files_check.py 36/36 (T16.2), sample_check.py 10/10 and
critical_reopen_check.py 11/11 (T16.3), run on Matt's machine with
Edge 154. T16.2 and T16.3 done; wave 16 verification complete.
tests/cdp.py: every probe first failed 'exited rc=0 without binding
the port'. The shell was elevated; Edge and Chrome de-elevate by
relaunching through Explorer and the relaunch drops the debugging
port ('Edge is running elevated: 1' in the browser log). Adds
--do-not-de-elevate on Windows and a 15 s grace for the port after an
rc=0 exit. Both inert on a normal shell and off Windows.
(cherry picked from commit f752ae3677)
152 lines
6.6 KiB
Markdown
152 lines
6.6 KiB
Markdown
# Wave 16 — Urgent security fixes
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**Items:** `D19`, `D20`, `D21`
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**Depends on:** nothing. Independent of waves 12 to 15 (see the decision record).
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**Decision record:** `docs/waves/decisions-2026-10-02.md`
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**Background:** `docs/reference/security-review-2026-10-01.md`
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Four tasks, in build order. All server-side. No page markup or stylesheet
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changes, so the 390px / 1440px screenshot rule does not apply; the
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browser probes that read files and SOPs are still listed for a run on a
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machine with Edge.
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New check for this wave: `tests/security_check.py`. It is self-contained (its
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own SQLite database, in-process, no browser), so it runs anywhere.
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---
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### T16.1 — D21: session decode fails closed; PyJWT 2.15.1
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- **Items:** `D21`
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- **Depends on:** nothing (first task)
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- **Blocks:** T16.4
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- **Surface:** `server/`
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- **Files:** `server/requirements.txt`, `server/auth.py` (`decode_token`), `tests/security_check.py` (new)
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**Do:** pin `PyJWT==2.15.1`. In `decode_token`, return `None` for an empty or
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over-long token (over 4096 characters) and for any exception from
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`jwt.decode`. Require the `exp` and `sub` claims.
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**Do not:** change token contents, the cookie, or the D18 refresh.
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**Done when:**
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- [x] the crafted-cookie request returns 401, not 500
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- [x] a valid session still works, and the D18 refresh still reissues
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- [x] `pip-audit -r server/requirements.txt` reports no PyJWT advisory
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- [x] smoke test 27/27
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---
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### T16.2 — D19: uploaded files download safely
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- **Items:** `D19`
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- **Depends on:** nothing
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- **Blocks:** T16.4
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- **Surface:** `server/`
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- **Files:** `server/files_http.py` (new), `server/app.py` (`get_wp_file`), `tests/security_check.py`
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**Do:** serve PDF and raster images inline as today. Serve every other type,
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SVG included, as an attachment with `Content-Security-Policy: sandbox;
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default-src 'none'`. Send `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` from the API too
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(NGINX already does; the dev server does not). Build `Content-Disposition`
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with an ASCII fallback and an RFC 5987 `filename*`. Reference code:
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`docs/reference/architecture-review/proposals/server/files_http.py` (P-6).
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**Do not:** refuse SVG uploads (decided: accept, download only). Do not change
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`Cache-Control`.
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**Done when:**
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- [x] an SVG downloads as an attachment with the sandbox header
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- [x] PNG, JPEG and PDF still open inline
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- [x] `Plan é.pdf` downloads (was 500)
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- [x] a name with CR/LF produces a valid header
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- [x] `tests/files_check.py` passes on a machine with Edge (CR-007 offline drawings)
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---
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### T16.3 — D20: one SOP per project
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- **Items:** `D20`
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- **Depends on:** nothing
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- **Blocks:** T16.4
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- **Surface:** `server/`
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- **Files:** `server/app.py` (`upsert_sop`, `latest_sop`, `project_summary`, `project_sop_team`, `project_qa_group`), `tests/security_check.py`
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**Do:** the four rules in D20. One helper picks the project's baseline SOP
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(canonical row if complete, else latest complete) and every baseline reader
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uses it.
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**Do not:** delete or rename existing SOP rows. Do not change any response shape.
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**Done when:**
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- [x] a `project_user` cannot create a second SOP on a project (400) or post
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`complete: true` while a complete SOP exists (403)
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- [x] a `project_user` can still draft and complete the first SOP of a project
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- [x] a Project Admin can still change the completed SOP
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- [x] POST without an id lands on `sop__<project_id>`
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- [x] a rogue complete SOP made before the fix no longer drives the baseline
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or the QA and PM/CM recipients
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- [x] `tests/sample_check.py` and `tests/critical_reopen_check.py` pass on a
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machine with Edge
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---
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### T16.4 — D19, D20, D21: verification
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- **Items:** `D19`, `D20`, `D21`
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- **Depends on:** T16.1 to T16.3
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- **Surface:** verification
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- **Files:** this file (verification record)
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**Done when:**
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- [x] `tests/security_check.py` passes
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- [x] `docs/reference/security-review/sec_probe.py`: S3 and S12 change as
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expected; every other line is unchanged
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- [x] the architecture review `equivalence_check.py` (current branch vs wave
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16) is IDENTICAL: the scenario does not use these paths, so it proves the
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rest of the work-package flow did not move
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- [x] smoke test 27/27
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- [x] the browser probes named in T16.2 and T16.3 are listed for a run on a
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machine with Edge (not available in the build sandbox)
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## Verification record
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Run 2026-10-02 in the build sandbox (Linux, Python 3.10, no browser), on branch
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`feat/wave-16-security` at T16.3.
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| Check | Result |
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| `tests/security_check.py` | **36/36** (D21 6, D19 14, D20 16) |
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| Same check against `da1325c` with PyJWT 2.13.0 | 20/36. The 16 failures are the findings (D21 3, D19 6, D20 7). The 20 passes are the "still works" checks plus three that already held (over-long cookie 401, non-member 404, SOP move refused by the existing completed-SOP rule) |
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| `docs/reference/security-review/sec_probe.py`, before vs after | Exactly 4 of 27 lines change: S3 (new complete SOP 200 -> **400**; baseline `sop_rogue` -> **`sop__proj_a`**; QA group attacker -> **real group**) and S12 (crafted cookie 500 -> **401**). All other lines identical |
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| `equivalence_check.py` (architecture review), `da1325c` vs wave 16 | **IDENTICAL**: 78 HTTP results, 89 audit rows, 24 notifications. The scenario's SOP id was changed from `sop_eq` to the canonical `sop__proj_eq` on both sides, because D20 refuses a non-canonical id on purpose |
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| `server/smoketest.py` | **27/27** after each of T16.1, T16.2, T16.3 |
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| `server/seed_demo.py` | Seeds the demo project; its SOP lands on the canonical id |
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| `pip-audit -r server/requirements.txt` | No known vulnerabilities |
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**Browser probes, run 2026-10-02 on Matt's machine (Windows, Edge 154,
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Python 3.12.10, `.venv`), one at a time:**
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| Probe | Task | Result |
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| `tests/files_check.py` | T16.2 | **36/36**, including the 1440px creator, 390px Field View, and the offline drawing cache with the server gone |
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| `tests/sample_check.py` | T16.3 | **10/10** |
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| `tests/critical_reopen_check.py` | T16.3 | **11/11**, PM + CM + assignee mail, sink-verified |
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T16.2 and T16.3 are done.
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**Harness fix needed to get there (`tests/cdp.py`, committed with this record).**
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Every probe failed first with "browser would not start ... exited rc=0
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without binding the port". Cause: the PowerShell session was elevated, and
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Edge and Chrome de-elevate by relaunching themselves through Explorer as a
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normal user; the relaunch drops `--remote-debugging-port`. Edge's log said so
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(`Edge is running elevated: 1`). No browser policy was involved (all hives
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checked). Two changes, both inert on a normal shell and on Linux/macOS:
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`--do-not-de-elevate` on Windows, and a 15-second grace for the port when the
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launched process exits rc=0. Probe results are unchanged by it; it only lets
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the browser start.
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