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Project-SDE-WP-Suite/docs/waves/wave-13.md

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# Wave 13 — Okta/AD deprovisioning sync
**Items:** `D18`
**Depends on:** wave 10 merged (it is). Not blocked by wave 11 or wave 12, but
shares `server/app.py` account-state surface with wave 12 (`CR-020`) — sequence
commits to avoid an avoidable conflict.
**Decision record:** `docs/waves/decisions-2026-09-17.md`
Six tasks, in build order. **T13.3's fail-closed behavior is the most
important done-when list in this wave — do not relax it to ship faster.**
---
### T13.1 — D18: idle timeout with an absolute ceiling
- **Items:** `D18`
- **Depends on:** nothing (first task, independent of the rest)
- **Blocks:** nothing
- **Surface:** `server/`
- **Files:** `server/auth.py`, `server/app.py` (`auth_gate` middleware),
`server/.env.example`, `DEPLOYMENT.md`
**Revised 2026-09-23** — originally just "shrink `AUTH_SESSION_HOURS`". Matt
asked whether an idle timeout would be a better fit than a flat session
length. It is, but not by itself — see the decision record's reasoning on why
idle-with-no-ceiling is actually a worse fit for this item's own threat model
than a flat expiry would have been. Build both.
**Do:**
- Add `login_at` to the JWT payload in `create_token()` — the original
sign-in time, distinct from `iat`, which becomes "when THIS token was
issued" once tokens start getting reissued. `login_at` never changes across
reissues; it's what the absolute ceiling is measured from.
- Add `AUTH_IDLE_MINUTES` (default 30). `AUTH_SESSION_HOURS` stays the name
for the absolute ceiling, default changing from 12 to a proposed 8 — update
its docstring/comment in `auth.py` and `.env.example`, since its MEANING is
changing (session length -> hard ceiling on top of a sliding idle window),
not just its value.
- In `auth_gate` (`server/app.py`), after confirming a request is
authenticated: if `now < login_at + AUTH_SESSION_HOURS` (the ceiling hasn't
passed), compute `new_exp = min(now + AUTH_IDLE_MINUTES, login_at +
AUTH_SESSION_HOURS)`. If `new_exp` is meaningfully later than the current
token's `exp` (throttle this — do not reissue on every single request, only
when enough time has passed to be worth a new cookie; a few minutes of
slack is fine), mint a refreshed token carrying forward `sub`/`username`/
`role`/`ver`/`login_at` unchanged, and set it on the response.
- If the ceiling HAS passed, do not refresh — let the existing token expire
on its own terms (it may already be invalid, or may tick over within the
idle window; either way, no new one is issued past the ceiling).
- The middleware should not need a DB round trip to do this — everything
needed (`sub`, `username`, `role`, `ver`, `login_at`) is already in the
validated claims. `get_current_user`'s existing per-request `is_active`/
`token_version` check is unaffected and still runs separately.
**Do not:** reissue the cookie on every request unconditionally — that's a
`Set-Cookie` header on every API call for no benefit over a coarser refresh.
Do not let the ceiling check silently vanish for tokens issued before this
change ships — a token with no `login_at` claim should fall back to treating
its own `iat` as `login_at`, not bypass the ceiling entirely.
**Done when:**
- [x] a session with continuous activity stays alive past 30 minutes but is
cut off at the `AUTH_SESSION_HOURS` ceiling regardless
*(2026-10-16, T13.6: a request every minute for 10 hours: alive well past 30 minutes, never extended past login + 8 h, cut off at the ceiling, original `login_at` kept.)*
- [x] a session with no activity for 30+ minutes is rejected on its next
request
*(2026-10-16, T13.6: an idle token gets 401 on a gated route; one inside the window gets 200.)*
- [x] the cookie is not rewritten on every single request — verify the
refresh is throttled, not unconditional
*(2026-10-16, T13.6: 20 rapid requests on a fresh session: 0 rewrites; 480 requests over 8 h: about one rewrite per 10 minutes; a refreshed cookie is not rewritten again on the next request. Mutation test: removing the throttle fails 3 checks.)*
- [x] a pre-existing token with no `login_at` claim (simulating a session
issued before this shipped) still gets a hard ceiling, via the `iat`
fallback
*(2026-10-16, T13.6: a token with iat 9 h ago and a still-valid old exp is not extended; one with iat 1 h ago is refreshed with `login_at` taken from `iat`; no `login_at` and no `iat` is not refreshed and does not crash. Mutation test: giving it a fresh ceiling fails.)*
- [x] `.env.example` and `DEPLOYMENT.md` explain both variables and flag both
defaults as proposed, not confirmed against Okta's own session policy
*(2026-10-16, T13.6: both variables are in both files, and both call the defaults proposed.)*
- [x] existing session/auth tests updated for the new mechanism, not just a
new number
*(2026-10-16, T13.6: there were none. T13.1 shipped with no test of its own. `tests/session_idle_check.py` is that test (T13.6 added it).)*
---
**Found while writing that test (T13.6, 2026-10-16):**
- Nothing under `/api/auth/` slides the session. `auth._EXEMPT_PREFIXES` covers
that whole prefix, so `auth_gate` never refreshes there (including
`/api/auth/me`). A page that only called `/api/auth/me` would not extend its
session. The spec says "after confirming a request is authenticated", and these
routes are not confirmed by the gate, so this is as written. Noted, not changed.
- The wave's exit criteria below say `AUTH_SESSION_HOURS` defaults to **2**. T13.1
(this section), `auth.py`, `.env.example` and `DEPLOYMENT.md` all say **8**. The
code and the T13.1 text agree, so the exit line looks like a leftover from
before the 2026-09-23 revision. Not changed here: it is a product number. Needs
Matt to say which one he means.
### T13.2 — D18: Okta Management API client
- **Items:** `D18`
- **Depends on:** nothing (independent of T13.1)
- **Blocks:** T13.3
- **Surface:** `server/`
- **Files:** new `server/okta_sync.py` (or extend `server/okta_auth.py` —
task's call), `server/.env.example`
**Do:** A small client for Okta's user-list endpoint, authenticated with a new,
separate credential (e.g. `OKTA_API_TOKEN`) — not the OIDC client secret used
for sign-in. Fetch the full user list (paginated per Okta's API) rather than
one-by-one lookups per local user; this app has ~20-odd accounts today, and a
list-and-diff is simpler and cheaper than N calls. Return each Okta user's
identity-claim value (matching `OKTA_IDENTITY_CLAIM`, already confirmed live
per wave 10) and status.
Follow the existing pattern for external credentials in this repo (`MICRON_DB_URL`,
`SMTP_PASSWORD`): env-only, never logged, never returned to the browser in an
error message.
**Do not:** reuse `OKTA_CLIENT_ID`/`OKTA_CLIENT_SECRET` for this. Sign-in and
the management API are different trust boundaries with different scopes;
conflating them means a compromise or rotation of one affects the other
unnecessarily.
**Done when:**
- [x] the client authenticates with its own credential, distinct from the OIDC
client
*(2026-10-16: `OKTA_API_TOKEN`, sent as `Authorization: SSWS`. `tests/okta_sync_check.py` sets a different OIDC client secret and asserts it is never sent.)*
- [x] it fetches the complete Okta user list, handling pagination
*(2026-10-16: follows `Link: rel="next"`, 200 per page, 2-page case checked. A next link to another host is refused, a chain longer than 50 pages raises instead of cutting the list off, redirects are never followed.)*
- [x] an auth failure or malformed response raises a clear, specific error
rather than returning an empty list indistinguishable from "everyone was
deprovisioned" — this distinction is what T13.3 depends on
*(2026-10-16: `OktaSyncError` for HTTP 401/403/404/429/5xx, redirects, network errors, timeouts, non-JSON, non-list, a bad item (never skipped), and an empty list. 31 failure checks. Mutation test: making the client return `[]` on an error fails 10 of them.)*
- [x] the credential is never logged or surfaced in any API response
*(2026-10-16: error messages carry the class name and HTTP status only, never the URL or a header. `describe()` has no token. Nothing is wired to an API response yet; T13.4 wires the startup log.)*
---
### T13.3 — D18: the sync job
- **Items:** `D18`
- **Depends on:** T13.2
- **Blocks:** T13.4
- **Surface:** `server/`
- **Files:** `server/okta_sync.py`, `server/app.py` (or wherever `log_event`
lives)
**Do:** Compare the Okta user list (T13.2) against local `users` rows. For any
local `is_active=True` user whose Okta identity is missing from the list, or
present with a non-active status, set `is_active=False` and write an
`AuditLog` row (`actor="system:okta_sync"`, action e.g.
`user_deprovisioned_by_sync`, detail naming the Okta status found). Never
touch a user already `is_active=False`. Never re-enable anyone.
**The fail-closed rule, non-negotiable:** if T13.2's client raises an error of
any kind (network, auth, malformed response, timeout), this task takes **no
action on any account** for that run and logs the failure clearly (server log,
at minimum). An error is never treated as "Okta returned zero active users."
Write a test that asserts this directly: feed the sync a failing client and
assert zero rows changed and zero `AuditLog` entries written.
**Done when:**
- [x] a user missing from Okta's list, or present but not active, is disabled
with a correctly-detailed audit row
*(2026-10-16: see "Decided 2026-10-16" below for which statuses count as "not active". Audit row: actor `system:okta_sync`, action `user_deprovisioned_by_sync`, `entity_type` user, `detail` `{okta_status, via}`; a missing user is recorded as `MISSING`.)*
- [x] a user already disabled is left alone (no duplicate audit row each run)
*(2026-10-16: a second run over the same data writes no new rows.)*
- [x] an active Okta user already active locally produces no audit row (only
changes are logged, not a clean bill of health every cycle)
*(2026-10-16: verified in `tests/okta_sync_job_check.py`.)*
- [x] **a simulated Okta API failure results in zero account changes and zero
audit rows** — this is the one check that must never be skipped or
weakened
*(2026-10-16: 10 stand-in failures (OktaSyncError, RuntimeError, ConnectionError, TimeoutError, ValueError, KeyError, empty list, None, two kinds of garbage), 4 through the real client (HTTP 401/403/429/500), the default path with no token, a failed commit, and a wrong identity attribute. Each: `ok` is False, zero accounts changed, zero audit rows. Mutation test: removing the fail-closed branch and the zero-match guard fails 28 of these.)*
- [x] the job never re-enables an account under any input
*(2026-10-16: a disabled account that is ACTIVE in Okta stays disabled, and `okta_sync.py` contains no assignment of `is_active` to True.)*
---
**Decided 2026-10-16 (Matt, in chat):** which Okta statuses disable an account.
The spec says "a non-active status". Read literally, that also catches
`PASSWORD_EXPIRED`, `LOCKED_OUT` and `RECOVERY`, which people leave on their
own, and this job never re-enables, so one AD password expiry would lock someone
out of the app until an admin stepped in. Decided: an account disables when it is
**missing** from Okta's list, or every Okta entry for it is **SUSPENDED** or
**DEPROVISIONED** (`DISABLING_STATUSES` in `server/okta_sync.py`). Okta's default
user list already leaves out DEPROVISIONED users, so those arrive as "missing".
**Added 2026-10-16, inside decision 4's "anything the sync can't confidently
parse":** if there are active local accounts and **none** of them matches any
Okta user, the run is refused and nothing changes. That pattern means the
identity attribute is wrong (`OKTA_SYNC_PROFILE_ATTRIBUTE`), not that the whole
company left. It is a guard, not a new feature. Raise it in the PR.
**Open, for the PR / Nick:** which Okta profile attribute equals the
`preferred_username` claim in this tenant. The client assumes `profile.login`,
Okta's default. Confirm before the first live run. A wrong value is caught by the
zero-match guard above only when it matches nobody at all; a value that matches
some accounts and not others would disable the rest. See `BL-069`.
### T13.4 — D18: run it on a schedule
- **Items:** `D18`
- **Depends on:** T13.3
- **Blocks:** T13.6
- **Surface:** `server/`, `docker-compose.yml`
- **Files:** `server/app.py` (startup hook) or a new sidecar per the `backup`
container's pattern — task's call, per the decision record's noted
alternative
**Do:** Wire T13.3 to run on an interval (proposed 15 minutes, env-overridable
— e.g. `OKTA_SYNC_INTERVAL_SECONDS`, matching `BACKUP_INTERVAL_SECONDS`'s
naming). Default choice is an in-process background task in the `api`
container; if a separate container is chosen instead, follow the `backup`
service's shape (own Dockerfile or script, `internal` network plus whatever
egress reaching Okta requires — check whether `outbound` as currently defined
is sufficient or Okta needs a distinct allowance).
**Done when:**
- [x] the job runs automatically on the configured interval without manual
invocation
*(2026-10-16: a daemon timer thread starts from the app's lifespan hook (`server/app.py`), checks once a minute, and ran the sync on its own in `tests/okta_sync_schedule_check.py`. With `OKTA_API_TOKEN` unset it starts nothing and the startup log says `Okta sync DISABLED`. Booted the real app both ways; the thread starts and ends with the app.)*
- [x] interval is env-configurable with a sane default
*(2026-10-16: `OKTA_SYNC_INTERVAL_SECONDS`, default 900. A non-number uses the default. A value under 300 is raised to 300. Passed through `docker-compose.yml`.)*
- [x] a container restart does not produce a duplicate/overlapping run, and a
slow cycle does not stack with the next one
*(2026-10-16: the api runs 2 gunicorn workers, so each starts its own timer. One row in `app_settings` (key `okta_sync`) is the gate: a worker claims a cycle with one atomic conditional UPDATE, so exactly one wins. Checked with 8 racing workers on a file database, 15 rounds plus the first-insert race: exactly 1 winner every time. The row outlives a restart, so a restart inside the interval starts nothing. A slow run cannot overlap the next: a fetch is capped at 120 s in total and the interval cannot go below 300 s. Inside one process the thread runs one cycle at a time. This needed no migration: `app_settings` already exists.)*
---
**Decided 2026-10-16 (task's call, per this task's "Do"):** in-process timer in the
`api` container, as D18 proposed, not a sidecar. The `backup` pattern was the
alternative; it would need its own image and would not remove the 2-worker
duplicate question, because the sync reads the application database anyway.
**Network check, as the task asked:** the `outbound` network the `api` service
already joins is an ordinary bridge with a gateway, so Okta is reachable with no
network change. The host firewall must allow https to the Okta org.
**One change to T13.2's code:** `fetch_users()` now also stops after 120 seconds in
total (`TOTAL_DEADLINE_SECONDS`), which is what lets the scheduler promise no
overlap. Tested in `tests/okta_sync_check.py` section 8.
**T13.4 follow-up, 2026-10-16:** the sync's INFO log lines did not appear in
`docker compose logs api`. Nothing in the app configures Python logging, and
gunicorn configures only its own loggers, so INFO from any `wpsuite.*` logger is
dropped. The T13.4 check booted the app in-process with logging switched on,
which hid it. With the exact Dockerfile launch (2 gunicorn workers), a healthy
start printed zero Okta lines. `okta_sync.py` now gives its own logger one stderr
handler (only when the root logger has none). Re-run with the real gunicorn
command: `configured` and `scheduled` (or `DISABLED`) now print once per worker.
No other module's output changed. App-wide logging stays a separate question
(BL-028 is the same family).
### T13.5 — D18: admin visibility
- **Items:** `D18`
- **Depends on:** T13.3
- **Blocks:** T13.6
- **Surface:** `html/`
- **Files:** `html/users.js` / `html/admin.js` (wherever audit history is
already surfaced)
**Do:** Confirm an auto-disable reads clearly wherever admins already look at
account history — the actor string (`system:okta_sync`) should be
self-explanatory in context, not require reading server logs to understand.
Do not build new UI beyond making sure the existing audit surface renders this
actor sensibly. Email/notification to admins on auto-disable is a noted
fast-follow (the decision record flags it as open, not required here) — do not
build it in this task; log it instead if it's tempting to add.
**Done when:**
- [x] an auto-disabled account's audit entry is visible and legible in the
existing admin UI without special-casing
*(2026-10-16: run on the PC against the real page, 1440px and 390px, `tests/okta_sync_ui_check.py` 28/28. The admin Activity log card reads: Who `system:okta_sync`, Action `user deprovisioned by sync`, Type `user`, Item the username, Detail `okta_status: SUSPENDED, via: okta_sync` (a person missing from Okta reads `okta_status: MISSING`). Search for `okta_sync` and the User accounts filter both find the rows. No sideways scroll, no JavaScript errors. The disabled account is refused on its very next request; an account still active in Okta is not. A project super user does not see these rows: they belong to no project, so only admins do, the same as other user-management events. No code in `html/` changed.)*
- [x] nothing here silently assumes `CR-019`'s activity view exists yet — this
must work standalone
*(2026-10-16: the check reads only the Activity log (AuditLog) card. The new Activity & usage card is on the page but is not read.)*
---
**No UI was built.** The existing card renders the new rows legibly as is. Two
things you might expect and did not get, both on purpose: no admin email on an
auto-disable (D18 calls it a fast-follow; not built, not logged as a new item
because D18 already names it), and no per-user history view in the User
Directory (it has none today, and the task says not to build one).
### T13.6 — D18: verification
- **Items:** `D18`
- **Depends on:** T13.4, T13.5
- **Blocks:** nothing
- **Surface:** `server/`
- **Files:** as touched above
**Do:** Full verification per `CLAUDE.md`. Beyond the usual run: specifically
re-run T13.3's fail-closed test in isolation and confirm it still passes after
T13.4's scheduling wrapper is in place — the scheduling layer must not
introduce a path that swallows the client's error and proceeds anyway.
**Done when:**
- [ ] all `D18` acceptance criteria in `decisions-2026-09-17.md` are met or a
failure is stated with a reason
- [ ] the fail-closed behavior is verified end to end through the scheduled
wrapper, not just the bare sync function
- [ ] smoke test and `seed_demo.py` both still pass
- [ ] full test suite passes
---
## Wave 13 exit criteria
- [ ] `AUTH_SESSION_HOURS` defaults to 2, documented
- [ ] the sync job runs on a schedule and correctly disables accounts Okta no
longer shows as active
- [ ] every auto-disable is individually audited with a clearly non-human actor
- [ ] an Okta API failure of any kind changes zero accounts — verified, not
assumed
- [ ] the sync never re-enables an account
- [ ] `D18` fully accounted for, no open acceptance criteria
## Release note (2026-10-16)
T13.1 (commit `6cde6e3`) is held back from `main` until T14.1 lands, per the merge
rule in `wave-12.md`. The release branch contains wave 11 and T13.2 to T13.5.
`tests/session_idle_check.py` skips (exit 0) when `auth.maybe_refresh_token` is absent.
Sessions keep the flat `AUTH_SESSION_HOURS` lifetime (default 12) until T13.1 lands.
T13.6 result (2026-10-16, merged release tree, Edge on the PC): 47 test scripts, 45 pass.
The two failures are not regressions. `token_check.py` exits 2 (CLI usage detail).
`generalinfo_check.py` finds an old color-literal gap in `wp-creation-styles.css`.
Alembic upgrade, downgrade, upgrade passed. Import check passed.