Cody Schaefer
c47b2ae210
Far smaller than estimated, because the premise was wrong. I had said four checks sign in and would each need a fake directory. They do not: seed() mints a session token with auth.create_token() and sets the cookie directly - browser_check's own docstring says so - and the only breakage was a leftover password_hash= kwarg on a model that no longer has the column. Deleting that one line in browser_check.seed() unblocked 39 files that import seed/start_server from it. launcher_check needed the same. console_dialogs_check's password-reset half is deleted rather than ported. Its docstring now records what went and where the prompt kit is still covered (wpPromptDialog has five callers left in wp-creation-app.js; creator_dialogs_check exercises them, validation included - verified, 20/20). Nothing was left skipped in place of the removed section. Exactly one check genuinely needed a seam: url_state_check drives the real login form to prove a deep link's ?next= survives authentication. That cannot be faked by minting a cookie, because the login round trip is the thing under test. The seam is env-driven because it has to be: start_server launches the app as a SUBPROCESS, so a monkeypatch in the test process would never reach the code doing the authenticating. server/ldap_fake.py reads WP_LDAP_FAKE_DIRECTORY and ldap_auth dispatches to it AFTER the empty-input guard, so the anonymous-bind guard covers the fake path too - a fake that reimplemented it would let the real one rot unnoticed. The production guard is the point of that module. An env var that makes any password work is exactly the kind of thing that escapes into production, and D13 left no other way in. is_active() refuses whenever a non-SQLite DATABASE_URL is configured - the same test auth._load_secret uses - and describe() shouts in capitals so a fake run can never be mistaken for a real one in the startup log. Two things found on the way, neither of them the app's fault: - url_state_check's "signing in continues to the requested page" asserted `"wp-creation-index.html" in location.href`. That string is in the ?next= parameter too, so it passed while sitting on login.html with the sign-in rejected. It would have passed with login entirely broken. Tightened to assert we actually left the login page. - Two assertions in my own new ldap_auth_check read the WRONG database: server/db.py binds its engine from DATABASE_URL at import, so setting the env var afterwards keeps reading whichever file was configured first. users_in() now opens the file it is asked about with sqlite3. The CERT_NONE check also had to become an AST walk - the module docstring names validate=ssl.CERT_NONE in order to explain why it is banned, and a text search cannot tell that apart from a real call. tests/ldap_auth_check.py is new coverage rather than repair: the anonymous-bind guard, CERT_REQUIRED by AST, the nested matching rule in the filter, the production refusal, a refused sign-in creating no account, and an existing admin still being an admin with their locally-set name intact. 20/20. Run so far, all green: browser_check 71/71, launcher_check 58/58, console_dialogs 12/12, url_state 23/23, qa_gate 41/41, critical_reopen 11/11, creator_dialogs 20/20, a11y 22/22, kitting_notify 17/17, ldap_auth 20/20. A full sweep of the remaining ~30 is running; its box stays unticked until it reports. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>