promote changes an existing account. It does not create one.
Full verification on the final tree (1a3468e).
- Test suite on Matt's PC (Edge): 50 scripts, 48 pass. The two failures are not regressions:
token_check.pyexits 2 (it needs--outor--compare), andgeneralinfo_check.pyfinds an old colour literal (rgba() inwp-creation-styles.css. server/smoketest.py: 27 of 27 checks pass.server/seed_demo.py: runs clean. Both ran in the sandbox against a throwaway SQLite database. Note: usehttp://127.0.0.1:PORT, nothttp://localhost:PORT, because Python's cookie jar does not send a cookie set forlocalhost(logged as BL-071).- The Okta tests (
okta_sync_check,_job_,_schedule_,_dry_run_,_oauth_,_dpop_,_ui_) andsecurity_check.pypass.
Still open for wave 13.
T13.1(idle timeout) is held back frommainuntil T14.1 lands. The exit criterion "AUTH_SESSION_HOURSdefaults to 2" is not met, and it conflicts with T13.1's own text (8 hours). Matt has not chosen."Every auto-disable is individually audited with a clearly non-human actor" was not checked after the live run.Checked 2026-10-17: the Admin Console activity list shows one row, actorsystem:okta_sync, action "user deprovisioned by sync", itemadmin, detailokta_status: MISSING, via: okta_sync, at 11:46 AM local (18:46 UTC).D18cannot be called fully accounted for while T13.1 is outstanding.BL-069(a cap on one run and a last-admin guard) is open.