Files
Project-SDE-WP-Suite/server/README.md
Cody Schaefer dc0cee240e T10.8 D13/D14 - documentation matches what the code now does
DEPLOY-login-portal.md was the most wrong and is rewritten. It described taking
a username/password portal live - bcrypt, and a first admin created with
`create-admin --password`. Every command in it now fails. It keeps its filename
and carries a note saying what it replaced, because an admin holding the old
copy needs to know why the steps stopped working rather than concluding the
deploy is broken. New content leads with the warning that there is no
break-glass, and puts verification BEFORE announcing the deploy - the log line,
the certificate check that binds nothing, then a real sign-in.

DEPLOYMENT.md: AUTH_RESET_* replaced with the LDAP variables; the users table
row no longer claims a password_hash column; "Self-service password reset"
replaced by a section saying there isn't one and pointing at Okta. New "Domain
authentication" section covering the three things that are not obvious - why
prime.local and never a DC or an IP, why the CA bundle is not a certificate
issued to this app (with the thumbprints and a Get-ChildItem line to rebuild
it), and why the outbound network stopped being optional - plus the lockout
arithmetic written out so the next person to raise AUTH_MAX_ATTEMPTS sees the
constraint rather than a magic 2.

server/README.md: endpoint table drops /api/auth/password and gains the role
route; the login-portal section becomes domain authentication; create-admin
becomes the two-step bootstrap (sign in, then promote).

CLAUDE.md: a new "authentication rules" section beside the token rule, for the
same reason that one exists - four things that look like tidying-up if you do
not know why. The empty-password guard that must run before bind(), CERT_REQUIRED
with an explicit CA file, AUTH_MAX_ATTEMPTS being arithmetic rather than taste,
and connecting to the domain name rather than a DC. Plus: no break-glass, and
roles are local - never read a role from AD.

Closed three done-when boxes that were open rather than ticked:

  T10.8  all of them
  T10.9  promote/demote verified against a real bind (Aug 24), not a stub
  T10.3  the Postgres round trip, on postgres:16-alpine

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-24 08:26:31 -05:00

365 lines
13 KiB
Markdown

# Work Package Suite API
A small Python (FastAPI) service that stores project **SOPs**, **Work Packages**,
and **comments** in PostgreSQL. NGINX serves the static site and proxies `/api/`
to this service.
```
browser → NGINX ──serves──> static site (index.html, …)
└─proxy /api/─> api container (:8000) → db container (postgres)
```
## Endpoints
| Method | Path | Purpose |
|--------|------|---------|
| GET | `/api/health` | liveness check (unauthenticated) |
| POST | `/api/auth/login` | sign in (`{username, password}`) — binds against the domain, sets the session cookie |
| POST | `/api/auth/logout` | clear the session cookie |
| GET | `/api/auth/me` | the logged-in user |
| GET | `/api/auth/users` | list accounts (**admin**) |
| POST | `/api/auth/users` | pre-create an account (**admin**) — optional; accounts self-provision on first sign-in |
| POST | `/api/auth/users/{id}/role` | change an account's permissions role (**admin**) |
| DELETE | `/api/auth/users/{id}` | delete an account (**admin**) |
| POST | `/api/sops` | create/update a SOP (upsert by `id`) |
| GET | `/api/sops` | list SOP summaries |
| GET | `/api/sops/latest?complete=true` | most recent (complete) SOP |
| GET | `/api/sops/{id}` | full SOP document |
| DELETE | `/api/sops/{id}` | delete a SOP |
| POST | `/api/wps` | create/update a Work Package (upsert by `id`) |
| GET | `/api/wps?sop_id=…` | list WPs (optionally for one SOP) |
| GET | `/api/wps/{id}` | full WP document |
| DELETE | `/api/wps/{id}` | delete a WP |
| POST | `/api/comments` (and `/api/feedback`) | add a comment |
| GET | `/api/comments?source=&sop_id=&wp_id=&step=` | list comments |
Interactive docs once running: **`/api/docs`**.
The full client document is stored in each row's `data` (JSON) column; common
fields (name, number, status, …) are promoted to columns for listing/filtering.
---
## Sign-in (domain authentication, D13)
**The suite stores no passwords.** Signing in performs an LDAPS **simple bind** to
`ldaps://prime.local:636` as `<sAMAccountName>@prime.local` using the password the
person typed — their Windows password. A successful bind is the authentication.
See `server/ldap_auth.py`; the schema has no `password_hash` column.
Sign-in issues a signed JWT
that rides in an **HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax** cookie (`wp_session`); the cookie is
marked **Secure** automatically whenever the request arrives over HTTPS (via
NGINX's `X-Forwarded-Proto`). There is no server-side session store — each
request is validated by checking the cookie's signature and expiry.
**The real security boundary is the API:** every `/api/` data route is refused
with `401` unless a valid session cookie is present (see `auth_gate` in
`app.py`). The static pages additionally include `auth-guard.js`, which redirects
to `login.html` when there's no session — that's for UX, not protection.
**The directory supplies identity; this app supplies authorization.** Roles live in
the local `users` table and are never read from AD — so an existing admin stays an
admin. Roles are `admin`, `project_super_user`, `project_admin`, `project_user`.
**Accounts are created on first successful sign-in.** Anyone who binds successfully
and is in the required group gets a `users` row at `project_user` with **no project
access** — they can sign in and will see nothing until an admin grants access. That
is least privilege, and it is deliberate; the creation is written to the audit log
so it is visible rather than silent.
**A required AD group gates sign-in.** `LDAP_REQUIRED_GROUP` (a group name or a full
DN; nested groups count). Empty means any domain account may sign in.
**There is no password reset and no break-glass.** The login page links to
`https://primecontrols.okta.com/` for password self-service. If the domain is
unreachable, or `LDAP_CA_FILE` is wrong, or the required group is misconfigured,
**nobody can sign in, including admins** — the API logs one line at startup saying
whether LDAP is configured and reachable, so check `docker compose logs api` first.
**Connect to the domain name, never a DC hostname or an IP.** Every DC certificate
carries `prime.local` in its SAN, so the domain name both passes hostname validation
and round-robins across all six DCs. An IP fails with `hostname mismatch` — there is
no IP SAN — and the only way to force it through is to disable validation, which
must never happen: domain passwords cross this link.
**The trust anchor is a CA certificate, not one issued to this app.** The API is the
TLS *client*, and clients present nothing. `server/certs/prime-ca-chain.pem` holds
`PRIME CONTROLS ROOT CA` + `PRIME CONTROLS ISSUING CA 1` — public certificates, no
private key, nothing to request from IT. Override the path with `LDAP_CA_FILE`.
Diagnose the connection without touching an account (no bind, so it cannot
contribute to a lockout):
```bash
docker compose exec api openssl s_client -connect prime.local:636 -CAfile /app/server/certs/prime-ca-chain.pem </dev/null 2>&1 | grep "Verify return"
# want: Verify return code: 0 (ok)
```
### Set the signing secret
Add `AUTH_SECRET_KEY` to `.env` (see `.env.example`). **Required in production**
without it the API uses a random per-process key, so logins reset on restart.
```bash
python -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(48))"
```
### Bootstrap the first admin
Two steps, in this order. There is no `create-admin` any more — there is no password
to set and no account to create.
```bash
# 1. Sign in to the app once. That provisions your account at project_user.
# 2. Promote it:
docker compose exec api python -m server.manage_users promote alice
```
It prompts for **your** domain username and password, binds to confirm who you are,
and prints `alice: project_user -> admin`.
Other commands: `list`, `promote <user> [--role …]`, `demote <user>`,
`disable <user>`, `enable <user>`. After that, admins manage accounts from the Admin
console.
**Every command that changes anything requires a domain bind** (D14), prompted —
there is deliberately no `--password` flag, which would put a live domain password
into shell history and `ps` output. `list` needs no credential so an outage stays
diagnosable. The bind here does **not** apply the required-group gate, so a mistyped
group cannot lock you out of the tool that fixes it.
Be clear on what the bind is worth: anyone with a shell here can still write to the
`users` table with `psql`. It is defence in depth and, mostly, **accountability**
every role change now writes an audit row naming a person, which shell changes
previously did not.
---
## Local dev
```bash
cd server
python -m venv .venv && . .venv/bin/activate # Windows: .venv\Scripts\activate
pip install -r requirements.txt
# No DATABASE_URL → uses a local sqlite file, so you can start immediately:
uvicorn server.app:app --reload --port 8000 # run from the PROJECT ROOT
```
Then open http://localhost:8000/api/docs.
> Run uvicorn/gunicorn from the **project root** (the folder that contains the
> `server/` directory), because the import path is `server.app:app`.
---
## Production — Docker Compose
This is the recommended production setup. Three containers run in an isolated
internal network; only NGINX is exposed to the outside via the external `proxy`
network.
```
[external proxy network]
┌────▼────┐ internal network ┌──────────┐ ┌────────┐
│ nginx │ ───────────────────> │ api │ → │ db │
└─────────┘ └──────────┘ └────────┘
```
### 1. Create the credentials file
Create `.env` in the **project root** (same directory as `docker-compose.yml`).
This file is never committed — add it to `.gitignore`.
```bash
# .env — project root
POSTGRES_DB=wpsuite
POSTGRES_USER=wpsuite
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=<strong-random-password>
# Must match POSTGRES_* above; hostname is the compose service name "db"
DATABASE_URL=postgresql+psycopg://wpsuite:<strong-random-password>@db:5432/wpsuite
```
Generate a strong password:
```bash
openssl rand -base64 32
```
### 2. Add the Dockerfile
Create `Dockerfile` in the **project root**:
```dockerfile
FROM python:3.12-slim
WORKDIR /app
COPY server/requirements.txt ./server/
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r server/requirements.txt
COPY server/ ./server/
EXPOSE 8000
CMD ["gunicorn", "-k", "uvicorn.workers.UvicornWorker", \
"-b", "0.0.0.0:8000", "--workers", "2", "server.app:app"]
```
### 3. Update the NGINX site config
The API is no longer at `127.0.0.1:8000` — it is the `api` container.
Update the `/api/` proxy block in your nginx conf (e.g. `nginx/conf.d/wp-suite.conf`):
```nginx
location /api/ {
proxy_pass http://api:8000; # ← service name, not localhost
proxy_http_version 1.1;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
client_max_body_size 5m;
}
```
### 4. docker-compose.yml
Replace your existing `docker-compose.yml` with:
```yaml
services:
webserver:
image: nginx:alpine
container_name: nginx_webserver
volumes:
- ./html:/usr/share/nginx/html:ro
- ./nginx/conf.d:/etc/nginx/conf.d:ro
- ./nginx/nginx.conf:/etc/nginx/nginx.conf:ro
- ./logs:/var/log/nginx
restart: unless-stopped
depends_on:
api:
condition: service_started
networks:
- proxy # external — reachable by your reverse proxy / traefik
- internal # needs a path to the api container
api:
build: .
container_name: wp_api
env_file: .env # loads DATABASE_URL
restart: unless-stopped
depends_on:
db:
condition: service_healthy # waits for postgres to accept connections
networks:
- internal
db:
image: postgres:16-alpine
container_name: wp_db
env_file: .env # loads POSTGRES_DB / USER / PASSWORD
volumes:
- pgdata:/var/lib/postgresql/data
restart: unless-stopped
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U $${POSTGRES_USER} -d $${POSTGRES_DB}"]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
networks:
- internal
volumes:
pgdata:
networks:
proxy:
name: proxy
external: true
internal:
internal: true # no outbound internet access from api/db
```
### 5. First-time startup
```bash
# Build the api image and start all containers
docker compose up -d --build
# Confirm all three containers are running
docker compose ps
# Tail logs (Ctrl-C to stop following)
docker compose logs -f api
```
Tables are created automatically on first API startup — no manual `CREATE TABLE`
needed.
### Authentication notes
**Postgres → API authentication** is handled entirely through `DATABASE_URL` in
`.env`. The `db` container uses `POSTGRES_USER` / `POSTGRES_PASSWORD` to
initialise the database on first run; the `api` container uses the matching
credentials in `DATABASE_URL` to connect. Neither credential ever appears in the
compose file itself.
**Network isolation**: the `db` container is on the `internal` network only —
it has no port exposed to the host and is unreachable from outside the compose
stack. Only the `api` container can open a connection to it.
**Changing the password**: update both `POSTGRES_PASSWORD` and the password
in `DATABASE_URL` in `.env`, then:
```bash
# Stop api first (db must keep running to accept the ALTER USER command)
docker compose stop api
docker compose exec db psql -U wpsuite -c "ALTER USER wpsuite PASSWORD 'new-password';"
docker compose start api
```
### Day-to-day operations
```bash
# Rebuild api after a code change
docker compose up -d --build api
# View postgres data directly
docker compose exec db psql -U wpsuite -d wpsuite
# Take a database backup
docker compose exec db pg_dump -U wpsuite wpsuite > backup-$(date +%F).sql
# Restore from backup
docker compose exec -T db psql -U wpsuite -d wpsuite < backup-2025-01-01.sql
# Stop everything (data volume is preserved)
docker compose down
# Stop everything AND delete all data
docker compose down -v
```
---
## Quick test
`/api/health` is open; data routes now require a session, so log in first and
reuse the cookie jar:
```bash
curl http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/health # {"ok":true} — no auth needed
# Sign in, saving the session cookie to a jar
curl -c jar.txt -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/auth/login \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"alice","password":"<password>"}'
# Reuse the cookie on protected routes
curl -b jar.txt http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/comments
```
Without the cookie, protected routes return `401 {"detail":"Not authenticated"}`.
Or via the nginx proxy (replace with your hostname):
```bash
curl https://wp-suite.company.local/api/health
```