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Project-SDE-WP-Suite/docs/waves/decisions-2026-10-02.md
Matt Mabrey 8dd0afaba4 wave 16: planning docs for D19, D20, D21
D19 - uploaded files download safely (SEC-01, SEC-15e)
D20 - one SOP per project (SEC-02)
D21 - session decode fails closed, PyJWT 2.15.1 (SEC-07)

From the security review of 2026-10-01. Decision record and task
breakdown only in this commit - no code yet.

(cherry picked from commit 1c221a122e)
2026-10-06 13:27:46 -07:00

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# Decisions — October 2, 2026
Three items, from the security review of 2026-10-01
(`docs/reference/security-review-2026-10-01.md`). They get `D` ids because they
are internal security calls made mid-build, the same category as `D15` and
`D18`, not features a user asked for.
Decided by Matt Mabrey, 2026-10-02.
| Item | Title | Review finding | Task |
|---|---|---|---|
| `D19` | Uploaded files download safely | SEC-01, SEC-15e (BL-035, BL-036) | T16.2 |
| `D20` | One SOP per project | SEC-02 (BL-048) | T16.3 |
| `D21` | Session decode fails closed; PyJWT upgraded | SEC-07 (BL-052) | T16.1 |
**Schedule:** wave 16. It is **independent of waves 12 to 15**: it touches
`server/` only, and no file in it is changed by a task in those waves except
`server/app.py`, in functions they do not touch (`get_wp_file`, `upsert_sop`,
the SOP baseline readers). Wave 16 may merge before wave 12.
**Out of this round, by decision:** SEC-06 (session revocation) waits for the
AWS work. All other SEC findings stay as backlog drafts in
`docs/reference/security-review/backlog-drafts.md`.
---
## D19 — Uploaded files download safely
- **Problem:** an SVG drawing can carry a script. The server sends it back
`inline` with its own content type, on the app's origin, so the script runs
as whoever opens it (SEC-01). Separately, a file name that is not Latin-1
(for example `Plan é.pdf`) makes the download fail with 500, and CR/LF in a
name reaches the response header (SEC-15e).
- **Decision:** SVG uploads stay **accepted**, but every file that is not a
PDF or a raster image downloads as an **attachment** inside a **sandbox**:
`Content-Disposition: attachment` and
`Content-Security-Policy: sandbox; default-src 'none'`. PDF and raster images
(PNG, JPEG, GIF, WebP, BMP, AVIF) keep opening inline. Every file name goes
out in the RFC 6266 / RFC 5987 form (ASCII fallback plus `filename*`).
- **Why accept SVG instead of refusing it:** no change for the person who
uploads, and no migration for SVGs already stored. The protection is on the
way out, which also covers any SVG already in the database.
- **Must not change:** inline preview of PDF and images (CR-007), the
`Cache-Control` the offline drawing cache relies on, the D8 limits, and the
upload API.
## D20 — One SOP per project
- **Problem:** the rule "changing a completed SOP is a Project Admin action"
checks only the SOP row being posted. A `project_user` can post a NEW SOP id
with `complete: true`. Every reader picks "the latest complete SOP", so that
row becomes the baseline every page loads and the source of PM, CM and QA
mail routing (SEC-02, probe S3).
- **Decision:**
1. A project has one SOP, with the id `sop__<project_id>`. The browser has
always written that id (`pushSOP` in `project-data.js`). A request with no
id gets it. A request that would CREATE a SOP with any other id on a
project is refused with 400.
2. Existing SOP rows with other ids (for example rows `seed_demo.py` made)
stay. They can still be updated under the old rules. Nothing is deleted.
3. While a project has a complete SOP, writing any SOP on that project with
`complete: true`, and changing a complete SOP, needs Project Admin on the
project.
4. The readers prefer the canonical row: `project_sop_team`,
`project_qa_group`, `project_summary` and `GET /api/sops/latest` with
`complete=true&project_id=` read `sop__<project_id>` when it is complete,
and fall back to "latest complete" only when it is not. So a rogue row
made before this fix cannot stay the baseline.
- **Must not change:** a project member drafting the SOP and completing it the
first time (allowed today, allowed after); admin access to project-less
SOPs; the response shape of every SOP route.
## D21 — Session decode fails closed; PyJWT upgraded
- **Problem:** a crafted 1.6 KB cookie makes PyJWT 2.13.0 raise an error that
`decode_token` does not catch, so an unauthenticated request gets a 500 and
a stack trace in the log (SEC-07, probe S12). `pip-audit` lists 13
advisories for 2.13.0.
- **Decision:** pin **PyJWT 2.15.1** (`pip-audit`: no known vulnerabilities on
2026-10-02). `decode_token` treats ANY decode failure, and any cookie longer
than 4096 characters, as "not signed in" (401). It also requires the `exp`
and `sub` claims, which every token this app issues carries.
- **Must not change:** every valid session, the D18 sliding refresh and
ceiling, and the fake Okta test seam.