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feat/waves
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feat/wave-
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@@ -58,15 +58,6 @@ POSTGRES_PASSWORD=<strong-random-password>
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# openssl rand -base64 48
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AUTH_SECRET_KEY=<strong-random-secret>
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# OPTIONAL — D18 (2026-09-23): a session slides on activity (AUTH_IDLE_MINUTES,
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# default 30) capped by a hard ceiling from original sign-in regardless of
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# activity (AUTH_SESSION_HOURS, default 8). Both are proposed defaults, not
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# confirmed against this tenant's Okta SSO session policy — if Okta's own
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# session outlives either one, re-auth here is likely a fast silent redirect
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# rather than a real login screen. Full explanation in server/.env.example.
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# AUTH_IDLE_MINUTES=30
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# AUTH_SESSION_HOURS=8
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# REQUIRED (in spirit — see the note below) — Okta OIDC is the only sign-in
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# path (D15/D16). There is no local password anywhere in this app to fall back
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# to, so without these nobody can sign in at all. Get them from the Okta app
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|
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BIN
docs/reference/baseline/wave-12/users-1440-selected.png
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docs/reference/baseline/wave-12/users-1440.png
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docs/reference/baseline/wave-12/users-390-selected.png
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docs/reference/baseline/wave-12/users-390.png
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@@ -283,9 +283,7 @@ python tests/triage_check.py # A6 - the sidebar answers the stand-up
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python tests/qa_gate_check.py # CR-014/D2/D9/D10 - QA gate + capture sink 41 checks
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python tests/files_check.py # CR-007/D8 - drawings upload + real offline 36 checks
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python tests/sticky_bar_check.py # B6 - save reachable on every wizard step 12 checks
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# tests/usage_check.py (D5) removed at T11.6 - it tested the per-browser
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# analytics core and admin report, both retired in favour of CR-019's
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# server-side Activity & usage card (see docs/waves/decisions-2026-09-17.md).
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python tests/usage_check.py # D5 - one analytics core, admin report 15 checks
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python tests/creator_dialogs_check.py # S1 creator - 0 natives, errors at fields 20 checks
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```
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@@ -318,6 +316,17 @@ python tests/critical_reopen_check.py # BL-021 - on-hold mail reaches PM + CM
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python tests/console_dialogs_check.py # BL-024 - consoles/launcher: 21 natives -> 0 17 checks
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```
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Wave 12 (CR-020, bulk user editing) adds these:
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```bash
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python tests/bulk_users_check.py # CR-020 - bulk routes, guards, audit, CSV; NO browser 61 checks
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python tests/bulk_users_ui_check.py # CR-020 - selection, toolbar, CSV, typed delete at 1440/390px
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```
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`console_dialogs_check.py` gained section 4 (the bulk delete prompt). `tests/cdp.py`
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passes `--do-not-de-elevate` on Windows so the probes start from an Administrator
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shell (same change as wave 16, T16.4).
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**Three probes were re-pointed at `T7.1`.** `sections_check.py` 5b drove the live
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cross-frame toggle hand-off, which no longer exists; it now pins the surviving path and
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the fact that an UNSAVED toggle correctly does not travel - a behaviour change, recorded
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@@ -662,3 +662,37 @@ deliberately deferred.
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worth confirming rather than assuming).
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- **Suggested wave or follow-up:** next housekeeping pass — needs Nick on
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whether to delete, archive, or rewrite it as historical record.
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### BL-060 — A super user is told they can change access the server then refuses
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- **Found during:** T12.6 (CR-020 verification, the CSV path)
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- **Where:** `server/app.py` `manage_user_problem` (the reason text), `get_user_projects` / `set_user_projects` (the rule)
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- **What:** for an account that is also on a project the super user does not
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administer, the refusal reason ends "You can still change their access and
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role on your own projects." Neither the project-access dialog's routes nor
|
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the CR-020 bulk project route allow that: all of them call
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`require_manage_user`, which refuses the account. The bulk route mirrors the
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single route on purpose (CR-020: same rules), so the words promise something
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neither path does. Either the text or the rule is wrong; which one is a
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product call.
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- **Why not now:** changing either is out of CR-020's scope (the wave must
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not widen what a super user can do), and it needs a decision.
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- **Suggested wave or follow-up:** needs Nick: should a super user be able to
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add or remove a shared account on their own projects? Then fix the text or
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the rule, not both.
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### BL-061 — The sync badge covers controls while it shows
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- **Found during:** T12.6 (the wave 12 screenshots)
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- **Where:** `html/project-data.js` `renderSyncBadge` (fixed bottom-right, `z-index:9998`)
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- **What:** for about 2 seconds after each sync the "Everything sent to the
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project" badge sits over whatever is in the bottom-right corner: a Delete
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button on the User Directory at 1440px, the bulk bar's "Set permissions" at
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390px. It is `pointer-events:none`, so clicks pass through, but the control is
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hidden while it shows, and on the console pages there is no outbox work to
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report at all.
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- **Why not now:** `project-data.js` is shared by every page and owned by the
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outbox work in wave 14 (T14.1 to T14.3 change this badge's states anyway).
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- **Suggested wave or follow-up:** wave 14, alongside T14.1's badge changes:
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do not show the badge on pages with nothing to sync, and keep it clear of
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page controls.
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@@ -200,6 +200,21 @@ bad multi-select now removes more than one account at once, permanently.
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version is a materially different (and riskier) feature if that turns out to
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be what's actually wanted.
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### Confirmed 2026-10-06 (Matt Mabrey, at the start of wave 12)
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Both recommendations above are confirmed as written, and the two details
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`wave-12.md` left to the build are decided:
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1. **Bulk delete:** the dialog lists the affected usernames and the request is
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not sent until the word `DELETE` is typed, whatever the count.
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2. **Project assignment is add/remove** to or from one project at a time, with
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the per-project permissions role (`ProjectMember.role`) set on add. It never
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replaces a user's whole project list.
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3. **Changing the table filter clears the selection** (T12.2), and the toolbar
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says so, so no row hidden by the filter stays selected.
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4. **The CSV holds usernames only** (T12.4). The action and its settings are
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chosen in the toolbar and apply to every valid row of the file.
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### Frontend/backend boundary
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Selection state (which rows are checked) is fine as client-side UI state — it
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@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
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# Session notes — 2026-09-23
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Working notes for the `feat/waves-11-13` line (CR-019, CR-020 reserved, D18),
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written up before merge. Not a spec document — `wave-11.md`, `wave-13.md` and
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`decisions-2026-09-17.md` are the source of truth for scope and acceptance
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criteria. This is the "what actually happened building it" record.
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## What shipped today
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**CR-019 (wave 11) — usage/activity metrics, T11.1 through T11.6 complete:**
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- `UsageEvent` table + migration (T11.1), a capture endpoint wired into
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`auth-guard.js` so every protected page pings it once per load, plus a
|
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`login` event at Okta sign-in (T11.2).
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- `GET /api/usage/summary` (T11.3) — active users by day/week/month,
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per-user last-active, per-tool breakdown, filterable by date/project/
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user/tool, all combinable.
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- `GET /api/usage/export` (T11.4) — raw and sanitized CSV. Sanitized mode
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replaces the username with an HMAC-SHA256 pseudonym (keyed with
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`auth.SECRET_KEY`), stable per user across rows and across separate
|
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export calls, so an external tool (Power BI etc.) can still group by
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user without ever seeing a real name.
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- A new "Activity & usage" card in the admin console (T11.5): real filter
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controls, the summary tables, both export buttons. Client-side gated
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admin-only same as the rest of the console; the API underneath is
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independently gated server-side regardless.
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- Retired the old per-browser "Usage logs" panel and `wp-usage.js`
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entirely (T11.6) — it had no reader left and was never a real data
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source for the new report anyway. The scattered `track()` call sites in
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the creator and wizard were left in place calling a documented no-op,
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rather than deleting ~45 individual call sites for the same effect.
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Only **T11.7 (final wave verification)** is left before wave 11 is fully
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closed out — everything under it has already been verified per-task, so
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this is a consolidation pass, not new work.
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**D18 (wave 13) — Okta/AD deprovisioning, T13.1 only:**
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- Session lifetime changed from one flat `AUTH_SESSION_HOURS` to a sliding
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idle timeout (`AUTH_IDLE_MINUTES`, default 30) capped by a hard ceiling
|
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from original sign-in (`AUTH_SESSION_HOURS`, default 8, meaning changed
|
||||
from "session length" to "absolute ceiling"). Both defaults are flagged
|
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in `.env.example` and `DEPLOYMENT.md` as proposed, not confirmed against
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the tenant's actual Okta SSO policy.
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- **T13.2 onward (the actual Okta Management API sync job) is paused** —
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explicit call from Matt: no Okta API credential yet, come back to it
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later. Not started, not blocked on anything code-side.
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**CR-020 (wave 12, bulk user editing):** not started. Reserved, scoped in
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`wave-12.md`, no code touched.
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## Environment work (not itself a task, but load-bearing)
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- Fixed a CRLF/LF mismatch that was making every tracked file look modified
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to this session's git client (`core.autocrlf true`, repo-local, no file
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content changed).
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- This machine had no Python. Installed it via `winget` (`Python.Python.3.12`)
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and set up a `.venv` in the repo with `server/requirements.txt` installed,
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specifically so `tests/baseline_shots.py` could run locally — this
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||||
sandbox has no headless-capable browser and can't download one (network
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||||
allowlist), so the 390px/1440px screenshot verification CLAUDE.md asks
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for had to run on Matt's own machine instead, using the browser already
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installed there (Edge).
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- Established a repeatable local verification loop for every task: throwaway
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SQLite, fake-Okta sign-in, promote to admin, `seed_demo.py` +
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`smoketest.py` (27/27 passing throughout), plus `baseline_shots.py` for
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anything touching `html/`.
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## Standing constraints, still in effect
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- Everything stays local on this branch line. No `git push` at any point
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today.
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- One task per PR discipline was kept even though all of it landed on one
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branch — each commit corresponds to exactly one task ID, in wave order,
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each individually verified before the next started.
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## Before merging
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- Run T11.7 (full wave-11 verification pass) and record it in `wave-11.md`.
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- Decide where this branch actually merges to — `feat/waves-11-13` has all
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of today's commits already; this notes branch was cut from it so it can
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fast-forward back in, or merge as its own PR if the notes should be
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reviewed separately from the code.
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- T13.2+ and all of wave 12 remain explicitly out of scope until Matt says
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otherwise.
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@@ -1,280 +0,0 @@
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# Wave 11 — Usage and activity metrics
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**Items:** `CR-019`
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**Depends on:** wave 10 merged (it is; this wave does not wait on anything else)
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**Decision record:** `docs/waves/decisions-2026-09-17.md`
|
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Seven tasks, one concern each, in build order. Do not start a task whose
|
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dependency is not merged. `CR-020` (bulk user editing) is reserved but not
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scoped — it does not belong in this wave.
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---
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### T11.1 — CR-019: `usage_events` table + migration
|
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- **Items:** `CR-019`
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- **Depends on:** nothing (first task)
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- **Blocks:** T11.2
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- **Surface:** `server/`
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- **Files:** `server/models.py`, `server/alembic/versions/`
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**Do:** Add a `UsageEvent` model — append-only, same spirit as `AuditLog` but for
|
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navigation/feature-open events rather than business mutations. Suggested shape:
|
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`id`, `at` (indexed), `user_id` (or username — match whatever `AuditLog.actor`
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does today for consistency), `project_id` (nullable — not every event is
|
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project-scoped, e.g. opening the admin console), `tool` (e.g. `creator`,
|
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`wizard`, `field_view`, `dashboard`, `admin`, `directory`), `event` (e.g.
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`page_open`, `login`), `detail` (JSON, optional). Write the migration. Do not
|
||||
touch `AuditLog` — this is a new table, not an extension of it (see the
|
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decision record's reasoning).
|
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**Do not:** fold this into `AuditLog`. They serve different questions and mixing
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them makes the existing audit trail noisier for its existing readers.
|
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**Done when:**
|
||||
|
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- [ ] `UsageEvent` exists with an indexed `at` column (this table will be scanned
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by date range constantly)
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- [ ] migration applies cleanly against both SQLite (dev) and Postgres (prod) —
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||||
render `alembic upgrade --sql` for postgresql and read it before calling
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this done, per the class of defect `BL-027` logged
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- [ ] no change to `AuditLog`'s shape or behavior
|
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|
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---
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### T11.2 — CR-019: capture the events
|
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|
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- **Items:** `CR-019`
|
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- **Depends on:** T11.1
|
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- **Blocks:** T11.3
|
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- **Surface:** `server/` + `html/`
|
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- **Files:** `server/app.py` (new endpoint), `html/auth-guard.js`
|
||||
|
||||
**Problem:** Six pages need this and none should implement it separately — that
|
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is exactly how `S4`'s "no global nav on two pages" and the four parallel token
|
||||
systems (`S5`) happened. `auth-guard.js` is already loaded first, in the `<head>`,
|
||||
on all six protected pages (`index.html`, `field.html`, `users.html`,
|
||||
`wp-creation-index.html`, `work-package-suite.html`, `admin.html`) and already
|
||||
knows the verified user once the `wp-auth-ready` event fires. That is the one
|
||||
place this belongs.
|
||||
|
||||
**Do:** Add a small `POST /api/usage/ping`-style endpoint that writes one
|
||||
`UsageEvent` row per call, keyed to the session (server trusts the session, not
|
||||
anything the client claims about identity). Call it once from `auth-guard.js`
|
||||
after `wp-auth-ready`, tagging `tool` from the page's own path. Also write a
|
||||
`login` event at the point a session is actually established (reuse whatever
|
||||
`okta_callback` already does at sign-in — do not add a second source of truth
|
||||
for "did this person log in").
|
||||
|
||||
**Do not:** build a per-page capture call. If a page needs this and
|
||||
`auth-guard.js` does not cover it, fix `auth-guard.js`, not the page.
|
||||
|
||||
**Done when:**
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] one `page_open` event is recorded for a real sign-in on each of the six
|
||||
pages, verified per page
|
||||
- [ ] exactly one `login` event per Okta sign-in, not one per page load after
|
||||
it
|
||||
- [ ] the endpoint rejects a request with no valid session (this is server-
|
||||
enforced identity, not client-reported)
|
||||
- [ ] no page other than `auth-guard.js` calls this endpoint directly
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### T11.3 — CR-019: aggregation endpoint with filters
|
||||
|
||||
- **Items:** `CR-019`
|
||||
- **Depends on:** T11.2
|
||||
- **Blocks:** T11.4, T11.5
|
||||
- **Surface:** `server/`
|
||||
- **Files:** `server/app.py`
|
||||
|
||||
**Do:** Build the read side: active-user counts by day/week/month, per-user
|
||||
last-active timestamp (derived from `UsageEvent`, not `User.last_login_at`,
|
||||
which only ever holds one value), and a per-tool usage breakdown. Accept query
|
||||
filters: date range, project, user, tool — combinable, per the decision record.
|
||||
This is server aggregation, the same principle `B4` established for the
|
||||
pipeline strip: the browser asks for a number, the server computes it from real
|
||||
rows, nothing is derived client-side from a partial cache.
|
||||
|
||||
**Done when:**
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] active-user counts are correct against a seeded fixture with known dates
|
||||
- [ ] filters combine correctly (verified: user + date range + tool together
|
||||
narrows correctly, not just each alone)
|
||||
- [ ] a project filter that matches nothing returns an empty result, not an
|
||||
error or the unfiltered total
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### T11.4 — CR-019: export, raw and sanitized
|
||||
|
||||
- **Items:** `CR-019`
|
||||
- **Depends on:** T11.3
|
||||
- **Blocks:** T11.5
|
||||
- **Surface:** `server/`
|
||||
- **Files:** `server/app.py`
|
||||
|
||||
**Do:** A CSV export endpoint over the same filtered query T11.3 exposes.
|
||||
Two modes: raw (real usernames, the console's default) and sanitized. Sanitized
|
||||
mode replaces the actor field with a stable pseudonymous id — a per-user hash,
|
||||
consistent across rows in the same export and across separate export runs —
|
||||
so an external system (Power BI or similar) can still group and trend "by
|
||||
user" without ever receiving a real name. Do not simply drop the identity
|
||||
column; that breaks per-user grouping downstream, which defeats the point of
|
||||
an activity export.
|
||||
|
||||
**Done when:**
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] raw export contains real usernames
|
||||
- [ ] sanitized export never contains a real username or email anywhere in the
|
||||
file, including in a `detail` blob if one is included
|
||||
- [ ] the same real user maps to the same pseudonymous id within one export AND
|
||||
across two separate export runs (a hash of something stable, not a
|
||||
per-request random id)
|
||||
- [ ] both modes otherwise contain identical rows for the same filter
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### T11.5 — CR-019: admin console Activity tab
|
||||
|
||||
- **Items:** `CR-019`
|
||||
- **Depends on:** T11.3, T11.4
|
||||
- **Blocks:** T11.7
|
||||
- **Surface:** `html/`
|
||||
- **Files:** `html/admin.html`, `html/admin.js`
|
||||
|
||||
**Do:** New tab, same role gate as the User Directory. Filters (date range,
|
||||
project, user, tool) driving the tables from T11.3; export buttons (raw and
|
||||
sanitized) calling T11.4. Build accessible from the start per `C1` — this is a
|
||||
new component, not a legacy one carrying an old defect forward: real
|
||||
`<button>`/`<select>` controls, keyboard-reachable, `aria-live` on any
|
||||
count that updates without a page reload, focus visible throughout.
|
||||
|
||||
**Done when:**
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] the tab is reachable only by an admin (the card lives inside admin.html,
|
||||
already gated client-side by gateByRole(); the API underneath it is
|
||||
independently gated server-side by require_user_manager regardless)
|
||||
- [x] every filter is a real form control, keyboard-operable (date/select/text
|
||||
inputs and a `<button>`, no click-div)
|
||||
- [x] both export buttons produce the files T11.4 defines (verified against
|
||||
the live endpoint in T11.4's own checks, and present/wired here)
|
||||
- [x] works at 390px and 1440px — verified 2026-09-23 via
|
||||
`tests/baseline_shots.py --pages admin` run locally on Windows (this
|
||||
sandbox has no headless browser available; the script was run on the
|
||||
user's machine instead, after installing Python via winget since it
|
||||
wasn't present). Screenshots in `docs/reference/baseline/admin-390.png`
|
||||
/ `admin-1440.png`. No JS errors, no horizontal overflow at either
|
||||
width; the card rendered with real seeded data (events, by-tool,
|
||||
per-user-last-active tables) confirming the filters and summary read
|
||||
correctly, not just that the markup exists.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### T11.6 — CR-019: retire the per-browser Usage report
|
||||
|
||||
- **Items:** `CR-019`
|
||||
- **Depends on:** T11.5
|
||||
- **Blocks:** T11.7
|
||||
- **Surface:** `html/`
|
||||
- **Files:** `html/admin.js` (the `usage-admin` panel, `admin.js:666-699`),
|
||||
`html/wp-usage.js` and its two call sites
|
||||
|
||||
**Do:** Remove the old per-browser `usage-admin` panel from `admin.js` now that
|
||||
the real one exists, per the 2026-09-17 decision. Decide what happens to
|
||||
`wp-usage.js`'s recording calls (wizard dwell-tracking, the creator's
|
||||
equivalent): they were never reliably tied to a real identity, so they are not
|
||||
a data source the new report can adopt. Default to removing the recorder too
|
||||
unless it is still doing something useful on its own (re-read what it actually
|
||||
records before deciding — do not assume from this file alone).
|
||||
|
||||
**Do not:** leave the old panel in place "just in case." Two activity reports
|
||||
showing two different numbers is worse than one.
|
||||
|
||||
**Decision (2026-09-23):** `wp-usage.js` is removed, not kept — it had no
|
||||
reader left once the admin panel above it was removed (the "download the
|
||||
full event log" button lived only in that panel), and per the original
|
||||
decision record it was never reliably tied to a real identity, so it was
|
||||
never a candidate source for the new report either. The file itself and its
|
||||
three `<script>` includes (`admin.html`, `wp-creation-index.html`,
|
||||
`work-package-suite.html`) are gone. Its two call sites
|
||||
(`wp-creation-app.js`, `work-package-suite-app.js`) keep a local `track()`
|
||||
function as a documented no-op rather than having each of their ~45
|
||||
individual `track('event', …)` call sites deleted one at a time — that
|
||||
would be a far larger, riskier diff for the same outcome (no more data is
|
||||
recorded either way), and it keeps each call site as a marker of what was
|
||||
worth recording if usage analytics are ever rebuilt server-side. The
|
||||
dwell-timer plumbing that only ever fed `track()` (`work-package-suite-app.js`'s
|
||||
`_stepEnter`/`trackStepDwell`) was left in place for the same reason — it is
|
||||
inert now, not broken, and touching it buys nothing.
|
||||
|
||||
Also removed: `tests/usage_check.py` (tested exactly the retired feature —
|
||||
D5/T7.10's per-browser analytics core and admin report) and its line in
|
||||
`docs/reference/file-map.md`, replaced with a note pointing at this decision.
|
||||
|
||||
**Done when:**
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] the old `usage-admin` panel and its markup are gone from `admin.html`/
|
||||
`admin.js`
|
||||
- [x] a decision on `wp-usage.js` itself is recorded (removed, or kept with a
|
||||
stated reason) — not left ambiguous — see above
|
||||
- [x] nothing else in the app references the removed code; grep confirms
|
||||
(only remaining hits are this file, the 2026-09-17 decision record, and
|
||||
the two explanatory code comments left at the retired call sites — all
|
||||
prose, not live references)
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### T11.7 — CR-019: verification
|
||||
|
||||
- **Items:** `CR-019`
|
||||
- **Depends on:** T11.6
|
||||
- **Blocks:** nothing
|
||||
- **Surface:** `html/` + `server/`
|
||||
- **Files:** as touched above
|
||||
|
||||
**Do:** Full verification per `CLAUDE.md`: run the app locally, exercise the
|
||||
new tab at 390px and 1440px, before/after screenshots, run the existing smoke
|
||||
test and `seed_demo.py`, run the full suite.
|
||||
|
||||
**Done when:**
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] all `CR-019` acceptance criteria in `decisions-2026-09-17.md` are met or
|
||||
a failure is stated with a reason — all met
|
||||
- [x] screenshots committed — `admin-390.png`/`admin-1440.png` (and
|
||||
`creator`/`sop` at both widths, touched by T11.6's script-tag removal)
|
||||
- [x] smoke test and `seed_demo.py` both still pass — 27/27, verified
|
||||
2026-09-24 against the exact branch state about to be considered
|
||||
deployable
|
||||
- [x] full test suite passes — verified 2026-09-24: ran all 39
|
||||
`tests/*_check.py` scripts plus the `usage_events` migration
|
||||
round-trip. Result: 38/39 exit 0.
|
||||
- `token_check.py` exits 2 with no arguments by design (needs `--out`
|
||||
or `--compare`) — a CLI-invocation detail, not a test failure;
|
||||
already confirmed non-regression in wave 10.
|
||||
- `generalinfo_check.py` has one pre-existing failure (a raw colour
|
||||
literal in `html/wp-creation-styles.css`, a file no wave 11/13 task
|
||||
touched) — already diagnosed as pre-existing in wave 10.
|
||||
- `autosave_check.py` **did** regress from T11.6 (it asserted the
|
||||
retired analytics tracker still wrote to localStorage) — found by
|
||||
this run, fixed same day (commit `4f3a94b`), now 33/33.
|
||||
- Migration (T11.1): SQLite upgrade → downgrade → upgrade round-trip
|
||||
clean; `alembic upgrade ... --sql` against the `postgresql` dialect
|
||||
renders valid DDL (`TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE`, `JSON`, no
|
||||
SQLite-only syntax) — no `BL-027`-class defect.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Wave 11 exit criteria
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] real, server-side activity data exists per user, indefinitely retained
|
||||
- [x] the admin console shows it, filterable by date/project/user/tool
|
||||
- [x] export works in both raw and sanitized form
|
||||
- [x] the old per-browser report is gone, not duplicated
|
||||
- [x] `CR-019` fully accounted for, no open acceptance criteria
|
||||
|
||||
Wave 11 is closed out as of 2026-09-24. `CR-020` (wave 12) remains reserved
|
||||
and unstarted. `D18`/wave 13 (`T13.2` onward) remains paused pending an Okta
|
||||
API credential, per standing instruction — `T13.1`'s session changes were
|
||||
included in this same verification pass and did not regress anything above.
|
||||
@@ -3,7 +3,14 @@
|
||||
**Items:** `CR-020`
|
||||
**Depends on:** wave 10 merged (it is). Independent of wave 11 (`CR-019`) — no
|
||||
shared files, may build in either order or in parallel.
|
||||
**Decision record:** `docs/waves/decisions-2026-09-17.md`
|
||||
**Decision record:** `docs/waves/decisions-2026-09-17.md` (open details
|
||||
confirmed 2026-10-06, see "Confirmed 2026-10-06" in the CR-020 section)
|
||||
|
||||
**Branch (decided 2026-10-06):** `feat/wave-12-bulk-users`, cut from `main`
|
||||
(`df20b8f`, production). Only this file and the decision record come across
|
||||
from `feat/waves-11-13`, so the PR into `main` is wave 12 alone: no wave 11
|
||||
code and no T13.1, which must not reach `main` before T14.1. Wave 16 is not
|
||||
merged yet; it touches different functions, and whichever lands second rebases.
|
||||
|
||||
Six tasks, in build order.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -38,15 +45,15 @@ exist for the single case — bulk delete stays a hard delete, matching
|
||||
|
||||
**Done when:**
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] each of the four bulk actions is callable with a list of user ids and a
|
||||
- [x] each of the four bulk actions is callable with a list of user ids and a
|
||||
single set of parameters
|
||||
- [ ] a batch containing the actor's own account rejects only that row, not
|
||||
- [x] a batch containing the actor's own account rejects only that row, not
|
||||
the whole batch — verified for disable, demote, and delete
|
||||
- [ ] a super user's batch that includes a user/project outside what they
|
||||
- [x] a super user's batch that includes a user/project outside what they
|
||||
manage rejects only that row, with a stated reason
|
||||
- [ ] every successful row produces its own `AuditLog` entry, identical in
|
||||
- [x] every successful row produces its own `AuditLog` entry, identical in
|
||||
shape to what the single-user endpoint would have written
|
||||
- [ ] a batch with some failing rows still applies to the rows that succeed,
|
||||
- [x] a batch with some failing rows still applies to the rows that succeed,
|
||||
and the response lists exactly which rows failed and why
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
@@ -67,12 +74,12 @@ disappears at zero.
|
||||
|
||||
**Done when:**
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] select-all selects exactly the rows currently visible under the active
|
||||
- [x] select-all selects exactly the rows currently visible under the active
|
||||
filter, not the full unfiltered table
|
||||
- [ ] changing the filter while rows are selected does something sane and
|
||||
- [x] changing the filter while rows are selected does something sane and
|
||||
visible (either clears the selection or keeps it explicit which rows are
|
||||
still selected) — pick one and state it, don't leave it undefined
|
||||
- [ ] the toolbar is keyboard-reachable and only present when >=1 row is
|
||||
- [x] the toolbar is keyboard-reachable and only present when >=1 row is
|
||||
selected
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
@@ -97,13 +104,13 @@ partial failure.
|
||||
|
||||
**Done when:**
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] role change, activate/disable, and project assignment each work end to
|
||||
- [x] role change, activate/disable, and project assignment each work end to
|
||||
end against a multi-row selection
|
||||
- [ ] the confirmation dialog names the exact affected count before anything is
|
||||
- [x] the confirmation dialog names the exact affected count before anything is
|
||||
sent
|
||||
- [ ] a batch with a partial failure shows which rows failed, not just an
|
||||
- [x] a batch with a partial failure shows which rows failed, not just an
|
||||
undifferentiated error
|
||||
- [ ] `aria-live` announces the outcome
|
||||
- [x] `aria-live` announces the outcome
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -123,11 +130,11 @@ T12.1 endpoints, not a third implementation of the bulk logic.
|
||||
|
||||
**Done when:**
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] a CSV with a mix of valid and invalid usernames applies to the valid
|
||||
- [x] a CSV with a mix of valid and invalid usernames applies to the valid
|
||||
rows and reports the invalid ones by row, with a reason
|
||||
- [ ] the same permission/self-action guards from T12.1 apply here — a CSV
|
||||
- [x] the same permission/self-action guards from T12.1 apply here — a CSV
|
||||
cannot reach a user a checkbox-driven batch couldn't
|
||||
- [ ] duplicate usernames in one CSV are handled without double-applying or
|
||||
- [x] duplicate usernames in one CSV are handled without double-applying or
|
||||
erroring confusingly
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
@@ -150,10 +157,10 @@ change it, not a reason to skip building a real confirmation now.
|
||||
|
||||
**Done when:**
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] the affected usernames are listed in the confirmation dialog before
|
||||
- [x] the affected usernames are listed in the confirmation dialog before
|
||||
delete is sent
|
||||
- [ ] the request is not sent until the confirmation phrase is typed correctly
|
||||
- [ ] the actor's own account, if somehow selected, is rejected with a clear
|
||||
- [x] the request is not sent until the confirmation phrase is typed correctly
|
||||
- [x] the actor's own account, if somehow selected, is rejected with a clear
|
||||
reason rather than silently included or silently dropped
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
@@ -173,21 +180,84 @@ suite.
|
||||
|
||||
**Done when:**
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] all `CR-020` acceptance criteria in `decisions-2026-09-17.md` are met or
|
||||
- [x] all `CR-020` acceptance criteria in `decisions-2026-09-17.md` are met or
|
||||
a failure is stated with a reason
|
||||
- [ ] screenshots committed
|
||||
- [ ] smoke test and `seed_demo.py` both still pass
|
||||
- [ ] full test suite passes
|
||||
- [x] screenshots committed
|
||||
- [x] smoke test and `seed_demo.py` both still pass
|
||||
- [x] full test suite passes
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Wave 12 exit criteria
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] all four bulk actions work against both a checkbox selection and a CSV
|
||||
- [x] all four bulk actions work against both a checkbox selection and a CSV
|
||||
upload
|
||||
- [ ] every existing single-user guardrail (self-action, scope, grantable
|
||||
- [x] every existing single-user guardrail (self-action, scope, grantable
|
||||
roles) holds under bulk use
|
||||
- [ ] bulk delete requires typed confirmation and lists affected usernames
|
||||
- [ ] partial failures are always reported, never hidden behind a blanket
|
||||
- [x] bulk delete requires typed confirmation and lists affected usernames
|
||||
- [x] partial failures are always reported, never hidden behind a blanket
|
||||
success
|
||||
- [ ] `CR-020` fully accounted for, no open acceptance criteria
|
||||
- [x] `CR-020` fully accounted for, no open acceptance criteria
|
||||
|
||||
## Verification record
|
||||
|
||||
Built 2026-10-06 on `feat/wave-12-bulk-users`
|
||||
(from `main`, `df20b8f`), one commit per task. Run in the build sandbox (Linux,
|
||||
Python 3.10, no browser).
|
||||
|
||||
| Check | Result |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `tests/bulk_users_check.py` (new, no browser) | **61/61**: all four actions, own-row refusals, super-user scope, per-row audit in the single route's shape, partial failure, project add/remove keeping other projects and roles, CSV resolve, 403/401/422 gates |
|
||||
| Same check against `main` | 7/18: the 7 single-route checks pass; every bulk check fails, because the routes do not exist there |
|
||||
| Single-user routes before/after (16 calls: 200/400/403/404, as admin and super user) | **Identical** responses, audit rows and memberships against `main`. The routes now call the same `apply_*` functions as the bulk routes |
|
||||
| Page logic, DOM harness (jsdom, the real `users.html` and scripts, mocked API) | **48/48**: selection, select-all over the filtered rows, filter clears selection, toolbar, confirm counts, per-row report, CSV, typed DELETE |
|
||||
| Same flows, jsdom against a real server seeded by `browser_check.seed()` | **13/13**, including the CSV report texts the browser probe expects |
|
||||
| `server/smoketest.py` | **27/27** |
|
||||
| `server/seed_demo.py` | Seeds the demo project |
|
||||
|
||||
**Decisions applied (confirmed 2026-10-06):** typed `DELETE`; project assignment
|
||||
is add/remove per project, with the per-project role (`ProjectMember.role`) set
|
||||
on add; filter or search change clears the selection; CSV holds usernames only.
|
||||
A row already in the requested state reports `unchanged` and writes no audit
|
||||
row (nothing changed). An email address in the CSV resolves only when exactly
|
||||
one account has it.
|
||||
|
||||
**Found and logged, not fixed:** BL-060, a super user's refusal reason promises
|
||||
a project-access change that neither the dialog nor the bulk route allows.
|
||||
|
||||
**Browser probes, run 2026-10-06 on Matt's machine (Windows, Chrome 153 / Edge 154,
|
||||
`.venv`), one at a time:**
|
||||
|
||||
| Probe | Result |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `tests/bulk_users_ui_check.py` (new) | **19/19**: selection, Space on a row box, role change, super-user CSV (another job / not found / herself / duplicate, each by line), add-to-project with a role, typed DELETE, 390px bar fit, no JS errors |
|
||||
| `tests/console_dialogs_check.py` | **16/16**, including the new section 4 (bulk delete prompt, natives poisoned) |
|
||||
| `tests/mobile_check.py` | **24/24**, users page included |
|
||||
| `tests/a11y_check.py` | **22/22**: users page 66 focusable elements, all with a visible ring; helper text 5.02:1 at worst |
|
||||
| `tests/browser_check.py` | **67/71**, then re-pointed (below); **rerun after the re-point: all passed** (reported by Matt, 2026-10-06) |
|
||||
|
||||
**`browser_check.py` re-pointed (T12.6).** Its four failures were assertions
|
||||
written against column POSITIONS: the manager table had 9 columns, and the
|
||||
own-row checks read `r.cells[3]` (Permissions) and `r.cells[4]` (Project role).
|
||||
CR-020's selection column is first, so the table has 10 and those indexes
|
||||
landed on Username and Email. Not an app defect. The probe now expects 10
|
||||
columns with the selection column first, finds the two cells by their header
|
||||
name rather than their position (so the next column cannot break it the same
|
||||
way), and adds one check: your own row has no selection box. Verified against
|
||||
the real page in the DOM harness, then rerun in the browser: all passed.
|
||||
|
||||
**Screenshots** (after; the before-shots are `baseline/users-1440.png` and
|
||||
`baseline/after-wave9/users-390.png`): `baseline/wave-12/users-1440.png`,
|
||||
`users-1440-selected.png`, `users-390.png`, `users-390-selected.png`. Reviewed:
|
||||
the bar, its four groups and the selected-row marking render as designed at
|
||||
both widths; nothing scrolls sideways at 390px.
|
||||
|
||||
**Seen in the screenshots, not caused by wave 12, logged as BL-061:** the
|
||||
pre-existing sync badge ("Everything sent to the project", `project-data.js`)
|
||||
is drawn over a row's Delete button at 1440px and over "Set permissions" at
|
||||
390px for about 2 seconds after a load. It is `pointer-events:none`, so it never
|
||||
blocks a click, but it hides a control while it shows.
|
||||
|
||||
**Wave 12 closed 2026-10-06.** Every task done-when and every exit criterion
|
||||
above is checked. Pushed as `feat/wave-12-bulk-users`; PR into `main` open.
|
||||
Merge after wave 16 (`feat/wave-16-on-main`); both orders tested conflict-free.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,242 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Wave 13 — Okta/AD deprovisioning sync
|
||||
|
||||
**Items:** `D18`
|
||||
**Depends on:** wave 10 merged (it is). Not blocked by wave 11 or wave 12, but
|
||||
shares `server/app.py` account-state surface with wave 12 (`CR-020`) — sequence
|
||||
commits to avoid an avoidable conflict.
|
||||
**Decision record:** `docs/waves/decisions-2026-09-17.md`
|
||||
|
||||
Six tasks, in build order. **T13.3's fail-closed behavior is the most
|
||||
important done-when list in this wave — do not relax it to ship faster.**
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### T13.1 — D18: idle timeout with an absolute ceiling
|
||||
|
||||
- **Items:** `D18`
|
||||
- **Depends on:** nothing (first task, independent of the rest)
|
||||
- **Blocks:** nothing
|
||||
- **Surface:** `server/`
|
||||
- **Files:** `server/auth.py`, `server/app.py` (`auth_gate` middleware),
|
||||
`server/.env.example`, `DEPLOYMENT.md`
|
||||
|
||||
**Revised 2026-09-23** — originally just "shrink `AUTH_SESSION_HOURS`". Matt
|
||||
asked whether an idle timeout would be a better fit than a flat session
|
||||
length. It is, but not by itself — see the decision record's reasoning on why
|
||||
idle-with-no-ceiling is actually a worse fit for this item's own threat model
|
||||
than a flat expiry would have been. Build both.
|
||||
|
||||
**Do:**
|
||||
|
||||
- Add `login_at` to the JWT payload in `create_token()` — the original
|
||||
sign-in time, distinct from `iat`, which becomes "when THIS token was
|
||||
issued" once tokens start getting reissued. `login_at` never changes across
|
||||
reissues; it's what the absolute ceiling is measured from.
|
||||
- Add `AUTH_IDLE_MINUTES` (default 30). `AUTH_SESSION_HOURS` stays the name
|
||||
for the absolute ceiling, default changing from 12 to a proposed 8 — update
|
||||
its docstring/comment in `auth.py` and `.env.example`, since its MEANING is
|
||||
changing (session length -> hard ceiling on top of a sliding idle window),
|
||||
not just its value.
|
||||
- In `auth_gate` (`server/app.py`), after confirming a request is
|
||||
authenticated: if `now < login_at + AUTH_SESSION_HOURS` (the ceiling hasn't
|
||||
passed), compute `new_exp = min(now + AUTH_IDLE_MINUTES, login_at +
|
||||
AUTH_SESSION_HOURS)`. If `new_exp` is meaningfully later than the current
|
||||
token's `exp` (throttle this — do not reissue on every single request, only
|
||||
when enough time has passed to be worth a new cookie; a few minutes of
|
||||
slack is fine), mint a refreshed token carrying forward `sub`/`username`/
|
||||
`role`/`ver`/`login_at` unchanged, and set it on the response.
|
||||
- If the ceiling HAS passed, do not refresh — let the existing token expire
|
||||
on its own terms (it may already be invalid, or may tick over within the
|
||||
idle window; either way, no new one is issued past the ceiling).
|
||||
- The middleware should not need a DB round trip to do this — everything
|
||||
needed (`sub`, `username`, `role`, `ver`, `login_at`) is already in the
|
||||
validated claims. `get_current_user`'s existing per-request `is_active`/
|
||||
`token_version` check is unaffected and still runs separately.
|
||||
|
||||
**Do not:** reissue the cookie on every request unconditionally — that's a
|
||||
`Set-Cookie` header on every API call for no benefit over a coarser refresh.
|
||||
Do not let the ceiling check silently vanish for tokens issued before this
|
||||
change ships — a token with no `login_at` claim should fall back to treating
|
||||
its own `iat` as `login_at`, not bypass the ceiling entirely.
|
||||
|
||||
**Done when:**
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] a session with continuous activity stays alive past 30 minutes but is
|
||||
cut off at the `AUTH_SESSION_HOURS` ceiling regardless
|
||||
- [ ] a session with no activity for 30+ minutes is rejected on its next
|
||||
request
|
||||
- [ ] the cookie is not rewritten on every single request — verify the
|
||||
refresh is throttled, not unconditional
|
||||
- [ ] a pre-existing token with no `login_at` claim (simulating a session
|
||||
issued before this shipped) still gets a hard ceiling, via the `iat`
|
||||
fallback
|
||||
- [ ] `.env.example` and `DEPLOYMENT.md` explain both variables and flag both
|
||||
defaults as proposed, not confirmed against Okta's own session policy
|
||||
- [ ] existing session/auth tests updated for the new mechanism, not just a
|
||||
new number
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### T13.2 — D18: Okta Management API client
|
||||
|
||||
- **Items:** `D18`
|
||||
- **Depends on:** nothing (independent of T13.1)
|
||||
- **Blocks:** T13.3
|
||||
- **Surface:** `server/`
|
||||
- **Files:** new `server/okta_sync.py` (or extend `server/okta_auth.py` —
|
||||
task's call), `server/.env.example`
|
||||
|
||||
**Do:** A small client for Okta's user-list endpoint, authenticated with a new,
|
||||
separate credential (e.g. `OKTA_API_TOKEN`) — not the OIDC client secret used
|
||||
for sign-in. Fetch the full user list (paginated per Okta's API) rather than
|
||||
one-by-one lookups per local user; this app has ~20-odd accounts today, and a
|
||||
list-and-diff is simpler and cheaper than N calls. Return each Okta user's
|
||||
identity-claim value (matching `OKTA_IDENTITY_CLAIM`, already confirmed live
|
||||
per wave 10) and status.
|
||||
|
||||
Follow the existing pattern for external credentials in this repo (`MICRON_DB_URL`,
|
||||
`SMTP_PASSWORD`): env-only, never logged, never returned to the browser in an
|
||||
error message.
|
||||
|
||||
**Do not:** reuse `OKTA_CLIENT_ID`/`OKTA_CLIENT_SECRET` for this. Sign-in and
|
||||
the management API are different trust boundaries with different scopes;
|
||||
conflating them means a compromise or rotation of one affects the other
|
||||
unnecessarily.
|
||||
|
||||
**Done when:**
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] the client authenticates with its own credential, distinct from the OIDC
|
||||
client
|
||||
- [ ] it fetches the complete Okta user list, handling pagination
|
||||
- [ ] an auth failure or malformed response raises a clear, specific error
|
||||
rather than returning an empty list indistinguishable from "everyone was
|
||||
deprovisioned" — this distinction is what T13.3 depends on
|
||||
- [ ] the credential is never logged or surfaced in any API response
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### T13.3 — D18: the sync job
|
||||
|
||||
- **Items:** `D18`
|
||||
- **Depends on:** T13.2
|
||||
- **Blocks:** T13.4
|
||||
- **Surface:** `server/`
|
||||
- **Files:** `server/okta_sync.py`, `server/app.py` (or wherever `log_event`
|
||||
lives)
|
||||
|
||||
**Do:** Compare the Okta user list (T13.2) against local `users` rows. For any
|
||||
local `is_active=True` user whose Okta identity is missing from the list, or
|
||||
present with a non-active status, set `is_active=False` and write an
|
||||
`AuditLog` row (`actor="system:okta_sync"`, action e.g.
|
||||
`user_deprovisioned_by_sync`, detail naming the Okta status found). Never
|
||||
touch a user already `is_active=False`. Never re-enable anyone.
|
||||
|
||||
**The fail-closed rule, non-negotiable:** if T13.2's client raises an error of
|
||||
any kind (network, auth, malformed response, timeout), this task takes **no
|
||||
action on any account** for that run and logs the failure clearly (server log,
|
||||
at minimum). An error is never treated as "Okta returned zero active users."
|
||||
Write a test that asserts this directly: feed the sync a failing client and
|
||||
assert zero rows changed and zero `AuditLog` entries written.
|
||||
|
||||
**Done when:**
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] a user missing from Okta's list, or present but not active, is disabled
|
||||
with a correctly-detailed audit row
|
||||
- [ ] a user already disabled is left alone (no duplicate audit row each run)
|
||||
- [ ] an active Okta user already active locally produces no audit row (only
|
||||
changes are logged, not a clean bill of health every cycle)
|
||||
- [ ] **a simulated Okta API failure results in zero account changes and zero
|
||||
audit rows** — this is the one check that must never be skipped or
|
||||
weakened
|
||||
- [ ] the job never re-enables an account under any input
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### T13.4 — D18: run it on a schedule
|
||||
|
||||
- **Items:** `D18`
|
||||
- **Depends on:** T13.3
|
||||
- **Blocks:** T13.6
|
||||
- **Surface:** `server/`, `docker-compose.yml`
|
||||
- **Files:** `server/app.py` (startup hook) or a new sidecar per the `backup`
|
||||
container's pattern — task's call, per the decision record's noted
|
||||
alternative
|
||||
|
||||
**Do:** Wire T13.3 to run on an interval (proposed 15 minutes, env-overridable
|
||||
— e.g. `OKTA_SYNC_INTERVAL_SECONDS`, matching `BACKUP_INTERVAL_SECONDS`'s
|
||||
naming). Default choice is an in-process background task in the `api`
|
||||
container; if a separate container is chosen instead, follow the `backup`
|
||||
service's shape (own Dockerfile or script, `internal` network plus whatever
|
||||
egress reaching Okta requires — check whether `outbound` as currently defined
|
||||
is sufficient or Okta needs a distinct allowance).
|
||||
|
||||
**Done when:**
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] the job runs automatically on the configured interval without manual
|
||||
invocation
|
||||
- [ ] interval is env-configurable with a sane default
|
||||
- [ ] a container restart does not produce a duplicate/overlapping run, and a
|
||||
slow cycle does not stack with the next one
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### T13.5 — D18: admin visibility
|
||||
|
||||
- **Items:** `D18`
|
||||
- **Depends on:** T13.3
|
||||
- **Blocks:** T13.6
|
||||
- **Surface:** `html/`
|
||||
- **Files:** `html/users.js` / `html/admin.js` (wherever audit history is
|
||||
already surfaced)
|
||||
|
||||
**Do:** Confirm an auto-disable reads clearly wherever admins already look at
|
||||
account history — the actor string (`system:okta_sync`) should be
|
||||
self-explanatory in context, not require reading server logs to understand.
|
||||
Do not build new UI beyond making sure the existing audit surface renders this
|
||||
actor sensibly. Email/notification to admins on auto-disable is a noted
|
||||
fast-follow (the decision record flags it as open, not required here) — do not
|
||||
build it in this task; log it instead if it's tempting to add.
|
||||
|
||||
**Done when:**
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] an auto-disabled account's audit entry is visible and legible in the
|
||||
existing admin UI without special-casing
|
||||
- [ ] nothing here silently assumes `CR-019`'s activity view exists yet — this
|
||||
must work standalone
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### T13.6 — D18: verification
|
||||
|
||||
- **Items:** `D18`
|
||||
- **Depends on:** T13.4, T13.5
|
||||
- **Blocks:** nothing
|
||||
- **Surface:** `server/`
|
||||
- **Files:** as touched above
|
||||
|
||||
**Do:** Full verification per `CLAUDE.md`. Beyond the usual run: specifically
|
||||
re-run T13.3's fail-closed test in isolation and confirm it still passes after
|
||||
T13.4's scheduling wrapper is in place — the scheduling layer must not
|
||||
introduce a path that swallows the client's error and proceeds anyway.
|
||||
|
||||
**Done when:**
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] all `D18` acceptance criteria in `decisions-2026-09-17.md` are met or a
|
||||
failure is stated with a reason
|
||||
- [ ] the fail-closed behavior is verified end to end through the scheduled
|
||||
wrapper, not just the bare sync function
|
||||
- [ ] smoke test and `seed_demo.py` both still pass
|
||||
- [ ] full test suite passes
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Wave 13 exit criteria
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] `AUTH_SESSION_HOURS` defaults to 2, documented
|
||||
- [ ] the sync job runs on a schedule and correctly disables accounts Okta no
|
||||
longer shows as active
|
||||
- [ ] every auto-disable is individually audited with a clearly non-human actor
|
||||
- [ ] an Okta API failure of any kind changes zero accounts — verified, not
|
||||
assumed
|
||||
- [ ] the sync never re-enables an account
|
||||
- [ ] `D18` fully accounted for, no open acceptance criteria
|
||||
@@ -34,12 +34,12 @@
|
||||
/* Every container admin.js paints a table into is a scrollport of its own, so a
|
||||
sticky header always has something to stick to rather than sliding up behind
|
||||
the app bar. Same rule as console.css's .tscroll. */
|
||||
#comments-admin, #audit-admin, #notif-box, #activity-admin, #projects-table, #defmem-table{
|
||||
#comments-admin, #audit-admin, #notif-box, #usage-admin, #projects-table, #defmem-table{
|
||||
overflow:auto; max-height:min(70vh,640px); overscroll-behavior:contain; }
|
||||
/* If admin.js wraps its table in its own .tscroll, the outer box steps aside so
|
||||
one table never ends up with two scrollbars. */
|
||||
#comments-admin:has(.tscroll), #audit-admin:has(.tscroll), #notif-box:has(.tscroll),
|
||||
#activity-admin:has(.tscroll), #projects-table:has(.tscroll), #defmem-table:has(.tscroll){
|
||||
#usage-admin:has(.tscroll), #projects-table:has(.tscroll), #defmem-table:has(.tscroll){
|
||||
overflow:visible; max-height:none; }
|
||||
|
||||
/* Comment text and audit detail are the two columns you are actually here to
|
||||
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
|
||||
border:1px solid var(--border-strong); border-radius:0; margin-bottom:var(--s3); }
|
||||
|
||||
@media (max-width:900px){
|
||||
#comments-admin, #audit-admin, #notif-box, #activity-admin, #projects-table, #defmem-table{
|
||||
#comments-admin, #audit-admin, #notif-box, #usage-admin, #projects-table, #defmem-table{
|
||||
max-height:none; }
|
||||
}
|
||||
</style>
|
||||
@@ -175,38 +175,16 @@
|
||||
<div id="audit-admin" class="note">Click refresh to load.</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- ACTIVITY & USAGE (CR-019) -->
|
||||
<!-- USAGE LOGS -->
|
||||
<div class="card">
|
||||
<h2>Activity & usage</h2>
|
||||
<div class="sub">Who is using the suite, which tools, and how often — recorded server-side on every
|
||||
sign-in and page open, kept indefinitely. Filter below, or export a CSV: raw (real usernames) for
|
||||
internal use, or sanitized (each user replaced with a stable, non-reversible id) for feeding into
|
||||
Power BI or another external reporting tool without carrying real identities.</div>
|
||||
<h2>Usage logs</h2>
|
||||
<div class="sub">Engagement recorded by both tools — the work package creator and the SOP wizard —
|
||||
sessions, actions and counts, with a download per tool (D5). Note: stored locally per browser,
|
||||
so this reflects activity on <strong>this</strong> machine.</div>
|
||||
<div class="toolbar">
|
||||
<label for="act-from">From</label>
|
||||
<input type="date" id="act-from" onchange="loadActivity()">
|
||||
<label for="act-to">To</label>
|
||||
<input type="date" id="act-to" onchange="loadActivity()">
|
||||
<select id="act-project" onchange="loadActivity()"><option value="">All projects</option></select>
|
||||
<input id="act-user" placeholder="Username…" oninput="loadActivity()">
|
||||
<select id="act-tool" onchange="loadActivity()">
|
||||
<option value="">All tools</option>
|
||||
<option value="launcher">Launcher</option>
|
||||
<option value="wizard">SOP wizard</option>
|
||||
<option value="creator">Work package creator</option>
|
||||
<option value="field_view">Field view</option>
|
||||
<option value="admin">Admin console</option>
|
||||
<option value="directory">User directory</option>
|
||||
</select>
|
||||
<button onclick="loadActivity()">Refresh</button>
|
||||
<button onclick="loadUsage()">Refresh</button>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<div id="activity-banner" class="banner" style="display:none"></div>
|
||||
<div id="activity-admin" class="note">Loading…</div>
|
||||
<div class="toolbar" style="margin-top:var(--s3)">
|
||||
<button onclick="exportActivity(false)">Download CSV (raw)</button>
|
||||
<button onclick="exportActivity(true)">Download CSV (sanitized)</button>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<div id="activity-export-banner" class="banner" style="display:none"></div>
|
||||
<div id="usage-admin" class="note">Click refresh to load.</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- DB SNAPSHOT -->
|
||||
@@ -237,6 +215,7 @@
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
<script src="wp-usage.js"></script>
|
||||
<script src="console-util.js"></script>
|
||||
<script src="wp-dialog.js"></script>
|
||||
<script src="admin.js"></script>
|
||||
|
||||
141
html/admin.js
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ function reveal(){
|
||||
loadNotifications();
|
||||
loadComments();
|
||||
loadAudit();
|
||||
loadActivity();
|
||||
loadUsage();
|
||||
}
|
||||
function showDenied(){
|
||||
document.getElementById('admin-denied').style.display='';
|
||||
@@ -189,19 +189,6 @@ async function loadProjects(){
|
||||
banner.style.display='none';
|
||||
_adminProjects = json;
|
||||
renderProjects();
|
||||
populateActivityProjectFilter();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The activity project filter reuses the same project list the Projects card
|
||||
// already fetched — no second /api/projects call just to fill a <select>.
|
||||
function populateActivityProjectFilter(){
|
||||
const sel = document.getElementById('act-project');
|
||||
if(!sel) return;
|
||||
const cur = sel.value;
|
||||
sel.innerHTML = '<option value="">All projects</option>' +
|
||||
_adminProjects.slice().sort((a,b)=>String(a.name||'').localeCompare(String(b.name||'')))
|
||||
.map(p => '<option value="'+uesc(p.id)+'">'+uesc(p.name||p.number||p.id)+'</option>').join('');
|
||||
sel.value = cur;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function renderProjects(){
|
||||
@@ -478,90 +465,6 @@ function renderAudit(){
|
||||
'</tr>').join('')+'</tbody></table>';
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── activity & usage (CR-019) ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
// Server-side, per-user activity — distinct from the "Activity log" card above
|
||||
// (that's AuditLog: business mutations) and from the "Usage logs" card below
|
||||
// (that's per-browser localStorage, D5/T7.10, on the way out per T11.6). This is
|
||||
// /api/usage/summary and /api/usage/export: real rows, aggregated server-side,
|
||||
// filterable by date/project/user/tool, and exportable raw or sanitized.
|
||||
function _activityFilters(){
|
||||
const q = new URLSearchParams();
|
||||
const from = document.getElementById('act-from').value; if(from) q.set('from', from);
|
||||
const to = document.getElementById('act-to').value; if(to) q.set('to', to);
|
||||
const proj = document.getElementById('act-project').value; if(proj) q.set('project_id', proj);
|
||||
const user = (document.getElementById('act-user').value||'').trim(); if(user) q.set('username', user);
|
||||
const tool = document.getElementById('act-tool').value; if(tool) q.set('tool', tool);
|
||||
return q;
|
||||
}
|
||||
async function loadActivity(){
|
||||
const banner = document.getElementById('activity-banner');
|
||||
const box = document.getElementById('activity-admin');
|
||||
if(!box) return;
|
||||
banner.style.display='none';
|
||||
box.textContent = 'Loading…';
|
||||
const { status, json } = await api('GET', '/api/usage/summary?'+_activityFilters().toString());
|
||||
if(status===403){
|
||||
banner.className='banner bad'; banner.style.display='';
|
||||
banner.textContent = '✕ Your account can’t see suite-wide activity here — this needs admin, or Project Super User on at least one project.';
|
||||
box.innerHTML=''; return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if(status!==200 || !json){
|
||||
banner.className='banner bad'; banner.style.display='';
|
||||
banner.textContent = '✕ Could not load activity ('+apiError(status, json, 'load failed')+').';
|
||||
box.innerHTML=''; return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
renderActivity(json);
|
||||
}
|
||||
function renderActivity(sum){
|
||||
const box = document.getElementById('activity-admin');
|
||||
if(!sum.event_count){ box.innerHTML = '<div class="note">No activity matches this filter.</div>'; return; }
|
||||
const fmt = s => s ? wpFormatDateTime(s) : '—';
|
||||
const bucket = (label, obj, take) => {
|
||||
const entries = Object.entries(obj).sort((a,b)=> b[0].localeCompare(a[0])).slice(0, take);
|
||||
if(!entries.length) return '';
|
||||
return '<table class="kv" style="margin-top:8px"><caption style="text-align:left;font-weight:600;margin-bottom:4px">'+
|
||||
uesc(label)+'</caption>'+entries.map(([k,v]) => '<tr><th>'+uesc(k)+'</th><td>'+v+' active user'+(v===1?'':'s')+'</td></tr>').join('')+
|
||||
'</table>';
|
||||
};
|
||||
const perTool = Object.entries(sum.by_tool||{});
|
||||
const toolTable = perTool.length ? '<table class="users"><thead><tr><th>Tool</th><th>Events</th></tr></thead><tbody>'+
|
||||
perTool.map(([t,n]) => '<tr><td>'+uesc(t||'(login)')+'</td><td>'+n+'</td></tr>').join('')+'</tbody></table>' :
|
||||
'<div class="note">No per-tool data.</div>';
|
||||
const perUser = Object.entries(sum.per_user_last_active||{}).sort((a,b)=> String(b[1]).localeCompare(String(a[1])));
|
||||
const userTable = perUser.length ? '<table class="users"><thead><tr><th>User</th><th>Last active</th></tr></thead><tbody>'+
|
||||
perUser.map(([u,t]) => '<tr><td><strong>'+uesc(u)+'</strong></td><td style="color:var(--muted)">'+fmt(t)+'</td></tr>').join('')+
|
||||
'</tbody></table>' : '<div class="note">No per-user data.</div>';
|
||||
box.innerHTML =
|
||||
'<div class="note">'+sum.event_count+' event'+(sum.event_count===1?'':'s')+' matched.</div>'+
|
||||
'<div class="row" style="gap:var(--s4);flex-wrap:wrap;align-items:flex-start">'+
|
||||
'<div>'+bucket('Active users by day', sum.active_users.by_day, 30)+'</div>'+
|
||||
'<div>'+bucket('Active users by week', sum.active_users.by_week, 12)+'</div>'+
|
||||
'<div>'+bucket('Active users by month', sum.active_users.by_month, 12)+'</div>'+
|
||||
'</div>'+
|
||||
'<h2 style="margin-top:16px">By tool</h2>'+toolTable+
|
||||
'<h2 style="margin-top:16px">Per-user last active</h2>'+userTable;
|
||||
}
|
||||
async function exportActivity(sanitize){
|
||||
const banner = document.getElementById('activity-export-banner');
|
||||
banner.className='banner'; banner.style.display=''; banner.textContent='Preparing export…';
|
||||
const q = _activityFilters();
|
||||
if(sanitize) q.set('sanitize', 'true');
|
||||
const { status, json } = await api('GET', '/api/usage/export?'+q.toString());
|
||||
if(status!==200 || typeof json !== 'string'){
|
||||
banner.className='banner bad';
|
||||
banner.textContent = '✕ Export failed ('+apiError(status, json, 'export failed')+').';
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
const blob = new Blob([json], { type:'text/csv' });
|
||||
const a = document.createElement('a');
|
||||
a.href = URL.createObjectURL(blob);
|
||||
a.download = 'usage_export_'+(sanitize?'sanitized':'raw')+'_'+new Date().toISOString().slice(0,10)+'.csv';
|
||||
document.body.appendChild(a); a.click(); a.remove();
|
||||
setTimeout(() => URL.revokeObjectURL(a.href), 1000);
|
||||
banner.className='banner ok';
|
||||
banner.textContent = '✓ Downloaded the '+(sanitize?'sanitized':'raw')+' export.';
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── notifications / email settings ──────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
let _settings = {};
|
||||
async function loadSettings(){
|
||||
@@ -753,6 +656,48 @@ async function loadNotifications(){
|
||||
'</tr>').join('')+'</tbody></table>';
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── usage logs (read from this browser's localStorage) ──────────────────────────
|
||||
// D5 / T7.10: the report for BOTH tools' recorded usage, in the one place an
|
||||
// operator-facing readout belongs - behind the same admin gate as this whole
|
||||
// page (gateByRole() below shows nothing else either). Data comes from
|
||||
// wp-usage.js, the single implementation; the keys predate the move, so
|
||||
// everything recorded before it is still here.
|
||||
function loadUsage(){
|
||||
const box = document.getElementById('usage-admin');
|
||||
if(!box) return;
|
||||
const tools = [
|
||||
['Work package creator', WPUsage.KEYS.creator, 'wp-iwp-usage'],
|
||||
['SOP wizard', WPUsage.KEYS.wizard, 'wp-suite-usage'],
|
||||
];
|
||||
let html = '';
|
||||
tools.forEach(([label, key, prefix]) => {
|
||||
const evs = (WPUsage.load(key).events) || [];
|
||||
html += '<h2 style="margin-top:16px">' + uesc(label) + '</h2>';
|
||||
if(!evs.length){
|
||||
html += '<div class="note">No usage recorded in this browser yet.</div>';
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
const byEvent = {}, sessions = new Set();
|
||||
let first = evs[0].ts, last = evs[0].ts;
|
||||
evs.forEach(e => {
|
||||
byEvent[e.event] = (byEvent[e.event]||0)+1;
|
||||
if(e.session) sessions.add(e.session);
|
||||
if(e.ts < first) first = e.ts; if(e.ts > last) last = e.ts;
|
||||
});
|
||||
const fmt = v => v ? wpFormatDateTime(v) : '—';
|
||||
html += '<table class="kv">'+
|
||||
'<tr><th>Sessions</th><td>'+sessions.size+'</td></tr>'+
|
||||
'<tr><th>Events</th><td>'+evs.length+'</td></tr>'+
|
||||
'<tr><th>Range</th><td style="font-weight:600">'+fmt(first)+' → '+fmt(last)+'</td></tr></table>';
|
||||
html += '<table class="users"><thead><tr><th>Event</th><th>Count</th></tr></thead><tbody>';
|
||||
Object.keys(byEvent).sort().forEach(k => html += '<tr><td>'+uesc(k)+'</td><td>'+byEvent[k]+'</td></tr>');
|
||||
html += '</tbody></table>';
|
||||
html += '<div class="toolbar" style="margin-top:8px"><button onclick="WPUsage.download(WPUsage.KEYS.'+
|
||||
(key === WPUsage.KEYS.creator ? 'creator' : 'wizard')+', ' + jsq(prefix) + ')">Download the full event log</button></div>';
|
||||
});
|
||||
box.innerHTML = html;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── access control: admins only ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
// auth-guard.js requires a login and sets window.WP_USER (firing 'wp-auth-ready').
|
||||
// Show the console for admins; otherwise show the "Admins only" notice.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -125,40 +125,12 @@
|
||||
// Nothing replaces it. Every signed-in page mounts the drawer, so there is no page
|
||||
// left that would need a floating fallback pill.
|
||||
|
||||
// ── CR-019: usage ping ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
// One page_open event per authenticated load, sent from exactly ONE place
|
||||
// (here) rather than from each page's own script - the shared-chrome lesson
|
||||
// S4 and the token-drift lesson S5 both taught this codebase the hard way.
|
||||
// Fire-and-forget: never blocks reveal(), never retries, never surfaces an
|
||||
// error to the person using the app - a missed usage ping is not something
|
||||
// anyone here should notice happening.
|
||||
var TOOL_BY_PAGE = {
|
||||
'index.html': 'launcher',
|
||||
'work-package-suite.html': 'wizard',
|
||||
'wp-creation-index.html': 'creator',
|
||||
'field.html': 'field_view',
|
||||
'admin.html': 'admin',
|
||||
'users.html': 'directory'
|
||||
};
|
||||
function pingUsage() {
|
||||
var page = (location.pathname.split('/').pop() || 'index.html');
|
||||
var tool = TOOL_BY_PAGE[page] || page.replace(/\.html$/, '');
|
||||
try {
|
||||
fetch('/api/usage/ping', {
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
|
||||
body: JSON.stringify({ tool: tool })
|
||||
}).catch(function () {});
|
||||
} catch (e) {}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function proceed(user) {
|
||||
clearTimeout(safety);
|
||||
window.WP_USER = user;
|
||||
reveal();
|
||||
if (window.WP_USER) {
|
||||
window.wpFlags(); // start the feature-flag fetch; pages await it as needed
|
||||
pingUsage();
|
||||
try { document.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent('wp-auth-ready', { detail: window.WP_USER })); } catch (e) {}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -24,7 +24,10 @@
|
||||
The directory is one wide table, so the column exceptions live here: email is
|
||||
the one cell long enough to stretch a row, and the two role dropdowns need
|
||||
room for "Assistant Project Manager" without pushing Actions off screen. */
|
||||
#users-table table td:nth-child(3){ max-width:230px; overflow:hidden; text-overflow:ellipsis; }
|
||||
/* The email cell, by its class: CR-020's selection column moved it from third to
|
||||
fourth on the managers' table, and a position-based rule would have followed
|
||||
the wrong column. */
|
||||
#users-table table td.ell{ max-width:230px; overflow:hidden; text-overflow:ellipsis; }
|
||||
#users-banner:not(:empty), #scope-banner:not(:empty){ margin-bottom:var(--s3); }
|
||||
#nu-projects{ margin-top:var(--s2); }
|
||||
#nu-projects .pickrow{ padding:var(--s1) var(--s1); }
|
||||
@@ -33,6 +36,45 @@
|
||||
#nu-project-list{ max-height:200px; overflow:auto; border:1px solid var(--border); }
|
||||
.whoami-chip{ font-size:12px; color:var(--muted); }
|
||||
.whoami-chip strong{ color:var(--text); }
|
||||
|
||||
/* CR-020: row selection and the bulk bar. Tokens only (the token rule). */
|
||||
#sel-banner:not(:empty), #bulk-banner:not(:empty), #csv-banner:not(:empty){ margin-bottom:var(--s3); }
|
||||
#bulk-banner ul, #csv-banner ul{ margin:var(--s1) 0 0; padding-left:var(--s5); font-weight:400;
|
||||
max-height:220px; overflow:auto; }
|
||||
#csv-btn[hidden]{ display:none; }
|
||||
table.grid th.selcell, table.grid td.selcell{ width:1%; padding:0 var(--s1); text-align:center; }
|
||||
/* The label is the hit area: the 16px box alone is under the 24px floor. */
|
||||
.selhit{ display:inline-flex; align-items:center; justify-content:center;
|
||||
min-width:28px; min-height:28px; cursor:pointer; }
|
||||
.selhit input{ width:16px; height:16px; margin:0; accent-color:var(--accent); cursor:pointer; }
|
||||
.selhit input:focus-visible{ outline:2px solid var(--accent); outline-offset:2px; }
|
||||
.selhit input:disabled{ cursor:default; }
|
||||
/* Not --accent-soft: that is the admin pill's own fill (console.css, hover note). */
|
||||
table.grid tbody tr.is-selected td{ background:var(--cds-layer-selected); }
|
||||
table.grid tbody tr.is-selected td.selcell{ box-shadow:inset 3px 0 0 var(--accent); }
|
||||
.bulkbar{ border:1px solid var(--accent); border-left:3px solid var(--accent);
|
||||
background:var(--surface); padding:var(--s2) var(--s3); margin:0 0 var(--s3); }
|
||||
.bulkbar[hidden]{ display:none; }
|
||||
.bulkhead{ display:flex; align-items:center; justify-content:space-between; gap:var(--s2);
|
||||
flex-wrap:wrap; margin-bottom:var(--s2); }
|
||||
.bulkgroup{ display:flex; flex-wrap:wrap; align-items:center; gap:var(--s2);
|
||||
padding:var(--s2) 0; border-top:1px solid var(--border); }
|
||||
.bulkgroup > .bulklabel{ font-size:12px; font-weight:600; color:var(--muted); min-width:110px; }
|
||||
.bulkgroup select{ height:var(--ctl); padding:0 var(--s1) 0 var(--s2); font:inherit; font-size:13px;
|
||||
border:1px solid var(--border-strong); border-radius:0; background:var(--surface); color:var(--text);
|
||||
max-width:100%; }
|
||||
.bulkgroup select:focus-visible{ outline:2px solid var(--accent); outline-offset:-2px; }
|
||||
/* The bulk delete dialog lists every affected username; a long list scrolls
|
||||
inside the dialog instead of pushing its buttons off the screen. */
|
||||
#wp-dlg-msg{ max-height:50vh; overflow:auto; }
|
||||
@media (max-width:620px){
|
||||
.bulkgroup > .bulklabel{ min-width:0; flex:1 1 100%; }
|
||||
.bulkgroup select, .bulkgroup button{ flex:1 1 100%; }
|
||||
}
|
||||
@media (pointer:coarse){
|
||||
.selhit{ min-width:44px; min-height:44px; }
|
||||
.bulkbar button, .bulkgroup select{ min-height:44px; }
|
||||
}
|
||||
</style>
|
||||
</head>
|
||||
<body>
|
||||
@@ -63,15 +105,33 @@
|
||||
<div class="sub" id="people-sub"></div>
|
||||
<div class="toolbar">
|
||||
<button onclick="loadUsers()">Refresh</button>
|
||||
<input id="user-search" placeholder="Search name / username / email / job function…" oninput="renderUsers()">
|
||||
<select id="user-filter" onchange="renderUsers()">
|
||||
<input id="user-search" placeholder="Search name / username / email / job function…" oninput="filterChanged()"
|
||||
aria-label="Search the directory">
|
||||
<select id="user-filter" onchange="filterChanged()" aria-label="Show">
|
||||
<option value="">Everyone</option>
|
||||
<option value="active">Active only</option>
|
||||
<option value="disabled">Disabled only</option>
|
||||
<option value="mine">Accounts I manage</option>
|
||||
</select>
|
||||
<!-- CR-020 (T12.4): a list of usernames from a file becomes the selection.
|
||||
Managers only; users.js shows it. -->
|
||||
<button type="button" id="csv-btn" onclick="pickCsv()" hidden
|
||||
title="A CSV with one username (or email) per line, first column. The action is chosen in the bulk bar.">Select from CSV…</button>
|
||||
<input type="file" id="csv-file" accept=".csv,.txt,text/csv,text/plain" hidden>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<div id="users-banner"></div>
|
||||
<div id="csv-banner"></div>
|
||||
<!-- CR-020: bulk actions on the selected rows. Present only while at least one
|
||||
row is selected (the hidden attribute also takes it out of the tab order). -->
|
||||
<div id="bulk-bar" class="bulkbar" role="region" aria-label="Bulk actions on the selected users" hidden>
|
||||
<div class="bulkhead">
|
||||
<strong id="bulk-count">0 selected</strong>
|
||||
<button type="button" onclick="clearSelection(true)">Clear selection</button>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<div id="bulk-actions"></div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<div id="sel-banner"></div>
|
||||
<div id="bulk-banner"></div>
|
||||
<div id="users-table"><div class="note">Loading…</div></div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
316
html/users.js
@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@
|
||||
let _users = []; // the directory as the server scoped it
|
||||
let _scope = null; // GET /api/auth/user-scope
|
||||
let _meId = null;
|
||||
// CR-020: the rows checked for a bulk action. Client-side UI state only - every
|
||||
// bulk action is decided and audited by the server, row by row (T12.1).
|
||||
let _selected = new Set();
|
||||
let _shownSelectable = []; // ids the current filter shows AND this caller may select
|
||||
|
||||
// ── boot ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
async function boot(){
|
||||
@@ -40,6 +44,7 @@ async function boot(){
|
||||
renderScope();
|
||||
}
|
||||
renderCreateForm();
|
||||
renderBulkActions();
|
||||
loadUsers();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -90,11 +95,309 @@ async function loadUsers(){
|
||||
}
|
||||
banner('users-banner','', '');
|
||||
_users = json;
|
||||
// Fresh data: any earlier selection may name accounts that changed or are gone.
|
||||
clearSelection(false);
|
||||
renderUsers();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function manages(){ return !!(_scope && _scope.can_manage_users); }
|
||||
|
||||
// ── selection (CR-020, T12.2) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
// A row is selectable when this caller may change the account. Your own row is
|
||||
// not: every bulk action that could touch it (disable, demote, delete) is refused
|
||||
// for your own account, so offering it would only produce a guaranteed failure.
|
||||
function selectable(u){ return manages() && !!u.manageable && u.id !== _meId; }
|
||||
|
||||
// The search box and the filter both decide which rows are shown. Changing either
|
||||
// clears the selection (decided 2026-10-06), so no row hidden by the filter can
|
||||
// stay selected and be acted on without being seen.
|
||||
function filterChanged(){
|
||||
const had = _selected.size;
|
||||
clearSelection(false);
|
||||
renderUsers();
|
||||
banner('sel-banner', '', had ? 'Selection cleared: the filter changed. Select the rows again.' : '');
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function clearSelection(announce){
|
||||
const had = _selected.size;
|
||||
_selected = new Set();
|
||||
updateSelectionUI();
|
||||
banner('sel-banner', '', (announce && had) ? 'Selection cleared.' : '');
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function setRowSelected(id, on){
|
||||
if(on) _selected.add(id); else _selected.delete(id);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Select-all acts on the rows the filter shows, never on the whole directory.
|
||||
function toggleSelectAll(on){
|
||||
_shownSelectable.forEach(id => setRowSelected(id, on));
|
||||
banner('sel-banner', '', '');
|
||||
updateSelectionUI();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Reflect _selected into the page without re-rendering the table, so keyboard
|
||||
// focus stays on the checkbox that was just used.
|
||||
function updateSelectionUI(){
|
||||
const wrap = document.getElementById('users-table');
|
||||
if(wrap){
|
||||
wrap.querySelectorAll('input.selbox').forEach(cb => {
|
||||
const on = _selected.has(cb.dataset.id);
|
||||
cb.checked = on;
|
||||
const tr = cb.closest('tr');
|
||||
if(tr) tr.classList.toggle('is-selected', on);
|
||||
});
|
||||
const all = document.getElementById('sel-all');
|
||||
if(all){
|
||||
const n = _shownSelectable.filter(id => _selected.has(id)).length;
|
||||
all.checked = n > 0 && n === _shownSelectable.length;
|
||||
all.indeterminate = n > 0 && n < _shownSelectable.length;
|
||||
all.disabled = !_shownSelectable.length;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
const bar = document.getElementById('bulk-bar');
|
||||
if(bar){
|
||||
const n = _selected.size;
|
||||
bar.hidden = n === 0;
|
||||
const c = document.getElementById('bulk-count');
|
||||
if(c) c.textContent = n + ' selected';
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// One listener for every checkbox in the table (event delegation): no ids are
|
||||
// bound into inline handlers, so there is nothing to escape.
|
||||
document.addEventListener('change', e => {
|
||||
const t = e.target;
|
||||
if(!(t instanceof HTMLInputElement)) return;
|
||||
if(t.id === 'sel-all'){ toggleSelectAll(t.checked); return; }
|
||||
if(t.classList.contains('selbox')){
|
||||
setRowSelected(t.dataset.id, t.checked);
|
||||
banner('sel-banner', '', '');
|
||||
updateSelectionUI();
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ── bulk actions (CR-020, T12.3) ──────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
// The toolbar offers only what this caller may do: the roles they may grant, the
|
||||
// projects they administer, the per-project roles they may hand out. The server
|
||||
// re-checks every row anyway (T12.1); this is so nobody is offered a choice that
|
||||
// can only fail.
|
||||
function renderBulkActions(){
|
||||
const box = document.getElementById('bulk-actions');
|
||||
const csvBtn = document.getElementById('csv-btn');
|
||||
if(csvBtn) csvBtn.hidden = !manages();
|
||||
if(!box || !manages()) return;
|
||||
const grantable = PERM_ROLES.filter(r => (_scope.grantable_roles || []).indexOf(r) >= 0);
|
||||
const projects = (_scope.managed_projects || []).slice()
|
||||
.sort((a,b) => (a.archived?1:0) - (b.archived?1:0));
|
||||
const projRoles = PROJECT_SCOPED_ROLES.filter(r => (_scope.grantable_project_roles || []).indexOf(r) >= 0);
|
||||
const group = (label, inner) => '<div class="bulkgroup" role="group" aria-label="'+uesc(label)+'">'+
|
||||
'<span class="bulklabel">'+uesc(label)+'</span>'+inner+'</div>';
|
||||
box.innerHTML =
|
||||
group('Permissions',
|
||||
'<select id="bulk-role" aria-label="New permissions role">'+
|
||||
grantable.map(r => '<option value="'+r+'"'+(r==='project_user'?' selected':'')+'>'+uesc(PERM_LABELS[r])+'</option>').join('')+
|
||||
'</select>'+
|
||||
'<button type="button" onclick="bulkRole()">Set permissions</button>') +
|
||||
group('Sign-in',
|
||||
'<button type="button" onclick="bulkActive(true)">Enable</button>'+
|
||||
'<button type="button" onclick="bulkActive(false)">Disable</button>') +
|
||||
(projects.length ? group('Project access',
|
||||
'<select id="bulk-project" aria-label="Project">'+
|
||||
projects.map(p => '<option value="'+uesc(p.id)+'">'+uesc((p.name||'(unnamed)')+(p.number?' '+p.number:'')+
|
||||
(p.archived?' (archived)':''))+'</option>').join('')+
|
||||
'</select>'+
|
||||
'<select id="bulk-project-role" aria-label="Role on that project, for Add">'+
|
||||
'<option value="">Role: same as account</option>'+
|
||||
projRoles.map(r => '<option value="'+r+'">Role: '+uesc(PERM_LABELS[r])+' here</option>').join('')+
|
||||
'</select>'+
|
||||
'<button type="button" onclick="bulkProject(\'add\')">Add to project</button>'+
|
||||
'<button type="button" onclick="bulkProject(\'remove\')">Remove from project</button>') : '') +
|
||||
group('Delete',
|
||||
'<button type="button" class="danger" onclick="bulkDelete()">Delete selected…</button>');
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function selectedIds(){ return _users.filter(u => _selected.has(u.id)).map(u => u.id); }
|
||||
function people(n){ return n + ' user' + (n === 1 ? '' : 's'); }
|
||||
function selVal(id){ return (document.getElementById(id) || {}).value || ''; }
|
||||
function selText(id){
|
||||
const s = document.getElementById(id);
|
||||
return (s && s.selectedIndex >= 0) ? s.options[s.selectedIndex].text : '';
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// One path for every bulk action: confirm through the dialog kit with the exact
|
||||
// count, send, report row by row, reload. A reload clears the selection, which is
|
||||
// right: the rows may have changed underneath it.
|
||||
async function runBulk(path, body, ask){
|
||||
const ids = selectedIds();
|
||||
if(!ids.length) return;
|
||||
if(!(await wpConfirmDialog({title: ask.title, okLabel: ask.ok, message: ask.message(ids.length)}))) return;
|
||||
return sendBulk(path, body, ask.title, ids);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function sendBulk(path, body, title, ids){
|
||||
bannerHtml('bulk-banner', '', uesc(title)+': working on '+uesc(people(ids.length))+'…');
|
||||
const { status, json } = await api('POST', path, Object.assign({ user_ids: ids }, body));
|
||||
if(status !== 200 || !json || !Array.isArray(json.results)){
|
||||
bannerHtml('bulk-banner', 'bad', '✕ '+uesc(apiError(status, json, title+' failed'))+' Nothing was changed.');
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
showBulkResult(json, title);
|
||||
loadUsers();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// T12.5: delete is permanent (a hard delete, as for one account) and one bad
|
||||
// multi-select now removes many, so it asks more than the other actions do:
|
||||
// every affected username is listed, and nothing is sent until the word DELETE
|
||||
// is typed, whatever the count (confirmed 2026-10-06). Your own account cannot
|
||||
// be selected; if it ever reached the request, the server refuses that row and
|
||||
// the report names it.
|
||||
async function bulkDelete(){
|
||||
const chosen = _users.filter(u => _selected.has(u.id));
|
||||
if(!chosen.length) return;
|
||||
const n = chosen.length;
|
||||
const typed = await wpPromptDialog({
|
||||
title: 'Delete '+people(n),
|
||||
message: 'Delete '+(n === 1 ? 'this account' : 'these '+n+' accounts')+'? Each one, and every project '+
|
||||
'assignment it has, is removed. This cannot be undone. Disable them instead if you only want to '+
|
||||
'block sign-in.\n\n'+chosen.map(u => '• '+u.username+(u.full_name ? ' ('+u.full_name+')' : '')).join('\n'),
|
||||
label: 'Type DELETE to confirm',
|
||||
value: '',
|
||||
okLabel: 'Delete '+people(n),
|
||||
validate: v => v === 'DELETE' ? '' : 'Type DELETE, in capital letters, to confirm.',
|
||||
});
|
||||
if(typed !== 'DELETE') return;
|
||||
return sendBulk('/api/auth/bulk-users/delete', {}, 'Delete accounts', chosen.map(u => u.id));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Every row is accounted for: changed, already so, or failed with the server's
|
||||
// reason. A batch that partly failed never reads as a success (CR-020).
|
||||
function showBulkResult(json, title){
|
||||
const failed = json.results.filter(r => r.status === 'failed');
|
||||
const parts = [json.ok+' changed'];
|
||||
if(json.unchanged) parts.push(json.unchanged+' already set');
|
||||
if(failed.length) parts.push(failed.length+' failed');
|
||||
const kind = !failed.length ? 'ok' : (json.ok + json.unchanged ? 'warn' : 'bad');
|
||||
const lead = (failed.length ? (kind === 'bad' ? '✕ ' : '⚠ ') : '✓ ')+uesc(title)+': '+parts.join(', ')+'.';
|
||||
const list = failed.length
|
||||
? '<ul>'+failed.map(r => '<li><strong>'+uesc(r.username || r.user_id)+'</strong>: '+uesc(r.reason)+'</li>').join('')+'</ul>'
|
||||
: '';
|
||||
bannerHtml('bulk-banner', kind, lead + list);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function bannerHtml(id, kind, html){
|
||||
const el = document.getElementById(id);
|
||||
if(!el) return;
|
||||
el.className = 'banner' + (kind ? ' '+kind : '');
|
||||
el.innerHTML = html;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function bulkRole(){
|
||||
const role = selVal('bulk-role');
|
||||
if(!role) return;
|
||||
return runBulk('/api/auth/bulk-users/role', { role }, {
|
||||
title: 'Set permissions', ok: 'Change permissions',
|
||||
message: n => 'Set permissions to '+(PERM_LABELS[role] || role)+' for '+people(n)+'?\n\n'+
|
||||
'Each account is checked on its own. Any that cannot be changed are listed afterwards.'});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function bulkActive(on){
|
||||
return runBulk('/api/auth/bulk-users/active', { is_active: !!on }, {
|
||||
title: on ? 'Enable accounts' : 'Disable accounts', ok: on ? 'Enable' : 'Disable',
|
||||
message: n => (on ? 'Enable sign-in for ' : 'Disable sign-in for ')+people(n)+'?'+
|
||||
(on ? '' : '\n\nA disabled account cannot sign in. Nothing else about it changes.')});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function bulkProject(op){
|
||||
const pid = selVal('bulk-project');
|
||||
if(!pid) return;
|
||||
const role = op === 'add' ? selVal('bulk-project-role') : '';
|
||||
const pname = selText('bulk-project');
|
||||
return runBulk('/api/auth/bulk-users/projects', { project_id: pid, op, role }, {
|
||||
title: op === 'add' ? 'Add to project' : 'Remove from project',
|
||||
ok: op === 'add' ? 'Add' : 'Remove',
|
||||
message: n => op === 'add'
|
||||
? 'Add '+people(n)+' to '+pname+' with '+(role ? PERM_LABELS[role]+' on that project' : 'their account role')+'?\n\n'+
|
||||
'Their other projects, and their roles there, stay as they are.'
|
||||
: 'Remove '+people(n)+' from '+pname+'?\n\nTheir other projects stay as they are.'});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── CSV upload (CR-020, T12.4) ────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
// The file holds usernames only (decided 2026-10-06). The server reads it and
|
||||
// answers line by line; the accepted accounts become the ordinary selection, so
|
||||
// the action, its confirmation and its row-by-row report are the same ones the
|
||||
// checkboxes use. A CSV cannot reach an account a checkbox could not: the bulk
|
||||
// route re-checks every row.
|
||||
const CSV_MAX_BYTES = 1024 * 1024;
|
||||
|
||||
// Blob.text() where the browser has it, FileReader where it does not (older
|
||||
// tablet browsers).
|
||||
function readFileText(file){
|
||||
if(typeof file.text === 'function') return file.text();
|
||||
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
|
||||
const r = new FileReader();
|
||||
r.onload = () => resolve(String(r.result || ''));
|
||||
r.onerror = () => reject(r.error);
|
||||
r.readAsText(file);
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function pickCsv(){
|
||||
const f = document.getElementById('csv-file');
|
||||
if(f){ f.value = ''; f.click(); }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
document.addEventListener('change', e => {
|
||||
if(e.target && e.target.id === 'csv-file' && e.target.files && e.target.files[0]) loadCsv(e.target.files[0]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
async function loadCsv(file){
|
||||
if(file.size > CSV_MAX_BYTES){
|
||||
bannerHtml('csv-banner', 'bad', '✕ '+uesc(file.name)+' is larger than 1 MB. Split it and load the parts one at a time.');
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
let text = '';
|
||||
try { text = await readFileText(file); }
|
||||
catch(_){ bannerHtml('csv-banner', 'bad', '✕ Could not read '+uesc(file.name)+'.'); return; }
|
||||
bannerHtml('csv-banner', '', 'Reading '+uesc(file.name)+'…');
|
||||
const { status, json } = await api('POST', '/api/auth/bulk-users/resolve', { text });
|
||||
if(status !== 200 || !json || !Array.isArray(json.rows)){
|
||||
bannerHtml('csv-banner', 'bad', '✕ '+uesc(apiError(status, json, 'Could not read the list')));
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Show everyone, so every accepted account is a visible, checked row: a
|
||||
// selection must never include a row the filter hides.
|
||||
const s = document.getElementById('user-search'), f = document.getElementById('user-filter');
|
||||
if(s) s.value = '';
|
||||
if(f) f.value = '';
|
||||
await loadUsers();
|
||||
const want = new Set(json.user_ids || []);
|
||||
_shownSelectable.forEach(id => { if(want.has(id)) _selected.add(id); });
|
||||
updateSelectionUI();
|
||||
const missed = [...want].filter(id => !_selected.has(id)).length;
|
||||
const rejected = json.rows.filter(r => r.status !== 'ok');
|
||||
const lead = (rejected.length || missed ? '⚠ ' : '✓ ')+uesc(file.name)+': '+json.read+' line'+(json.read===1?'':'s')+' read, '+
|
||||
_selected.size+' selected'+(rejected.length ? ', '+rejected.length+' rejected' : '')+'.'+
|
||||
(missed ? ' '+missed+' accepted account'+(missed===1?' is':'s are')+' no longer in the directory; reload and try again.' : '')+
|
||||
(_selected.size ? ' Pick an action in the bulk bar to apply it to the selected accounts.' : '');
|
||||
const list = rejected.length
|
||||
? '<ul>'+rejected.map(r => '<li>Line '+r.line+' ('+uesc(r.text)+'): '+uesc(r.reason)+'</li>').join('')+'</ul>'
|
||||
: '';
|
||||
bannerHtml('csv-banner', (rejected.length || missed) ? 'warn' : 'ok', lead + list);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function selCell(u){
|
||||
if(!selectable(u)){
|
||||
const why = u.id === _meId ? 'Your own account: change it one setting at a time'
|
||||
: (u.manage_blocked_reason || 'You cannot change this account');
|
||||
return '<td class="selcell"><span class="selhit" title="'+uesc(why)+'">'+
|
||||
'<input type="checkbox" disabled aria-label="'+uesc('Cannot select '+u.username+': '+why)+'"></span></td>';
|
||||
}
|
||||
return '<td class="selcell"><label class="selhit">'+
|
||||
'<input type="checkbox" class="selbox" data-id="'+uesc(u.id)+'"'+(_selected.has(u.id)?' checked':'')+
|
||||
' aria-label="'+uesc('Select '+u.username)+'"></label></td>';
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function renderUsers(){
|
||||
const wrap = document.getElementById('users-table');
|
||||
const q = ((document.getElementById('user-search')||{}).value||'').trim().toLowerCase();
|
||||
@@ -116,7 +419,8 @@ function renderUsers(){
|
||||
(u.project_role||'')+' '+roleLabel(u.role)).toLowerCase().indexOf(q) >= 0;
|
||||
});
|
||||
const count = '<div class="note">'+list.length+' of '+total+' '+(total===1?'person':'people')+'</div>';
|
||||
if(!list.length){ wrap.innerHTML = count+'<div class="note">Nothing matches.</div>'; return; }
|
||||
_shownSelectable = list.filter(selectable).map(u => u.id);
|
||||
if(!list.length){ wrap.innerHTML = count+'<div class="note">Nothing matches.</div>'; updateSelectionUI(); return; }
|
||||
|
||||
const head = manages()
|
||||
? ['Username','Name','Email',
|
||||
@@ -130,9 +434,16 @@ function renderUsers(){
|
||||
'Status'];
|
||||
const ths = head.map(h => Array.isArray(h)
|
||||
? '<th title="'+uesc(h[1])+'">'+uesc(h[0])+'</th>' : '<th>'+uesc(h)+'</th>').join('');
|
||||
// CR-020: a selection column for anyone who manages accounts. Select-all names
|
||||
// how many rows it covers, because it covers only what the filter shows.
|
||||
const selTh = manages()
|
||||
? '<th class="selcell"><label class="selhit"><input type="checkbox" id="sel-all" aria-label="'+
|
||||
uesc('Select all '+_shownSelectable.length+' shown that you can change')+'"></label></th>'
|
||||
: '';
|
||||
const rows = list.map(manages() ? managerRow : readonlyRow).join('');
|
||||
wrap.innerHTML = count+'<div class="tscroll"><table class="grid"><thead><tr>'+ths+
|
||||
wrap.innerHTML = count+'<div class="tscroll"><table class="grid"><thead><tr>'+selTh+ths+
|
||||
'</tr></thead><tbody>'+rows+'</tbody></table></div>'+legend();
|
||||
updateSelectionUI();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function legend(){
|
||||
@@ -189,6 +500,7 @@ function managerRow(u){
|
||||
if(!can && !me) actions.push('<span class="note" style="margin:0" title="'+uesc(why)+'">read-only</span>');
|
||||
|
||||
return '<tr'+(can||me ? '' : ' class="is-locked"')+'>'+
|
||||
selCell(u)+
|
||||
'<td><strong>'+uesc(u.username)+'</strong>'+(me?'<span class="me-tag">you</span>':'')+'</td>'+
|
||||
'<td>'+uesc(u.full_name||'')+'</td>'+
|
||||
// The address is truncated with the full value on the title: a long one used to
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2207,18 +2207,20 @@ function loadStepComments(){
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── USAGE ANALYTICS (retired, T11.6) ────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
// This used to write to wp-usage.js's per-browser localStorage log (D5/T7.10),
|
||||
// read back by the admin console's old "Usage logs" panel. CR-019 replaced
|
||||
// both with real, server-side, per-user activity (UsageEvent + the Activity &
|
||||
// usage card) - see decisions-2026-09-17.md for why this per-browser data was
|
||||
// never a source the new report could adopt. track() is now a no-op; kept
|
||||
// (rather than deleting its handful of call sites, including the dwell-timer
|
||||
// plumbing below) so this stays a one-line change instead of touching every
|
||||
// caller for the same outcome.
|
||||
// ── USAGE ANALYTICS ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
// Lightweight usage analytics stored in localStorage so the tool owner can review
|
||||
// engagement over time. No field VALUES are stored (field-edit events record only
|
||||
// the field id), keeping captured data non-sensitive.
|
||||
// D5 / T7.10: the analytics implementation lives in wp-usage.js and the report
|
||||
// on the admin console. The wizard's own copy of showAnalytics() never had a
|
||||
// caller here - the button lived on the creator - and once B7 dissolved the
|
||||
// frame the duplicate sat in the same document as five colliding globals.
|
||||
// This page only records; dwell tracking keeps its page-local state below.
|
||||
let _stepEnter = Date.now();
|
||||
|
||||
function track(event, detail){ /* retired, T11.6 — see comment above */ }
|
||||
function track(event, detail){
|
||||
WPUsage.track(WPUsage.KEYS.wizard, event, detail);
|
||||
}
|
||||
function trackStepDwell(){
|
||||
const ms = Date.now() - _stepEnter;
|
||||
if(ms > 400 && ms < 1000*60*60) track('step_dwell', {step: currentStep, ms});
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
|
||||
<!-- Addressable state (S3). Parses before the app scripts, which read the URL
|
||||
during their own boot. -->
|
||||
<script src="wp-url.js"></script>
|
||||
<script src="wp-usage.js"></script>
|
||||
<script src="wp-list-import.js"></script>
|
||||
<!-- Autosave, unsaved-work guard, draft recovery (S2). -->
|
||||
<script src="wp-autosave.js"></script>
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3993,17 +3993,11 @@ function openSopModal(){
|
||||
document.getElementById('sop-modal').classList.add('open'); track('view_sop');
|
||||
}
|
||||
function closeSopModal(){ document.getElementById('sop-modal').classList.remove('open'); }
|
||||
// CR-019 / T11.6 (2026-09-23): this used to write to wp-usage.js's per-browser
|
||||
// localStorage log (D5/T7.10). Retired along with the admin console's old
|
||||
// "Usage logs" panel, its only reader - real, server-side, per-user activity
|
||||
// now exists (UsageEvent, the Activity & usage card, T11.1-T11.5) and this
|
||||
// data was never reliably tied to a real identity anyway, so it was not a
|
||||
// source the new report could adopt (decisions-2026-09-17.md). track() stays
|
||||
// as a no-op rather than deleting its ~35 call sites throughout this file:
|
||||
// removing every call individually is a much larger, riskier diff for the
|
||||
// same outcome, and a call site here still documents the moment worth
|
||||
// recording if usage analytics are ever rebuilt server-side.
|
||||
function track(event,detail){ /* retired, T11.6 — see comment above */ }
|
||||
// D5 / T7.10: the analytics implementation lives in wp-usage.js - ONE copy for
|
||||
// the whole suite - and its report lives on the admin console, where an
|
||||
// operator-facing readout belongs. This page only records. Same key, same
|
||||
// event shape: everything recorded before the move is still readable after it.
|
||||
function track(event,detail){ if(devMode) return; WPUsage.track(WPUsage.KEYS.creator, event, detail); }
|
||||
|
||||
// ── COMMENTS ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
const COMMENTS_KEY='wp_iwp_comments_v1';
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
|
||||
<!-- Addressable state (S3). Parses before the app scripts, which read the URL
|
||||
during their own boot. -->
|
||||
<script src="wp-url.js"></script>
|
||||
<script src="wp-usage.js"></script>
|
||||
<!-- Autosave, unsaved-work guard, draft recovery (S2). -->
|
||||
<script src="wp-autosave.js"></script>
|
||||
<!-- Which sections this project uses (CR-006). The same file the SOP wizard
|
||||
|
||||
58
html/wp-usage.js
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
|
||||
/* Usage analytics core — the ONE implementation (D5 / T7.10).
|
||||
|
||||
This existed three times: the creator's copy, the wizard's copy (which had no
|
||||
caller — the button lived on the creator), and the admin console's own reader.
|
||||
Once the creator stopped being an iframe (B7/T7.1) the first two sat in one
|
||||
document as five colliding globals; an unreferenced duplicate is exactly what
|
||||
produced D5. One core now; the pages keep only a thin track() wrapper because
|
||||
page state (the creator's dev-mode pause) belongs to the page.
|
||||
|
||||
The storage KEYS are unchanged on purpose: everything recorded before this
|
||||
file existed is still readable through it. No field VALUES are ever stored —
|
||||
a field-edit event records the field id, nothing else.
|
||||
|
||||
Classic script, no modules: exposes window.WPUsage. */
|
||||
'use strict';
|
||||
|
||||
(function () {
|
||||
var SESSION = 's_' + Date.now().toString(36) + Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 6);
|
||||
|
||||
function load(key) {
|
||||
try { return JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem(key)) || { events: [] }; }
|
||||
catch (e) { return { events: [] }; }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function save(key, data) {
|
||||
try { localStorage.setItem(key, JSON.stringify(data)); }
|
||||
catch (e) { /* storage unavailable — degrade silently */ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function track(key, event, detail) {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
var d = load(key);
|
||||
d.events.push({ ts: new Date().toISOString(), session: SESSION, event: event, detail: detail || null });
|
||||
if (d.events.length > 5000) d.events = d.events.slice(-5000);
|
||||
save(key, d);
|
||||
} catch (e) { /* never let telemetry break the tool it watches */ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function download(key, prefix) {
|
||||
var blob = new Blob([JSON.stringify(load(key), null, 2)], { type: 'application/json' });
|
||||
var a = document.createElement('a');
|
||||
a.href = URL.createObjectURL(blob);
|
||||
a.download = (prefix || 'wp-usage') + '-' + new Date().toISOString().slice(0, 10) + '.json';
|
||||
document.body.appendChild(a);
|
||||
a.click();
|
||||
a.remove();
|
||||
setTimeout(function () { URL.revokeObjectURL(a.href); }, 1000);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
window.WPUsage = {
|
||||
load: load,
|
||||
save: save,
|
||||
track: track,
|
||||
download: download,
|
||||
// The pre-D5 keys, verbatim — continuity of the recorded data is a done-when.
|
||||
KEYS: { creator: 'wp_iwp_analytics_v1', wizard: 'wp_suite_analytics_v1' },
|
||||
};
|
||||
})();
|
||||
@@ -27,18 +27,8 @@ DATABASE_URL=postgresql+psycopg://wpsuite:CHANGE_ME@localhost:5432/wpsuite
|
||||
# python -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(48))"
|
||||
AUTH_SECRET_KEY=CHANGE_ME_run_the_command_above
|
||||
|
||||
# D18 (2026-09-23): a session slides on activity, capped by a hard ceiling
|
||||
# underneath - not one flat lifetime. Both defaults are proposed, not
|
||||
# confirmed against this tenant's actual Okta SSO session policy - if Okta's
|
||||
# own session outlives either number, re-auth here is likely a fast redirect
|
||||
# rather than a real login screen, so these cost less than they look like.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# No request for this many minutes ends the session outright.
|
||||
# AUTH_IDLE_MINUTES=30
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The absolute ceiling from original sign-in, regardless of activity - no
|
||||
# session outlives this no matter how continuously active it is. Default 8.
|
||||
# AUTH_SESSION_HOURS=8
|
||||
# How long a login lasts before re-authentication (hours). Default 12.
|
||||
# AUTH_SESSION_HOURS=12
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Okta OIDC (required — this is the only sign-in path) ───────────────────────
|
||||
# The Okta *authorization server* issuer, e.g. https://yourorg.okta.com/oauth2/default
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""usage events (CR-019, wave 11)
|
||||
|
||||
Append-only navigation/session activity, separate from audit_log on purpose —
|
||||
see the UsageEvent docstring in server/models.py. Retention is indefinite by
|
||||
decision (docs/waves/decisions-2026-09-17.md); nothing here schedules a purge.
|
||||
|
||||
Revision ID: 8e2cb3003f8a
|
||||
Revises: 1d60a608bb51
|
||||
Create Date: 2026-09-23 00:00:00.000000
|
||||
"""
|
||||
from alembic import op
|
||||
import sqlalchemy as sa
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# revision identifiers, used by Alembic.
|
||||
revision = '8e2cb3003f8a'
|
||||
down_revision = '1d60a608bb51'
|
||||
branch_labels = None
|
||||
depends_on = None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def upgrade() -> None:
|
||||
op.create_table('usage_events',
|
||||
sa.Column('id', sa.String(length=40), nullable=False),
|
||||
sa.Column('at', sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False),
|
||||
sa.Column('username', sa.String(length=200), nullable=False),
|
||||
sa.Column('project_id', sa.String(length=40), nullable=True),
|
||||
sa.Column('tool', sa.String(length=40), nullable=False),
|
||||
sa.Column('event', sa.String(length=40), nullable=False),
|
||||
sa.Column('detail', sa.JSON(), nullable=False),
|
||||
sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint('id')
|
||||
)
|
||||
op.create_index(op.f('ix_usage_events_at'), 'usage_events', ['at'], unique=False)
|
||||
op.create_index(op.f('ix_usage_events_username'), 'usage_events', ['username'], unique=False)
|
||||
op.create_index(op.f('ix_usage_events_project_id'), 'usage_events', ['project_id'], unique=False)
|
||||
op.create_index(op.f('ix_usage_events_tool'), 'usage_events', ['tool'], unique=False)
|
||||
op.create_index(op.f('ix_usage_events_event'), 'usage_events', ['event'], unique=False)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def downgrade() -> None:
|
||||
op.drop_index(op.f('ix_usage_events_event'), table_name='usage_events')
|
||||
op.drop_index(op.f('ix_usage_events_tool'), table_name='usage_events')
|
||||
op.drop_index(op.f('ix_usage_events_project_id'), table_name='usage_events')
|
||||
op.drop_index(op.f('ix_usage_events_username'), table_name='usage_events')
|
||||
op.drop_index(op.f('ix_usage_events_at'), table_name='usage_events')
|
||||
op.drop_table('usage_events')
|
||||
568
server/app.py
@@ -9,15 +9,10 @@ Run (prod): gunicorn -k uvicorn.workers.UvicornWorker -b 127.0.0.1:8000 serve
|
||||
Interactive docs: http://<host>/api/docs
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import base64
|
||||
import csv
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
import hmac
|
||||
import io
|
||||
import logging
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import re
|
||||
import uuid
|
||||
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
|
||||
from typing import Any, Optional
|
||||
from urllib.parse import urlparse
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -27,7 +22,7 @@ from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
|
||||
from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse, RedirectResponse
|
||||
from fastapi.staticfiles import StaticFiles
|
||||
from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field
|
||||
from sqlalchemy import select, delete, func, or_
|
||||
from sqlalchemy import select, delete, func
|
||||
from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
|
||||
from starlette.middleware.sessions import SessionMiddleware
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -108,23 +103,12 @@ def _csrf_ok(request: Request) -> bool:
|
||||
async def auth_gate(request: Request, call_next):
|
||||
path = request.url.path
|
||||
method = request.method
|
||||
claims = None
|
||||
if method != "OPTIONS" and auth._needs_auth(path):
|
||||
claims = auth.is_request_authenticated(request)
|
||||
if not claims:
|
||||
if not auth.is_request_authenticated(request):
|
||||
return JSONResponse(status_code=401, content={"detail": "Not authenticated"})
|
||||
if method in _UNSAFE_METHODS and path.startswith("/api/") and not _csrf_ok(request):
|
||||
return JSONResponse(status_code=403, content={"detail": "Cross-origin request rejected"})
|
||||
response = await call_next(request)
|
||||
# D18: slide the session forward on activity, capped by its absolute
|
||||
# ceiling. Reads only the already-validated claims - no DB hit here, and
|
||||
# the separate is_active/token_version check in get_current_user still
|
||||
# runs on its own for every request regardless of whether this refreshes.
|
||||
if claims is not None:
|
||||
refreshed = auth.maybe_refresh_token(claims)
|
||||
if refreshed:
|
||||
auth.set_session_cookie(response, request, refreshed)
|
||||
return response
|
||||
return await call_next(request)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def gen_id(prefix: str) -> str:
|
||||
@@ -772,11 +756,6 @@ async def okta_callback(request: Request, db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
|
||||
user.failed_attempts = 0
|
||||
user.locked_until = None
|
||||
user.last_login_at = models.utcnow()
|
||||
# CR-019: one login event per Okta sign-in, written here rather than
|
||||
# inferred from session creation elsewhere, so there is exactly one
|
||||
# source of truth for "did this person sign in" - not one per page load
|
||||
# afterward (T11.2 covers that separately, as page_open events).
|
||||
db.add(models.UsageEvent(id=gen_id("uev"), username=user.username, tool="", event="login"))
|
||||
db.commit()
|
||||
db.refresh(user)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1034,16 +1013,100 @@ def create_user(body: NewUserIn, actor: models.User = Depends(require_user_manag
|
||||
return directory_entry(db, u, actor)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── One account-level change, used by the single-user routes AND the bulk routes ──
|
||||
# CR-020 (T12.1): a bulk action is the single-user action, once per row. So each
|
||||
# rule lives in exactly one function below, and both kinds of route call it: a
|
||||
# bulk request cannot reach further than a one-at-a-time request, because there
|
||||
# is no second copy of the rules for it to reach through. Every function checks
|
||||
# all of its guards BEFORE it changes anything, so a row that is refused leaves
|
||||
# nothing half-written, and writes its AuditLog row the way the single route
|
||||
# always has. None of them commits; the route owns the transaction.
|
||||
def guard_target(db: Session, actor: "models.User", u: "models.User") -> None:
|
||||
"""The two checks every account change starts with: may the caller see this
|
||||
account (404 if not, so existence does not leak), and may they change it."""
|
||||
require_see_user(db, actor, u)
|
||||
require_manage_user(db, actor, u)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def apply_user_active(db: Session, actor: "models.User", u: "models.User", is_active: bool) -> None:
|
||||
if u.id == actor.id and not is_active:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="You cannot disable your own account")
|
||||
u.is_active = is_active
|
||||
log_event(db, actor, "user_enabled" if is_active else "user_disabled", "user", u.id,
|
||||
summary=u.username, detail={"is_active": bool(is_active)})
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def apply_user_role(db: Session, actor: "models.User", u: "models.User", role: str) -> None:
|
||||
"""The role guards: never your own role, never the last active admin. The
|
||||
grantable-roles check is the caller's, made once per request before this."""
|
||||
if u.id == actor.id:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="You cannot change your own role")
|
||||
if auth.is_admin(u) and role != auth.ROLE_ADMIN:
|
||||
other_admins = db.scalars(
|
||||
select(models.User.id).where(
|
||||
(models.User.role == auth.ROLE_ADMIN)
|
||||
& (models.User.id != u.id)
|
||||
& (models.User.is_active.is_(True))
|
||||
)
|
||||
).all()
|
||||
if not other_admins:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Can't remove the last admin account")
|
||||
old_role = u.role
|
||||
u.role = role
|
||||
detail = {"from": old_role, "to": role}
|
||||
# Promoting someone to admin retires their default-member flag: an admin already
|
||||
# reaches every project, so the flag would do nothing except sit there invisibly
|
||||
# (the console shows admins no controls) and come back to life the day they are
|
||||
# demoted. Same reasoning as clearing the role in set_user_auto_add.
|
||||
if role == auth.ROLE_ADMIN and (u.auto_add_projects or u.auto_add_role):
|
||||
u.auto_add_projects = False
|
||||
u.auto_add_role = ""
|
||||
detail["auto_add_cleared"] = True
|
||||
log_event(db, actor, "role_changed", "user", u.id, summary=u.username, detail=detail)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def apply_user_delete(db: Session, actor: "models.User", u: "models.User") -> None:
|
||||
if u.id == actor.id:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="You cannot delete your own account")
|
||||
log_event(db, actor, "user_deleted", "user", u.id, summary=u.username, detail={"role": u.role})
|
||||
db.delete(u)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def apply_user_projects(db: Session, actor: "models.User", u: "models.User",
|
||||
managed: Optional[set], valid: set, roles: dict) -> None:
|
||||
"""Replace the caller's slice of `u`'s memberships with `valid`, each carrying
|
||||
its role from `roles` ('' = inherit). `valid` must already be checked to exist
|
||||
and to sit inside `managed`."""
|
||||
# Rebuild only the rows this caller owns. Scoping the DELETE is the whole of the
|
||||
# "leave other jobs alone" guarantee — get it wrong and a super user's save
|
||||
# silently revokes access everywhere else.
|
||||
doomed = delete(models.ProjectMember).where(models.ProjectMember.user_id == u.id)
|
||||
if managed is not None:
|
||||
# in_() on an empty set is a valid always-false predicate, so a caller who
|
||||
# administers nothing deletes nothing (require_manage_user already refused them).
|
||||
doomed = doomed.where(models.ProjectMember.project_id.in_(managed))
|
||||
db.execute(doomed)
|
||||
for pid in valid:
|
||||
db.add(models.ProjectMember(id=gen_id("pm"), user_id=u.id, project_id=pid,
|
||||
role=roles.get(pid, "")))
|
||||
log_event(db, actor, "project_access_changed", "user", u.id, summary=u.username,
|
||||
detail={"projects": len(valid),
|
||||
"scope": "all" if managed is None else "managed",
|
||||
"overrides": {p: r for p, r in roles.items() if p in valid}})
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def project_scoped_grantable(actor: "models.User") -> tuple:
|
||||
"""Per-project roles `actor` may hand out. Only an app admin can make someone a
|
||||
super user on a project. user_scope and get_user_projects still spell the same
|
||||
rule inline for the console; left as they are to keep this diff to CR-020."""
|
||||
return auth.PROJECT_SCOPED_ROLES if auth.is_admin(actor) else (auth.ROLE_PROJECT_ADMIN, auth.ROLE_PROJECT_USER)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@app.post("/api/auth/users/{user_id}/active")
|
||||
def set_user_active(user_id: str, body: ActiveIn, actor: models.User = Depends(require_user_manager), db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
|
||||
u = load_target_user(db, user_id)
|
||||
require_see_user(db, actor, u)
|
||||
require_manage_user(db, actor, u)
|
||||
if u.id == actor.id and not body.is_active:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="You cannot disable your own account")
|
||||
u.is_active = body.is_active
|
||||
log_event(db, actor, "user_enabled" if body.is_active else "user_disabled", "user", u.id,
|
||||
summary=u.username, detail={"is_active": bool(body.is_active)})
|
||||
guard_target(db, actor, u)
|
||||
apply_user_active(db, actor, u, body.is_active)
|
||||
db.commit()
|
||||
return directory_entry(db, u, actor)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1060,32 +1123,8 @@ def set_user_role(user_id: str, body: RoleIn, actor: models.User = Depends(requi
|
||||
if body.role not in allowed:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"role must be one of {', '.join(allowed)}")
|
||||
u = load_target_user(db, user_id)
|
||||
require_see_user(db, actor, u)
|
||||
require_manage_user(db, actor, u)
|
||||
if u.id == actor.id:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="You cannot change your own role")
|
||||
if auth.is_admin(u) and body.role != auth.ROLE_ADMIN:
|
||||
other_admins = db.scalars(
|
||||
select(models.User.id).where(
|
||||
(models.User.role == auth.ROLE_ADMIN)
|
||||
& (models.User.id != u.id)
|
||||
& (models.User.is_active.is_(True))
|
||||
)
|
||||
).all()
|
||||
if not other_admins:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Can't remove the last admin account")
|
||||
old_role = u.role
|
||||
u.role = body.role
|
||||
detail = {"from": old_role, "to": body.role}
|
||||
# Promoting someone to admin retires their default-member flag: an admin already
|
||||
# reaches every project, so the flag would do nothing except sit there invisibly
|
||||
# (the console shows admins no controls) and come back to life the day they are
|
||||
# demoted. Same reasoning as clearing the role in set_user_auto_add.
|
||||
if body.role == auth.ROLE_ADMIN and (u.auto_add_projects or u.auto_add_role):
|
||||
u.auto_add_projects = False
|
||||
u.auto_add_role = ""
|
||||
detail["auto_add_cleared"] = True
|
||||
log_event(db, actor, "role_changed", "user", u.id, summary=u.username, detail=detail)
|
||||
guard_target(db, actor, u)
|
||||
apply_user_role(db, actor, u, body.role)
|
||||
db.commit()
|
||||
db.refresh(u)
|
||||
return directory_entry(db, u, actor)
|
||||
@@ -1142,12 +1181,8 @@ def set_user_auto_add(user_id: str, body: AutoAddIn, admin: models.User = Depend
|
||||
@app.delete("/api/auth/users/{user_id}")
|
||||
def delete_user(user_id: str, actor: models.User = Depends(require_user_manager), db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
|
||||
u = load_target_user(db, user_id)
|
||||
require_see_user(db, actor, u)
|
||||
require_manage_user(db, actor, u)
|
||||
if u.id == actor.id:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="You cannot delete your own account")
|
||||
log_event(db, actor, "user_deleted", "user", u.id, summary=u.username, detail={"role": u.role})
|
||||
db.delete(u)
|
||||
guard_target(db, actor, u)
|
||||
apply_user_delete(db, actor, u)
|
||||
db.commit()
|
||||
return {"deleted": user_id}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1200,8 +1235,7 @@ def set_user_projects(user_id: str, body: ProjectAssignIn, actor: models.User =
|
||||
exactly as they were, because a payload that simply omits them would otherwise cut
|
||||
someone off from a job the caller can't even see."""
|
||||
u = load_target_user(db, user_id)
|
||||
require_see_user(db, actor, u)
|
||||
require_manage_user(db, actor, u)
|
||||
guard_target(db, actor, u)
|
||||
requested = [p for p in dict.fromkeys(body.project_ids) if p]
|
||||
for pid in requested:
|
||||
check_id(pid)
|
||||
@@ -1214,28 +1248,227 @@ def set_user_projects(user_id: str, body: ProjectAssignIn, actor: models.User =
|
||||
# A super user may hand out the project-scoped roles below their own; only an app
|
||||
# admin can make someone a super user on a project. Anything unrecognised falls
|
||||
# back to inheriting the account's own role.
|
||||
allowed = auth.PROJECT_SCOPED_ROLES if auth.is_admin(actor) else (auth.ROLE_PROJECT_ADMIN, auth.ROLE_PROJECT_USER)
|
||||
allowed = project_scoped_grantable(actor)
|
||||
roles = {pid: r for pid, r in (body.roles or {}).items() if r in allowed}
|
||||
# Rebuild only the rows this caller owns. Scoping the DELETE is the whole of the
|
||||
# "leave other jobs alone" guarantee — get it wrong and a super user's save
|
||||
# silently revokes access everywhere else.
|
||||
doomed = delete(models.ProjectMember).where(models.ProjectMember.user_id == user_id)
|
||||
if managed is not None:
|
||||
# in_() on an empty set is a valid always-false predicate, so a caller who
|
||||
# administers nothing deletes nothing (require_manage_user already refused them).
|
||||
doomed = doomed.where(models.ProjectMember.project_id.in_(managed))
|
||||
db.execute(doomed)
|
||||
for pid in valid:
|
||||
db.add(models.ProjectMember(id=gen_id("pm"), user_id=user_id, project_id=pid,
|
||||
role=roles.get(pid, "")))
|
||||
log_event(db, actor, "project_access_changed", "user", u.id, summary=u.username,
|
||||
detail={"projects": len(valid),
|
||||
"scope": "all" if managed is None else "managed",
|
||||
"overrides": {p: r for p, r in roles.items() if p in valid}})
|
||||
apply_user_projects(db, actor, u, managed, valid, roles)
|
||||
db.commit()
|
||||
return {"assigned": sorted(valid), "roles": {p: roles.get(p, "") for p in sorted(valid)}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Bulk user administration — CR-020 (T12.1) ─────────────────────────────────
|
||||
# Four actions over a list of accounts: activate/disable, permissions role,
|
||||
# project add/remove (with the per-project role), delete. Each row runs exactly
|
||||
# the guards and the audit of the single-user route, through the same apply_*
|
||||
# function above. Rules, decided 2026-09-17 and confirmed 2026-10-06:
|
||||
# * a row that is refused is reported with its reason and the rest still run;
|
||||
# a batch is never reported as a success when part of it failed;
|
||||
# * one AuditLog row per changed account, the same as the single route writes -
|
||||
# never one opaque "bulk" entry;
|
||||
# * the caller's own account is refused only on its own row (disable, demote,
|
||||
# delete), never by failing the whole batch;
|
||||
# * project assignment adds to or removes from ONE project; it never replaces a
|
||||
# user's whole project list.
|
||||
# A row already in the requested state is reported "unchanged" and writes no
|
||||
# audit row: nothing changed, so there is nothing to audit.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The routes live under /api/auth/bulk-users/ rather than /api/auth/users/bulk/,
|
||||
# because POST /api/auth/users/{user_id}/active would otherwise match "bulk" as
|
||||
# a user id.
|
||||
BULK_MAX_USERS = 500
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class BulkUsersIn(BaseModel):
|
||||
user_ids: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=BULK_MAX_USERS)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class BulkActiveIn(BulkUsersIn):
|
||||
is_active: bool
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class BulkRoleIn(BulkUsersIn):
|
||||
role: str
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class BulkProjectIn(BulkUsersIn):
|
||||
project_id: str
|
||||
op: str # "add" | "remove"
|
||||
role: str = "" # per-project role on add; '' = inherit the account's own
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def run_bulk(db: Session, actor: "models.User", user_ids: list[str], action: str, apply) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Run `apply(u)` once per distinct id, in the order given. `apply` returns
|
||||
"ok" or "unchanged", or raises HTTPException with the reason the single-user
|
||||
route would have given. The flush after every row matters: the session does
|
||||
not autoflush, and a later row's guard (the last-admin count, for one) has to
|
||||
see what an earlier row already changed."""
|
||||
results = []
|
||||
for uid in dict.fromkeys(i for i in user_ids if i):
|
||||
row = {"user_id": uid, "username": "", "status": "", "reason": ""}
|
||||
try:
|
||||
check_id(uid)
|
||||
u = load_target_user(db, uid)
|
||||
row["username"] = u.username
|
||||
guard_target(db, actor, u)
|
||||
row["status"] = apply(u)
|
||||
db.flush()
|
||||
except HTTPException as exc:
|
||||
row["status"] = "failed"
|
||||
row["reason"] = exc.detail if isinstance(exc.detail, str) else str(exc.detail)
|
||||
results.append(row)
|
||||
db.commit()
|
||||
counts = {s: sum(1 for r in results if r["status"] == s) for s in ("ok", "unchanged", "failed")}
|
||||
return {"action": action, "requested": len(results), **counts, "results": results}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@app.post("/api/auth/bulk-users/active")
|
||||
def bulk_set_active(body: BulkActiveIn, actor: models.User = Depends(require_user_manager), db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
|
||||
def apply(u):
|
||||
if bool(u.is_active) == bool(body.is_active):
|
||||
return "unchanged"
|
||||
apply_user_active(db, actor, u, body.is_active)
|
||||
return "ok"
|
||||
return run_bulk(db, actor, body.user_ids, "enable" if body.is_active else "disable", apply)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@app.post("/api/auth/bulk-users/role")
|
||||
def bulk_set_role(body: BulkRoleIn, actor: models.User = Depends(require_user_manager), db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
|
||||
allowed = grantable_roles(actor)
|
||||
if body.role not in allowed:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"role must be one of {', '.join(allowed)}")
|
||||
|
||||
def apply(u):
|
||||
# Compared as stored: a legacy 'user' row moved to 'project_user' is a real
|
||||
# change of the stored value, so it is applied and audited, as one at a time.
|
||||
if u.role == body.role:
|
||||
return "unchanged"
|
||||
apply_user_role(db, actor, u, body.role)
|
||||
return "ok"
|
||||
return run_bulk(db, actor, body.user_ids, "role", apply)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@app.post("/api/auth/bulk-users/projects")
|
||||
def bulk_set_project(body: BulkProjectIn, actor: models.User = Depends(require_user_manager), db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
|
||||
"""Add every listed account to one project (with a per-project role), or remove
|
||||
them from it. Implemented as the single route's replace of the caller's slice,
|
||||
computed per user, so the audit row is the same shape the dialog writes."""
|
||||
if body.op not in ("add", "remove"):
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="op must be 'add' or 'remove'")
|
||||
check_id(body.project_id)
|
||||
if not db.get(models.Project, body.project_id):
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Project not found")
|
||||
managed = managed_project_ids(db, actor)
|
||||
if managed is not None and body.project_id not in managed:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="You don't administer the users of that project")
|
||||
role = (body.role or "").strip()
|
||||
if body.op == "add" and role and role not in project_scoped_grantable(actor):
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=400,
|
||||
detail=f"role must be '' (inherit) or one of {', '.join(project_scoped_grantable(actor))}")
|
||||
pid = body.project_id
|
||||
|
||||
def apply(u):
|
||||
mine = [m for m in db.scalars(select(models.ProjectMember)
|
||||
.where(models.ProjectMember.user_id == u.id)).all()
|
||||
if managed is None or m.project_id in managed]
|
||||
current = {m.project_id: (m.role or "") for m in mine}
|
||||
if body.op == "add":
|
||||
if current.get(pid) == role:
|
||||
return "unchanged"
|
||||
current[pid] = role
|
||||
else:
|
||||
if pid not in current:
|
||||
return "unchanged"
|
||||
current.pop(pid)
|
||||
# Roles on the caller's OTHER projects are carried over exactly as stored -
|
||||
# adding someone to one job must never reset their role on another.
|
||||
apply_user_projects(db, actor, u, managed, set(current),
|
||||
{p: r for p, r in current.items() if r})
|
||||
return "ok"
|
||||
return run_bulk(db, actor, body.user_ids, "project_" + body.op, apply)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class BulkResolveIn(BaseModel):
|
||||
text: str = Field(default="", max_length=200_000)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
_CSV_HEADER_WORDS = ("username", "user", "login", "email", "user name")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@app.post("/api/auth/bulk-users/resolve")
|
||||
def bulk_resolve(body: BulkResolveIn, actor: models.User = Depends(require_user_manager), db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
|
||||
"""CR-020 (T12.4): turn an uploaded list of usernames into the account ids a
|
||||
bulk action will run on - a second way IN to the same four bulk routes, not a
|
||||
third copy of their rules. The CSV holds usernames only (decided 2026-10-06);
|
||||
the action is chosen in the console and applies to every accepted row.
|
||||
|
||||
Validate and report, the CR-005 pattern: every line is either accepted or
|
||||
rejected WITH ITS LINE NUMBER and a reason - never silently skipped. A line is
|
||||
rejected when it names nobody this caller can see (the same 'not found' a
|
||||
hidden account gets everywhere else), an account they may not change (with
|
||||
the same reason the single route would give), their own account, or a
|
||||
username already listed on an earlier line. Nothing is changed here; the
|
||||
bulk route the console calls next re-checks every row anyway."""
|
||||
rows = []
|
||||
seen: dict[str, int] = {}
|
||||
visible = visible_user_ids(db, actor)
|
||||
cache: dict = {}
|
||||
for line_no, raw in enumerate((body.text or "").splitlines(), start=1):
|
||||
line = raw.strip().lstrip("")
|
||||
if not line:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
cell = re.split(r"[,;\t]", line, maxsplit=1)[0].strip().strip('"').strip()
|
||||
if not cell:
|
||||
rows.append({"line": line_no, "text": line[:120], "status": "rejected",
|
||||
"reason": "no username in the first column"})
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if line_no == 1 and cell.lower() in _CSV_HEADER_WORDS:
|
||||
continue # header row
|
||||
row = {"line": line_no, "text": cell[:120], "status": "rejected", "reason": "",
|
||||
"user_id": None, "username": ""}
|
||||
if any(ord(ch) < 32 for ch in cell) or len(cell) > 120:
|
||||
row["reason"] = "not a valid username"
|
||||
rows.append(row)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
key = cell.lower()
|
||||
if key in seen:
|
||||
row["reason"] = f"duplicate of line {seen[key]}"
|
||||
rows.append(row)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
seen[key] = line_no
|
||||
u = db.scalars(select(models.User).where(func.lower(models.User.username) == key)).first()
|
||||
if u is None:
|
||||
# An offboarding list usually carries email addresses. Accepted only
|
||||
# when exactly one account has that address, so a shared or reused
|
||||
# address can never pick the wrong person.
|
||||
by_mail = db.scalars(select(models.User).where(func.lower(models.User.email) == key)).all()
|
||||
u = by_mail[0] if len(by_mail) == 1 else None
|
||||
if u is None or (visible is not None and u.id not in visible):
|
||||
row["reason"] = "User not found"
|
||||
elif u.id == actor.id:
|
||||
row["reason"] = "your own account - change it one setting at a time"
|
||||
else:
|
||||
problem = manage_user_problem(db, actor, u, cache)
|
||||
if problem:
|
||||
row["reason"] = problem
|
||||
else:
|
||||
row.update(status="ok", user_id=u.id, username=u.username)
|
||||
rows.append(row)
|
||||
accepted = [r for r in rows if r["status"] == "ok"]
|
||||
return {"read": len(rows), "accepted": len(accepted), "rejected": len(rows) - len(accepted),
|
||||
"user_ids": [r["user_id"] for r in accepted], "rows": rows}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@app.post("/api/auth/bulk-users/delete")
|
||||
def bulk_delete(body: BulkUsersIn, actor: models.User = Depends(require_user_manager), db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
|
||||
"""Hard delete, the same as DELETE /api/auth/users/{id} (decided 2026-09-17:
|
||||
no soft delete invented for the bulk case). The console asks for the typed
|
||||
word DELETE first; the server's guard is the per-row rules, as for one."""
|
||||
def apply(u):
|
||||
apply_user_delete(db, actor, u)
|
||||
return "ok"
|
||||
return run_bulk(db, actor, body.user_ids, "delete", apply)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Projects ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
@app.post("/api/projects")
|
||||
def upsert_project(body: ProjectIn, user: models.User = Depends(auth.get_current_user), db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
|
||||
@@ -3395,177 +3628,6 @@ def create_feedback(body: CommentIn, user: models.User = Depends(auth.get_curren
|
||||
return _save_comment(body, db, user)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── CR-019: usage/activity metrics ──────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
class UsageIn(BaseModel):
|
||||
tool: str = ""
|
||||
project_id: Optional[str] = None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@app.post("/api/usage/ping")
|
||||
def usage_ping(body: UsageIn, user: models.User = Depends(auth.get_current_user), db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
|
||||
"""One usage_events row per authenticated page load. Called exactly once,
|
||||
from auth-guard.js after wp-auth-ready fires (T11.2) - never duplicated
|
||||
per page's own script, the same lesson S4's per-page nav already taught
|
||||
this codebase. `user` comes from the session via get_current_user, never
|
||||
from anything the client claims - identity here is a server-enforced
|
||||
fact, matching every other write in this file, not a client-reported one."""
|
||||
tool = (body.tool or "").strip()[:40]
|
||||
db.add(models.UsageEvent(
|
||||
id=gen_id("uev"), username=user.username, project_id=body.project_id,
|
||||
tool=tool, event="page_open",
|
||||
))
|
||||
db.commit()
|
||||
return {"ok": True}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _parse_date_q(v: str, end: bool = False) -> Optional[datetime]:
|
||||
"""Accepts a plain YYYY-MM-DD (what a <input type=date> sends) or a full
|
||||
ISO datetime. A date-only `to` means "through the end of that day", not
|
||||
midnight at its start - otherwise a range of "today" would match nothing
|
||||
from today at all."""
|
||||
if not v:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
d = datetime.fromisoformat(v)
|
||||
except ValueError:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if d.tzinfo is None:
|
||||
d = d.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
if end and len(v) <= 10: # date-only
|
||||
d = d + timedelta(days=1) - timedelta(microseconds=1)
|
||||
return d
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _usage_query(db: Session, caller: "models.User", date_from, date_to, project_id, username, tool):
|
||||
"""Shared by the summary and export endpoints so the two can never
|
||||
disagree about which rows a filter set matches - the export is a raw
|
||||
dump of exactly what the summary counted, not a separately-derived view."""
|
||||
stmt = select(models.UsageEvent)
|
||||
managed = managed_project_ids(db, caller)
|
||||
if managed is not None:
|
||||
# A project_super_user (never an app admin, who gets managed=None) is
|
||||
# scoped to events tied to a project they administer, plus their OWN
|
||||
# suite-wide activity (admin console opens etc. carry no project_id) -
|
||||
# never another user's activity outside what they manage.
|
||||
if managed:
|
||||
stmt = stmt.where(or_(
|
||||
models.UsageEvent.project_id.in_(managed),
|
||||
models.UsageEvent.username == caller.username,
|
||||
))
|
||||
else:
|
||||
stmt = stmt.where(models.UsageEvent.username == caller.username)
|
||||
df = _parse_date_q(date_from)
|
||||
dt = _parse_date_q(date_to, end=True)
|
||||
if df:
|
||||
stmt = stmt.where(models.UsageEvent.at >= df)
|
||||
if dt:
|
||||
stmt = stmt.where(models.UsageEvent.at <= dt)
|
||||
if project_id:
|
||||
stmt = stmt.where(models.UsageEvent.project_id == project_id)
|
||||
if username:
|
||||
stmt = stmt.where(models.UsageEvent.username == username)
|
||||
if tool:
|
||||
stmt = stmt.where(models.UsageEvent.tool == tool)
|
||||
return stmt.order_by(models.UsageEvent.at)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@app.get("/api/usage/summary")
|
||||
def usage_summary(
|
||||
date_from: Optional[str] = Query(None, alias="from"),
|
||||
date_to: Optional[str] = Query(None, alias="to"),
|
||||
project_id: Optional[str] = Query(None),
|
||||
username: Optional[str] = Query(None),
|
||||
tool: Optional[str] = Query(None),
|
||||
caller: models.User = Depends(require_user_manager),
|
||||
db: Session = Depends(get_db),
|
||||
):
|
||||
"""CR-019. Same gate as the User Directory (require_user_manager): an app
|
||||
admin or a project_super_user with at least one managed project. Filters
|
||||
combine. Aggregated in Python over the filtered row set rather than a SQL
|
||||
GROUP BY - correct and simple at today's scale; if usage_events grows
|
||||
into the millions (plausible, given retention is indefinite by decision),
|
||||
the day/week/month bucketing here is the first thing to move server-side
|
||||
into SQL. Not done now because nothing currently requires it."""
|
||||
rows = db.scalars(_usage_query(db, caller, date_from, date_to, project_id, username, tool)).all()
|
||||
|
||||
by_day: dict[str, set] = {}
|
||||
by_week: dict[str, set] = {}
|
||||
by_month: dict[str, set] = {}
|
||||
per_user_last: dict[str, datetime] = {}
|
||||
per_tool: dict[str, int] = {}
|
||||
for e in rows:
|
||||
by_day.setdefault(e.at.date().isoformat(), set()).add(e.username)
|
||||
by_week.setdefault(e.at.strftime("%G-W%V"), set()).add(e.username)
|
||||
by_month.setdefault(e.at.strftime("%Y-%m"), set()).add(e.username)
|
||||
if e.username not in per_user_last or e.at > per_user_last[e.username]:
|
||||
per_user_last[e.username] = e.at
|
||||
per_tool[e.tool] = per_tool.get(e.tool, 0) + 1
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"active_users": {
|
||||
"by_day": {k: len(v) for k, v in sorted(by_day.items())},
|
||||
"by_week": {k: len(v) for k, v in sorted(by_week.items())},
|
||||
"by_month": {k: len(v) for k, v in sorted(by_month.items())},
|
||||
},
|
||||
"per_user_last_active": {u: models._iso(t) for u, t in sorted(per_user_last.items())},
|
||||
"by_tool": dict(sorted(per_tool.items(), key=lambda kv: -kv[1])),
|
||||
"event_count": len(rows),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _pseudonym(username: str) -> str:
|
||||
"""A stable per-user id for the sanitized export — the SAME input always
|
||||
produces the SAME output, within one export and across separate export
|
||||
runs, so an external system (Power BI or similar) can still group and
|
||||
trend "by user" without ever receiving a real name. HMAC rather than a
|
||||
plain hash: a plain sha256(username) is trivially reversed against a
|
||||
wordlist of the handful of usernames this app actually has; keying it
|
||||
with AUTH_SECRET_KEY (already a real secret, already required in
|
||||
production — see auth.py) means recovering a username from its
|
||||
pseudonym requires the signing key, not just guessing."""
|
||||
digest = hmac.new(auth.SECRET_KEY.encode(), username.encode(), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
|
||||
return "u_" + digest[:16]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@app.get("/api/usage/export")
|
||||
def usage_export(
|
||||
date_from: Optional[str] = Query(None, alias="from"),
|
||||
date_to: Optional[str] = Query(None, alias="to"),
|
||||
project_id: Optional[str] = Query(None),
|
||||
username: Optional[str] = Query(None),
|
||||
tool: Optional[str] = Query(None),
|
||||
sanitize: bool = Query(False),
|
||||
caller: models.User = Depends(require_user_manager),
|
||||
db: Session = Depends(get_db),
|
||||
):
|
||||
"""CR-019. Same gate, same filters, same underlying row set as
|
||||
usage_summary() (_usage_query) — the export can never show a different
|
||||
slice of data than what the console counted for the same filters.
|
||||
|
||||
sanitize=true replaces `username` with a stable pseudonym (_pseudonym)
|
||||
and — deliberately — the `detail` column is not exported in EITHER mode.
|
||||
Every event this app writes today (login, page_open) leaves `detail`
|
||||
empty, so this costs nothing now, but it also means a future event type
|
||||
that DOES populate `detail` can't accidentally leak a real name into a
|
||||
sanitized file through a column nobody thought to scrub. If `detail`
|
||||
is ever needed in the export, it has to be sanitized explicitly, not
|
||||
assumed safe because the rest of the row was."""
|
||||
rows = db.scalars(_usage_query(db, caller, date_from, date_to, project_id, username, tool)).all()
|
||||
buf = io.StringIO()
|
||||
w = csv.writer(buf)
|
||||
w.writerow(["at", "username", "project_id", "tool", "event"])
|
||||
for e in rows:
|
||||
who = _pseudonym(e.username) if sanitize else e.username
|
||||
w.writerow([models._iso(e.at), who, e.project_id or "", e.tool, e.event])
|
||||
filename = "usage_export_%s_%s.csv" % (
|
||||
"sanitized" if sanitize else "raw", datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y%m%d"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
return Response(
|
||||
content=buf.getvalue(), media_type="text/csv",
|
||||
headers={"Content-Disposition": f'attachment; filename="{filename}"'},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@app.get("/api/comments")
|
||||
def list_comments(
|
||||
source: Optional[str] = Query(None),
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -59,26 +59,8 @@ log = logging.getLogger("wpsuite.auth")
|
||||
|
||||
COOKIE_NAME = "wp_session"
|
||||
JWT_ALG = "HS256"
|
||||
# D18 (2026-09-23): a session now slides on activity, capped by a hard ceiling
|
||||
# underneath - not a single flat lifetime. A pure idle timer with no ceiling
|
||||
# would let a continuously-active session never force a fresh Okta recheck,
|
||||
# which is a worse fit for this item's own purpose (catching someone still
|
||||
# active after being deprovisioned) than a flat expiry would have been. Both
|
||||
# numbers are proposed defaults, not confirmed against the tenant's actual
|
||||
# Okta SSO session policy - see docs/waves/decisions-2026-09-17.md.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# No request for this long invalidates the session outright.
|
||||
IDLE_MINUTES = int(os.getenv("AUTH_IDLE_MINUTES", "30"))
|
||||
# The absolute ceiling from the ORIGINAL sign-in, regardless of activity. Same
|
||||
# env var name as the old flat-lifetime design; the meaning changed, the name
|
||||
# didn't, because it still answers "how long can this session possibly live."
|
||||
SESSION_HOURS = int(os.getenv("AUTH_SESSION_HOURS", "8"))
|
||||
# How much later a refreshed exp must be before it's worth rewriting the
|
||||
# cookie. Without this, an active session gets a new Set-Cookie on literally
|
||||
# every request - correct, but wasteful, and it makes the cookie a busier
|
||||
# target than it needs to be. A third of the idle window is a reasonable
|
||||
# balance: refreshed a few times within any idle window, never every request.
|
||||
_REFRESH_SLACK = timedelta(minutes=max(1, IDLE_MINUTES // 3))
|
||||
# How long a session lasts before the person must sign in again.
|
||||
SESSION_HOURS = int(os.getenv("AUTH_SESSION_HOURS", "12"))
|
||||
|
||||
# ── permissions roles ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
ROLE_ADMIN = "admin"
|
||||
@@ -178,30 +160,6 @@ SECRET_KEY = _load_secret()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── tokens ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
def _parse_claim_dt(v) -> Optional[datetime]:
|
||||
"""`login_at` is a custom claim, so unlike `exp`/`iat` (which PyJWT
|
||||
special-cases for a datetime -> POSIX-timestamp conversion on encode) it
|
||||
is stored and read back as a plain numeric timestamp. Returns None for
|
||||
anything unparseable rather than raising - a malformed or legacy token
|
||||
should fail closed into "no refresh", not 500."""
|
||||
if v is None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return datetime.fromtimestamp(float(v), tz=timezone.utc)
|
||||
except (TypeError, ValueError, OSError):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _next_exp(login_at: datetime, now: datetime) -> datetime:
|
||||
"""Whichever comes first: another IDLE_MINUTES of quiet from now, or the
|
||||
absolute SESSION_HOURS ceiling measured from the session's original
|
||||
sign-in. Shared by create_token and maybe_refresh_token so the two can't
|
||||
drift apart."""
|
||||
ceiling = login_at + timedelta(hours=SESSION_HOURS)
|
||||
idle_edge = now + timedelta(minutes=IDLE_MINUTES)
|
||||
return min(ceiling, idle_edge)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def create_token(user: "models.User") -> str:
|
||||
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
|
||||
payload = {
|
||||
@@ -210,48 +168,7 @@ def create_token(user: "models.User") -> str:
|
||||
"role": user.role,
|
||||
"ver": user.token_version or 0,
|
||||
"iat": now,
|
||||
"login_at": now.timestamp(),
|
||||
"exp": _next_exp(now, now),
|
||||
}
|
||||
return jwt.encode(payload, SECRET_KEY, algorithm=JWT_ALG)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def maybe_refresh_token(claims: dict) -> Optional[str]:
|
||||
"""Given a validated token's claims, return a reissued token if the
|
||||
session is worth extending, or None if nothing should change. Called from
|
||||
`auth_gate` on every authenticated request (D18) - deliberately reads only
|
||||
the already-validated claims, never the database, so it costs nothing
|
||||
beyond the JWT encode itself. The separate is_active/token_version check
|
||||
in get_current_user is unaffected either way.
|
||||
|
||||
Three ways this returns None: past the absolute ceiling (session is done,
|
||||
full re-login required - never extended, not even by a second); the
|
||||
claims can't be parsed (fails closed into no-refresh rather than guessing);
|
||||
or a refresh happened recently enough that a new cookie isn't worth
|
||||
writing yet (_REFRESH_SLACK)."""
|
||||
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
|
||||
login_at = _parse_claim_dt(claims.get("login_at"))
|
||||
if login_at is None:
|
||||
# Pre-D18 token (no login_at claim) - fall back to iat so it still
|
||||
# gets a real ceiling instead of riding on the old flat exp forever.
|
||||
login_at = _parse_claim_dt(claims.get("iat"))
|
||||
if login_at is None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
ceiling = login_at + timedelta(hours=SESSION_HOURS)
|
||||
if now >= ceiling:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
new_exp = _next_exp(login_at, now)
|
||||
current_exp = _parse_claim_dt(claims.get("exp"))
|
||||
if current_exp is not None and (new_exp - current_exp) < _REFRESH_SLACK:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
payload = {
|
||||
"sub": claims.get("sub"),
|
||||
"username": claims.get("username"),
|
||||
"role": claims.get("role"),
|
||||
"ver": claims.get("ver", 0),
|
||||
"iat": now,
|
||||
"login_at": login_at.timestamp(),
|
||||
"exp": new_exp,
|
||||
"exp": now + timedelta(hours=SESSION_HOURS),
|
||||
}
|
||||
return jwt.encode(payload, SECRET_KEY, algorithm=JWT_ALG)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -337,45 +337,6 @@ class AuditLog(Base):
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class UsageEvent(Base):
|
||||
"""CR-019: append-only record of who used the suite, when, and which tool —
|
||||
navigation/session activity, not business mutations. Deliberately a SEPARATE
|
||||
table from AuditLog rather than a new `action` value there: AuditLog answers
|
||||
"who changed what" and is read by people auditing a specific record's
|
||||
history; mixing in a `page_open` row for every authenticated page load
|
||||
would make that trail noisy for its existing purpose. This table answers a
|
||||
different question — "who is active, and on what" — and CR-019's admin
|
||||
console reads from here, not from AuditLog.
|
||||
|
||||
Not a ForeignKey to `users`, matching AuditLog's own reasoning: a user who
|
||||
is later removed should still show up in historical activity rather than
|
||||
silently vanishing from it, and `D18`'s deprovisioning sync only ever sets
|
||||
`is_active=False` — it never deletes a row — so this is defensive symmetry
|
||||
rather than a live concern today.
|
||||
|
||||
Retention is indefinite (decided 2026-09-17, `decisions-2026-09-17.md`) —
|
||||
nothing purges rows written here; that is a deliberate product decision,
|
||||
not an oversight to fix later."""
|
||||
__tablename__ = "usage_events"
|
||||
|
||||
id: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(40), primary_key=True)
|
||||
at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), default=utcnow, index=True)
|
||||
username: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(200), default="", index=True)
|
||||
project_id: Mapped[Optional[str]] = mapped_column(String(40), nullable=True, index=True)
|
||||
# creator | wizard | field_view | dashboard | admin | directory | ...
|
||||
tool: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(40), default="", index=True)
|
||||
# page_open | login
|
||||
event: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(40), default="", index=True)
|
||||
detail: Mapped[dict] = mapped_column(JSON, default=dict)
|
||||
|
||||
def to_dict(self) -> dict:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"id": self.id, "at": _iso(self.at), "username": self.username,
|
||||
"project_id": self.project_id, "tool": self.tool, "event": self.event,
|
||||
"detail": self.detail or {},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class AppSetting(Base):
|
||||
"""Admin-editable application settings (feature flags, SMTP config, …) stored
|
||||
as key -> JSON value. Read/written via /api/settings (admin only). Secrets like
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -254,23 +254,27 @@ def main():
|
||||
if ("el.textContent = '" in ln or "el.innerHTML = '" in ln)
|
||||
and "the project" not in ln and ("✓" in ln or "⚠" in ln or "↻" in ln or "✕" in ln)])
|
||||
|
||||
print("\n7. autosave's own registration survives the retired analytics tracker")
|
||||
# This section used to also assert the per-browser usage-analytics dwell
|
||||
# listener (wp-usage.js) still fired alongside autosave, to catch autosave
|
||||
# accidentally replacing it. CR-019/T11.6 (2026-09-23) retired that tracker
|
||||
# on purpose - track() is now a documented no-op and wp-usage.js is gone -
|
||||
# so asserting it still records an event would be asserting the wrong
|
||||
# thing. What's still worth checking here is autosave's own registration,
|
||||
# which is what this section actually guards.
|
||||
print("\n7. the analytics dwell listener still fires")
|
||||
boot(page, base, tok, "/work-package-suite.html?project=projA&tab=sop")
|
||||
time.sleep(0.8)
|
||||
chk("the wizard registered autosave",
|
||||
chk("the wizard still has its analytics dwell tracker",
|
||||
page.eval("typeof trackStepDwell === 'function'"))
|
||||
chk("...and the wizard registered autosave too",
|
||||
page.eval("typeof WPAutosave === 'object' && typeof sopDraftId === 'function'"))
|
||||
chk("...and the retired dwell tracker is a harmless no-op, not missing or throwing",
|
||||
page.eval("""(() => {
|
||||
if (typeof trackStepDwell !== 'function') return false;
|
||||
try { trackStepDwell(); return true; } catch (e) { return false; }
|
||||
})()"""))
|
||||
before = page.eval("""(() => {
|
||||
try { return (JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem('wp_suite_analytics_v1')||'{}').events||[]).length; }
|
||||
catch(e){ return -1; }
|
||||
})()""")
|
||||
# trackStepDwell only records a dwell longer than 400ms, so give it one.
|
||||
time.sleep(0.9)
|
||||
page.eval("typeof trackStepDwell==='function' && trackStepDwell()")
|
||||
time.sleep(0.4)
|
||||
after_n = page.eval("""(() => {
|
||||
try { return (JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem('wp_suite_analytics_v1')||'{}').events||[]).length; }
|
||||
catch(e){ return -1; }
|
||||
})()""")
|
||||
chk("calling it records an event (it was not replaced by the guard)",
|
||||
after_n > before, "%s -> %s" % (before, after_n))
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
page.close()
|
||||
browser.close()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -207,9 +207,12 @@ def run(page, base, tok):
|
||||
chk("auth resolved to the admin account", page.eval("(window.WP_USER||{}).role") == "admin")
|
||||
chk("the directory is visible",
|
||||
page.eval("getComputedStyle(document.getElementById('users-main')).display") != "none")
|
||||
chk("manager table renders 9 columns",
|
||||
page.eval("document.querySelectorAll('#users-table thead th').length") == 9,
|
||||
# 10 since CR-020 (T12.2): the 9 data columns plus the row-selection column.
|
||||
chk("manager table renders 10 columns (9 + row selection)",
|
||||
page.eval("document.querySelectorAll('#users-table thead th').length") == 10,
|
||||
page.eval("document.querySelectorAll('#users-table thead th').length"))
|
||||
chk("...the first is the selection column",
|
||||
page.eval("!!document.querySelector('#users-table thead th.selcell #sel-all')"))
|
||||
chk("an admin sees every account in the fixture (7)",
|
||||
page.eval("document.querySelectorAll('#users-table tbody tr').length") == 7,
|
||||
page.eval("document.querySelectorAll('#users-table tbody tr').length"))
|
||||
@@ -237,15 +240,22 @@ def run(page, base, tok):
|
||||
|
||||
# Your own row: permissions locked so you cannot demote yourself, job function
|
||||
# still editable. Asserted on the two cells, not "no select in the row".
|
||||
# The cells are found by their HEADER, not by position: CR-020's selection
|
||||
# column moved every column one to the right and these asserted r.cells[3]
|
||||
# and [4], which then read the username and the email (T12.6).
|
||||
ROW = ("const r=[...document.querySelectorAll('#users-table tbody tr')]"
|
||||
".find(r=>r.querySelector('.me-tag'));")
|
||||
".find(r=>r.querySelector('.me-tag'));"
|
||||
"const col=n=>[...document.querySelectorAll('#users-table thead th')]"
|
||||
".findIndex(h=>h.textContent.trim().toLowerCase()===n);")
|
||||
def own(q):
|
||||
return "(()=>{" + ROW + "if(!r)return false;const c=r.cells[3];return " + q + "})()"
|
||||
return "(()=>{" + ROW + "if(!r)return false;const c=r.cells[col('permissions')];return " + q + "})()"
|
||||
chk("your own permissions cell is locked, not a dropdown",
|
||||
page.eval(own("!c.querySelector('select') && !!c.querySelector('.tag')")))
|
||||
chk("...and wears the Administrator pill", page.eval(own("!!c.querySelector('.tag.admin')")))
|
||||
chk("...while your job function stays editable",
|
||||
page.eval("(()=>{" + ROW + "return !!r && !!r.cells[4].querySelector('select')})()"))
|
||||
page.eval("(()=>{" + ROW + "return !!r && !!r.cells[col('project role')].querySelector('select')})()"))
|
||||
chk("...and your own row cannot be ticked for a bulk action",
|
||||
page.eval("(()=>{" + ROW + "return !!r && !r.querySelector('input.selbox')})()"))
|
||||
|
||||
page.eval("[...document.querySelectorAll('#users-table tbody button')]"
|
||||
".find(b=>/project/i.test(b.textContent)).click()")
|
||||
|
||||
326
tests/bulk_users_check.py
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,326 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
||||
"""CR-020 (wave 12): bulk user administration, server side.
|
||||
|
||||
python tests/bulk_users_check.py
|
||||
|
||||
Self-contained and needs NO browser: a throwaway SQLite database in a temp
|
||||
folder, the API driven in-process with FastAPI's TestClient, everything deleted
|
||||
afterward. Your real wpsuite.db is never touched.
|
||||
|
||||
What it proves is the wave's own exit criteria, measured on the server, where
|
||||
they are enforced:
|
||||
- every bulk action works on a list, row by row, with the single-user rules;
|
||||
- the caller's own account is refused on its own row, never the whole batch;
|
||||
- a super user's batch cannot reach an account or project outside their scope;
|
||||
- one AuditLog row per changed account, the same shape the single route writes;
|
||||
- a partial failure is reported row by row, never as a clean success;
|
||||
- project add/remove never touches the user's other projects or their roles;
|
||||
- the single-user routes, now built on the same functions, behave as before.
|
||||
|
||||
Exit codes: 0 all passed, 1 a check failed, 2 the run could not start.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import shutil
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
import warnings
|
||||
|
||||
warnings.filterwarnings("ignore")
|
||||
ROOT = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
|
||||
TMP = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="wp-bulk-users-check-")
|
||||
os.environ["DATABASE_URL"] = "sqlite:///" + os.path.join(TMP, "bulk.db").replace("\\", "/")
|
||||
os.environ["AUTH_SECRET_KEY"] = "bulk-users-check-key-bulk-users-check-0000"
|
||||
os.environ.pop("WP_OKTA_FAKE_DIRECTORY", None)
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, ROOT)
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
|
||||
from sqlalchemy import select
|
||||
from server import app as A, auth, models
|
||||
from server.db import SessionLocal
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
|
||||
print("could not start:", exc)
|
||||
sys.exit(2)
|
||||
|
||||
RESULTS = []
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def check(name, ok, detail=""):
|
||||
RESULTS.append(bool(ok))
|
||||
print(f" {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'} {name}" + (f" ({detail})" if detail and not ok else ""))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
db = SessionLocal()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def account(uid, role="project_user"):
|
||||
u = models.User(id=uid, username=uid[5:], role=role, email=uid[5:] + "@example.test")
|
||||
db.add(u)
|
||||
db.commit()
|
||||
return u
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def member(uid, pid, role=""):
|
||||
db.add(models.ProjectMember(id=f"pm_{uid}_{pid}", user_id=uid, project_id=pid, role=role))
|
||||
db.commit()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def client(user):
|
||||
c = TestClient(A.app, base_url="http://127.0.0.1", raise_server_exceptions=False)
|
||||
c.cookies.set(auth.COOKIE_NAME, auth.create_token(user))
|
||||
return c
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def fresh():
|
||||
s = SessionLocal()
|
||||
s.expire_all()
|
||||
return s
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def audit(action, entity_id=None):
|
||||
s = fresh()
|
||||
q = select(models.AuditLog).where(models.AuditLog.action == action)
|
||||
if entity_id:
|
||||
q = q.where(models.AuditLog.entity_id == entity_id)
|
||||
return s.scalars(q.order_by(models.AuditLog.at)).all()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def roles_of(uid):
|
||||
s = fresh()
|
||||
return {m.project_id: (m.role or "") for m in
|
||||
s.scalars(select(models.ProjectMember).where(models.ProjectMember.user_id == uid))}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def by_user(resp):
|
||||
return {r["user_id"]: r for r in resp.json().get("results", [])}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── fixture ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
admin = account("user_admin", "admin")
|
||||
admin2 = account("user_admin2", "admin")
|
||||
superu = account("user_super") # super user on proj1 and proj4 by membership
|
||||
pu = account("user_pu") # plain project user: manages nobody
|
||||
for n in range(1, 10):
|
||||
account(f"user_u{n}")
|
||||
for pid in ("proj1", "proj2", "proj3", "proj4"):
|
||||
db.add(models.Project(id=pid, name=pid))
|
||||
db.commit()
|
||||
member("user_super", "proj1", "project_super_user")
|
||||
member("user_super", "proj4", "project_super_user")
|
||||
member("user_pu", "proj1")
|
||||
for n in (1, 2, 3, 4, 5):
|
||||
member(f"user_u{n}", "proj1")
|
||||
member("user_u6", "proj1"); member("user_u6", "proj2", "project_admin") # partly outside super's scope
|
||||
member("user_u7", "proj2") # wholly outside it
|
||||
member("user_u8", "proj1"); member("user_u8", "proj4", "project_super_user") # a role super may not grant
|
||||
ca, cs, cp = client(admin), client(superu), client(pu)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def single_routes():
|
||||
print("\n0. the single-user routes still behave as before (now on the shared functions)")
|
||||
r = ca.post("/api/auth/users/user_admin/role", json={"role": "project_user"})
|
||||
check("changing your own role: 400, same words", r.status_code == 400 and "own role" in r.json()["detail"])
|
||||
r = ca.post("/api/auth/users/user_admin/active", json={"is_active": False})
|
||||
check("disabling yourself: 400, same words", r.status_code == 400 and "disable your own" in r.json()["detail"])
|
||||
r = ca.delete("/api/auth/users/user_admin")
|
||||
check("deleting yourself: 400, same words", r.status_code == 400 and "delete your own" in r.json()["detail"])
|
||||
r = cs.post("/api/auth/users/user_u6/role", json={"role": "project_admin"})
|
||||
check("a super user changing an account outside their scope: 403", r.status_code == 403)
|
||||
r = cs.put("/api/auth/users/user_u3/projects", json={"project_ids": ["proj1", "proj2"]})
|
||||
check("a super user assigning a project they don't run: 403", r.status_code == 403)
|
||||
r = ca.post("/api/auth/users/user_u9/role", json={"role": "project_admin"})
|
||||
check("a single role change still works and returns the directory row",
|
||||
r.status_code == 200 and r.json().get("role") == "project_admin")
|
||||
one = audit("role_changed", "user_u9")
|
||||
check("...and writes one role_changed row", len(one) == 1 and one[0].detail == {"from": "project_user", "to": "project_admin"},
|
||||
str([e.detail for e in one]))
|
||||
ca.post("/api/auth/users/user_u9/role", json={"role": "project_user"})
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def bulk_role():
|
||||
print("\n1. bulk permissions role")
|
||||
r = ca.post("/api/auth/bulk-users/role", json={
|
||||
"user_ids": ["user_u1", "user_u2", "user_admin", "user_nobody", "user_u1", "bad id!"],
|
||||
"role": "project_admin"})
|
||||
res = by_user(r)
|
||||
check("200 even though some rows fail (a partial failure is a result, not an error)", r.status_code == 200)
|
||||
check("u1 and u2 changed", res["user_u1"]["status"] == "ok" and res["user_u2"]["status"] == "ok")
|
||||
check("your own row is refused with its reason; the rest still ran",
|
||||
res["user_admin"]["status"] == "failed" and "own role" in res["user_admin"]["reason"])
|
||||
check("an unknown account is refused as 'User not found'",
|
||||
res["user_nobody"]["status"] == "failed" and res["user_nobody"]["reason"] == "User not found")
|
||||
check("a malformed id is refused, not crashed on", res["bad id!"]["status"] == "failed")
|
||||
check("a duplicated id is applied once", r.json()["requested"] == 5)
|
||||
check("counts match the rows", (r.json()["ok"], r.json()["failed"]) == (2, 3), str(r.json()))
|
||||
rows = audit("role_changed", "user_u1")
|
||||
check("one role_changed audit row per changed account, same shape as the single route",
|
||||
len(rows) == 1 and rows[0].detail == {"from": "project_user", "to": "project_admin"}
|
||||
and rows[0].actor == "admin" and rows[0].entity_type == "user", str([e.detail for e in rows]))
|
||||
r = ca.post("/api/auth/bulk-users/role", json={"user_ids": ["user_u1"], "role": "project_admin"})
|
||||
check("a row already in that role is 'unchanged' and writes no audit row",
|
||||
by_user(r)["user_u1"]["status"] == "unchanged" and len(audit("role_changed", "user_u1")) == 1)
|
||||
r = cs.post("/api/auth/bulk-users/role", json={"user_ids": ["user_u3"], "role": "admin"})
|
||||
check("a super user cannot grant admin in bulk either (grantable_roles, whole request 400)",
|
||||
r.status_code == 400)
|
||||
r = cs.post("/api/auth/bulk-users/role", json={"user_ids": ["user_u3", "user_u6", "user_u7"],
|
||||
"role": "project_admin"})
|
||||
res = by_user(r)
|
||||
check("super user: an account wholly inside their projects changes", res["user_u3"]["status"] == "ok")
|
||||
check("super user: an account also on a project they don't run is refused, with the reason",
|
||||
res["user_u6"]["status"] == "failed" and "don't administer" in res["user_u6"]["reason"],
|
||||
res["user_u6"]["reason"])
|
||||
check("super user: an account they cannot see is 'User not found' (no existence leak)",
|
||||
res["user_u7"]["status"] == "failed" and res["user_u7"]["reason"] == "User not found")
|
||||
r = ca.post("/api/auth/bulk-users/role", json={"user_ids": ["user_admin2"], "role": "project_user"})
|
||||
check("demoting another admin works while one active admin remains (the caller)",
|
||||
by_user(r)["user_admin2"]["status"] == "ok")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def bulk_active():
|
||||
print("\n2. bulk activate / disable")
|
||||
r = ca.post("/api/auth/bulk-users/active", json={"user_ids": ["user_u4", "user_admin", "user_u5"],
|
||||
"is_active": False})
|
||||
res = by_user(r)
|
||||
check("u4 and u5 disabled", res["user_u4"]["status"] == "ok" and res["user_u5"]["status"] == "ok"
|
||||
and not fresh().get(models.User, "user_u4").is_active)
|
||||
check("your own account is refused on its own row",
|
||||
res["user_admin"]["status"] == "failed" and "disable your own" in res["user_admin"]["reason"])
|
||||
check("one user_disabled audit row each, same shape as the single route",
|
||||
[e.detail for e in audit("user_disabled", "user_u4")] == [{"is_active": False}])
|
||||
r = ca.post("/api/auth/bulk-users/active", json={"user_ids": ["user_u4", "user_u2"], "is_active": True})
|
||||
res = by_user(r)
|
||||
check("re-enable: u4 ok, u2 (already active) unchanged",
|
||||
res["user_u4"]["status"] == "ok" and res["user_u2"]["status"] == "unchanged")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def bulk_projects():
|
||||
print("\n3. bulk project add / remove")
|
||||
r = cs.post("/api/auth/bulk-users/projects", json={"user_ids": ["user_u1", "user_u2", "user_u8"],
|
||||
"project_id": "proj1", "op": "add", "role": "project_admin"})
|
||||
res = by_user(r)
|
||||
check("add with a per-project role: every row ok", all(res[u]["status"] == "ok" for u in ("user_u1", "user_u2", "user_u8")),
|
||||
str(res))
|
||||
check("the role landed on that project", roles_of("user_u1").get("proj1") == "project_admin")
|
||||
check("the user's OTHER project and its role are untouched - even a role the caller could not grant",
|
||||
roles_of("user_u8").get("proj4") == "project_super_user", str(roles_of("user_u8")))
|
||||
rows = audit("project_access_changed", "user_u1")
|
||||
check("one project_access_changed row per account, in the single route's shape",
|
||||
len(rows) == 1 and set(rows[0].detail) == {"projects", "scope", "overrides"}
|
||||
and rows[0].detail["scope"] == "managed", str([e.detail for e in rows]))
|
||||
r = cs.post("/api/auth/bulk-users/projects", json={"user_ids": ["user_u1"], "project_id": "proj2", "op": "add"})
|
||||
check("a super user cannot add anyone to a project they don't run (403)", r.status_code == 403)
|
||||
r = cs.post("/api/auth/bulk-users/projects", json={"user_ids": ["user_u1"], "project_id": "proj1",
|
||||
"op": "add", "role": "project_super_user"})
|
||||
check("a super user cannot hand out super user on a project (400)", r.status_code == 400)
|
||||
r = ca.post("/api/auth/bulk-users/projects", json={"user_ids": ["user_u6"], "project_id": "proj3", "op": "add"})
|
||||
check("admin adds u6 to proj3; proj1 and proj2 memberships and roles stay",
|
||||
by_user(r)["user_u6"]["status"] == "ok"
|
||||
and roles_of("user_u6") == {"proj1": "", "proj2": "project_admin", "proj3": ""}, str(roles_of("user_u6")))
|
||||
r = cs.post("/api/auth/bulk-users/projects", json={"user_ids": ["user_u2", "user_u9"], "project_id": "proj1", "op": "remove"})
|
||||
res = by_user(r)
|
||||
check("remove: u2 taken off proj1", res["user_u2"]["status"] == "ok" and "proj1" not in roles_of("user_u2"))
|
||||
check("remove: someone not on it is 'User not found' to a super user who cannot see them",
|
||||
res["user_u9"]["status"] == "failed")
|
||||
r = ca.post("/api/auth/bulk-users/projects", json={"user_ids": ["user_u9"], "project_id": "proj1", "op": "remove"})
|
||||
check("remove: an admin removing someone not on the project gets 'unchanged'",
|
||||
by_user(r)["user_u9"]["status"] == "unchanged")
|
||||
r = ca.post("/api/auth/bulk-users/projects", json={"user_ids": ["user_u1"], "project_id": "proj1", "op": "replace"})
|
||||
check("only add and remove exist: no replace-the-whole-list (400)", r.status_code == 400)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def bulk_delete():
|
||||
print("\n4. bulk delete")
|
||||
r = ca.post("/api/auth/bulk-users/delete", json={"user_ids": ["user_u5", "user_admin", "user_gone"]})
|
||||
res = by_user(r)
|
||||
check("u5 deleted", res["user_u5"]["status"] == "ok" and fresh().get(models.User, "user_u5") is None)
|
||||
check("your own account is refused on its own row, the others still ran",
|
||||
res["user_admin"]["status"] == "failed" and "delete your own" in res["user_admin"]["reason"])
|
||||
check("an account that no longer exists is reported, not hidden",
|
||||
res["user_gone"]["status"] == "failed" and res["user_gone"]["reason"] == "User not found")
|
||||
check("one user_deleted audit row, same shape as the single route",
|
||||
[e.detail for e in audit("user_deleted", "user_u5")] == [{"role": "project_user"}])
|
||||
check("the deleted account's memberships went with it", roles_of("user_u5") == {})
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def csv_resolve():
|
||||
print("\n6. CSV upload: usernames in, a line-by-line report out (T12.4)")
|
||||
text = ("username\n" # header, skipped
|
||||
"u3\n"
|
||||
"U3\n" # same person, different case: a duplicate
|
||||
"nobody\n"
|
||||
"\n" # blank lines are not rows
|
||||
"u6\n" # visible to the super user, but also on a project they don't run
|
||||
"u7\n" # not visible to the super user at all
|
||||
"super\n" # the caller themself
|
||||
"u8@example.test,extra column\n" # an email address, matched to exactly one account
|
||||
",\n") # an empty first column
|
||||
r = cs.post("/api/auth/bulk-users/resolve", json={"text": text})
|
||||
j = r.json()
|
||||
rows = {x["line"]: x for x in j["rows"]}
|
||||
check("200 with a row for every non-blank line after the header",
|
||||
r.status_code == 200 and sorted(rows) == [2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10], sorted(rows))
|
||||
check("a valid username is accepted", rows[2]["status"] == "ok" and rows[2]["user_id"] == "user_u3")
|
||||
check("a repeated username is rejected as a duplicate of its first line, not applied twice",
|
||||
rows[3]["status"] == "rejected" and rows[3]["reason"] == "duplicate of line 2")
|
||||
check("an unknown username: 'User not found', with its line number", rows[4]["reason"] == "User not found")
|
||||
check("an account the caller may not change: rejected with the single route's own reason",
|
||||
rows[6]["status"] == "rejected" and "don't administer" in rows[6]["reason"], rows[6]["reason"])
|
||||
check("an account the caller cannot see: 'User not found' (a CSV leaks no more than the table)",
|
||||
rows[7]["reason"] == "User not found")
|
||||
check("the caller's own account is rejected with a clear reason", "your own account" in rows[8]["reason"])
|
||||
check("an email address resolves when exactly one account has it",
|
||||
rows[9]["status"] == "ok" and rows[9]["user_id"] == "user_u8")
|
||||
check("an empty first column is rejected, not skipped", rows[10]["reason"] == "no username in the first column")
|
||||
check("the ids handed back are exactly the accepted rows",
|
||||
j["user_ids"] == ["user_u3", "user_u8"] and (j["accepted"], j["rejected"]) == (2, 6), str(j["user_ids"]))
|
||||
r = cs.post("/api/auth/bulk-users/active", json={"user_ids": j["user_ids"] + ["user_u7"], "is_active": False})
|
||||
res = by_user(r)
|
||||
check("the CSV's ids go through the same bulk route and the same guards: an id slipped in by hand "
|
||||
"is still refused", res["user_u7"]["status"] == "failed" and res["user_u3"]["status"] == "ok")
|
||||
ca.post("/api/auth/bulk-users/active", json={"user_ids": ["user_u3", "user_u8"], "is_active": True})
|
||||
r = cp.post("/api/auth/bulk-users/resolve", json={"text": "u3"})
|
||||
check("a plain project user cannot resolve a list (403)", r.status_code == 403)
|
||||
r = cs.post("/api/auth/bulk-users/resolve", json={"text": "x" * 200_001})
|
||||
check("an oversized upload is refused (422)", r.status_code == 422)
|
||||
s = fresh()
|
||||
s.add(models.User(id="user_twin1", username="twin1", email="shared@example.test"))
|
||||
s.add(models.User(id="user_twin2", username="twin2", email="shared@example.test"))
|
||||
s.commit()
|
||||
r = ca.post("/api/auth/bulk-users/resolve", json={"text": "shared@example.test"})
|
||||
check("an email shared by two accounts matches neither", r.json()["rows"][0]["reason"] == "User not found")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def gates():
|
||||
print("\n7. who may call, and how much")
|
||||
for path, body in (("role", {"role": "project_user"}), ("active", {"is_active": False}),
|
||||
("projects", {"project_id": "proj1", "op": "add"}), ("delete", {})):
|
||||
r = cp.post(f"/api/auth/bulk-users/{path}", json={"user_ids": ["user_u3"], **body})
|
||||
check(f"a plain project user is refused /bulk-users/{path} (403)", r.status_code == 403, str(r.status_code))
|
||||
anon = TestClient(A.app, base_url="http://127.0.0.1", raise_server_exceptions=False)
|
||||
check("no session: 401", anon.post("/api/auth/bulk-users/delete", json={"user_ids": ["user_u3"]}).status_code == 401)
|
||||
r = ca.post("/api/auth/bulk-users/active", json={"user_ids": [f"user_x{i}" for i in range(501)], "is_active": False})
|
||||
check("more than 500 ids in one request is refused (422)", r.status_code == 422, str(r.status_code))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SECTIONS = [single_routes, bulk_role, bulk_active, bulk_projects, bulk_delete, csv_resolve, gates]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def main() -> int:
|
||||
print("Wave 12 bulk user administration - server checks")
|
||||
try:
|
||||
for section in SECTIONS:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
section()
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 - a missing route must read as FAIL, not a traceback
|
||||
check(f"section {section.__name__} ran to the end", False, f"{type(exc).__name__}: {exc}")
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
db.close()
|
||||
A.engine.dispose()
|
||||
shutil.rmtree(TMP, ignore_errors=True)
|
||||
passed = sum(RESULTS)
|
||||
print(f"\n{passed}/{len(RESULTS)} checks passed.")
|
||||
return 0 if passed == len(RESULTS) else 1
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
sys.exit(main())
|
||||
197
tests/bulk_users_ui_check.py
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
||||
"""CR-020 (wave 12): bulk user administration in the browser, at 1440px and 390px.
|
||||
|
||||
python tests/bulk_users_ui_check.py
|
||||
|
||||
Self-contained like the other probes: a throwaway SQLite database seeded by
|
||||
browser_check.seed(), its own uvicorn, headless Edge or Chrome over CDP. Your
|
||||
real wpsuite.db is never touched. Run it alone, not back to back with another
|
||||
probe (file-map.md: chained runs exhaust the browser's ports).
|
||||
|
||||
The server rules are proven in tests/bulk_users_check.py without a browser.
|
||||
This file proves the page: selection, the toolbar, the CSV path and the typed
|
||||
delete, end to end against the real server, operable by keyboard, and holding
|
||||
together at 390px. It writes the after-screenshots CLAUDE.md asks for to
|
||||
docs/reference/baseline/wave-12/; the before-shots are the existing
|
||||
users-1440.png and after-wave9/users-390.png.
|
||||
|
||||
Exit 0 all passed, 1 a failure, 2 could not run.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
import time
|
||||
import urllib.request
|
||||
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))))
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
|
||||
|
||||
import cdp # noqa: E402
|
||||
from browser_check import seed, start_server, chk, _PASS, _FAIL # noqa: E402
|
||||
|
||||
ROOT = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
|
||||
SHOTS = os.path.join(ROOT, "docs", "reference", "baseline", "wave-12")
|
||||
READY = "!!document.querySelector('#users-table table')"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def api(base, path, token):
|
||||
req = urllib.request.Request(base + path, headers={"Cookie": "wp_session=" + token})
|
||||
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10) as r:
|
||||
return json.loads(r.read().decode())
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def user(base, token, username):
|
||||
return next((u for u in api(base, "/api/auth/users", token) if u["username"] == username), None)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def press(page, key, code, vk):
|
||||
"""A REAL key event (Input.dispatchKeyEvent), not a synthetic KeyboardEvent:
|
||||
only a real one triggers a checkbox's native Space toggle - the lesson
|
||||
launcher_check.py records."""
|
||||
for t in ("keyDown", "keyUp"):
|
||||
page.ws.call("Input.dispatchKeyEvent", {"type": t, "key": key, "code": code,
|
||||
"windowsVirtualKeyCode": vk, "text": " " if t == "keyDown" else ""})
|
||||
time.sleep(0.3)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def answer(page, ok=True, typed=None):
|
||||
time.sleep(0.4)
|
||||
if typed is not None:
|
||||
page.eval("document.getElementById('wp-dlg-input').value=%s" % json.dumps(typed))
|
||||
page.eval("document.getElementById('%s').click()" % ("wp-dlg-ok" if ok else "wp-dlg-cancel"))
|
||||
time.sleep(1.2)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def tick(page, username):
|
||||
page.eval("(() => { const b=[...document.querySelectorAll('input.selbox')]"
|
||||
".find(x => x.dataset.id==='user_%s'); if(b) b.click(); })()" % username)
|
||||
time.sleep(0.2)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
BAR_390 = """(function(){
|
||||
var bar=document.getElementById('bulk-bar'); var out={sw:document.documentElement.scrollWidth,under:[],clipped:[],n:0};
|
||||
bar.querySelectorAll('button, select').forEach(function(el){
|
||||
var r=el.getBoundingClientRect(); if(!r.width||!r.height) return; out.n++;
|
||||
var id=el.tagName+' '+(el.textContent||el.id).trim().slice(0,20)+' '+Math.round(r.width)+'x'+Math.round(r.height);
|
||||
if(Math.min(r.width,r.height)<24) out.under.push(id);
|
||||
if(r.left<-2||r.right>392) out.clipped.push(id);
|
||||
});
|
||||
return JSON.stringify(out);
|
||||
})()"""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def main():
|
||||
exe = cdp.find_browser()
|
||||
if not exe:
|
||||
print("no headless-capable browser found; set WP_BROWSER.")
|
||||
return 2
|
||||
tmpdir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="wpsuite-bulkui-")
|
||||
db_path = os.path.join(tmpdir, "check.db")
|
||||
server = browser = None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
tok = seed(db_path)
|
||||
port = cdp.free_port()
|
||||
base = "http://127.0.0.1:%d" % port
|
||||
server = start_server(port, db_path)
|
||||
if server is None:
|
||||
print("server would not start")
|
||||
return 2
|
||||
browser = cdp.Browser(exe)
|
||||
page = browser.page()
|
||||
|
||||
def visit(who, width, mobile=False):
|
||||
page.clear_cookies()
|
||||
page.set_cookie("wp_session", tok[who])
|
||||
page.viewport(width, 900 if width > 500 else 844, mobile=mobile)
|
||||
page.goto(base + "/users.html", wait_for=READY)
|
||||
time.sleep(0.6)
|
||||
|
||||
print("\n1. the admin at 1440px")
|
||||
visit("root", 1440)
|
||||
page.screenshot(os.path.join(SHOTS, "users-1440.png"))
|
||||
chk("a selection column with select-all", page.eval("!!document.getElementById('sel-all')"))
|
||||
chk("no bulk bar until a row is selected", page.eval("document.getElementById('bulk-bar').hidden"))
|
||||
page.eval("document.querySelector('input.selbox[data-id=\"user_pat\"]').focus()")
|
||||
press(page, " ", "Space", 32)
|
||||
chk("Space on a focused row checkbox selects it (keyboard operable)",
|
||||
page.eval("document.querySelector('input.selbox[data-id=\"user_pat\"]').checked"))
|
||||
chk("the bar appears, reachable by keyboard",
|
||||
page.eval("!document.getElementById('bulk-bar').hidden && document.querySelector('#bulk-bar button').tabIndex >= 0"))
|
||||
tick(page, "legacy")
|
||||
chk("the bar counts the selection", page.eval("document.getElementById('bulk-count').textContent") == "2 selected")
|
||||
page.screenshot(os.path.join(SHOTS, "users-1440-selected.png"))
|
||||
page.eval("document.getElementById('bulk-role').value='project_admin';"
|
||||
"document.querySelector('[onclick=\"bulkRole()\"]').click()")
|
||||
time.sleep(0.4)
|
||||
chk("the confirm names the count", "for 2 users" in (page.eval("document.getElementById('wp-dlg-msg').textContent") or ""))
|
||||
answer(page)
|
||||
chk("both accounts changed on the server",
|
||||
user(base, tok["root"], "pat")["role"] == "project_admin" and user(base, tok["root"], "legacy")["role"] == "project_admin")
|
||||
chk("the result is announced", "2 changed" in page.eval("document.getElementById('bulk-banner').textContent")
|
||||
and page.eval("document.getElementById('bulk-banner').getAttribute('role')") in ("status", "alert"))
|
||||
tick(page, "pat")
|
||||
page.eval("const f=document.getElementById('user-filter'); f.value='active'; f.dispatchEvent(new Event('change'))")
|
||||
time.sleep(0.3)
|
||||
chk("changing the filter clears the selection, and says so",
|
||||
page.eval("document.getElementById('bulk-bar').hidden") and
|
||||
"filter changed" in page.eval("document.getElementById('sel-banner').textContent"))
|
||||
|
||||
print("\n2. the super user, a CSV with good and bad lines")
|
||||
visit("sue", 1440)
|
||||
page.eval("loadCsv(new File(['username\\npat\\nmix\\nbob\\nsue\\npat\\n'], 'list.csv', {type:'text/csv'}))")
|
||||
time.sleep(1.5)
|
||||
rep = page.eval("document.getElementById('csv-banner').textContent") or ""
|
||||
chk("only the account she may change is selected", page.eval("document.getElementById('bulk-count').textContent") == "1 selected", rep)
|
||||
chk("every bad line is reported by number and reason: another job, not found, herself, a duplicate",
|
||||
all(s in rep for s in ("Line 3 (mix)", "Line 4 (bob): User not found", "Line 5 (sue)", "Line 6 (pat): duplicate of line 2")), rep)
|
||||
page.eval("document.getElementById('bulk-project-role').value='project_admin';"
|
||||
"document.querySelector('[onclick=\"bulkProject(\\'add\\')\"]').click()")
|
||||
answer(page)
|
||||
roles = api(base, "/api/auth/users/user_pat/projects", tok["root"])["roles"]
|
||||
chk("add to project with a role landed on the server", roles.get("projA") == "project_admin", roles)
|
||||
|
||||
print("\n3. bulk delete needs the typed word")
|
||||
visit("root", 1440)
|
||||
tick(page, "bob")
|
||||
page.eval("document.querySelector('[onclick=\"bulkDelete()\"]').click()")
|
||||
time.sleep(0.4)
|
||||
chk("the dialog lists the username", "bob" in page.eval("document.getElementById('wp-dlg-msg').textContent"))
|
||||
page.eval("document.getElementById('wp-dlg-input').value='delete'; document.getElementById('wp-dlg-ok').click()")
|
||||
time.sleep(0.4)
|
||||
chk("a wrong word sends nothing", user(base, tok["root"], "bob") is not None
|
||||
and page.eval("document.getElementById('wp-dlg-overlay').classList.contains('open')"))
|
||||
answer(page, typed="DELETE")
|
||||
chk("DELETE deletes, and the report says so", user(base, tok["root"], "bob") is None
|
||||
and "1 changed" in page.eval("document.getElementById('bulk-banner').textContent"))
|
||||
|
||||
print("\n4. the gloved-hands width: 390px")
|
||||
visit("root", 390, mobile=True)
|
||||
page.screenshot(os.path.join(SHOTS, "users-390.png"))
|
||||
tick(page, "pat")
|
||||
m = json.loads(page.eval(BAR_390))
|
||||
page.screenshot(os.path.join(SHOTS, "users-390-selected.png"))
|
||||
chk("390px with the bar open: no sideways scrolling", m["sw"] <= 392, m["sw"])
|
||||
chk("390px: no bar control clipped past the screen", not m["clipped"], m["clipped"])
|
||||
chk("390px: every bar control meets the 24px floor", m["n"] > 0 and not m["under"], m["under"])
|
||||
|
||||
errs = [e for e in page.js_errors() if "beforeunload" not in e]
|
||||
chk("no JavaScript errors in the whole run", not errs, errs[:3])
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
if browser is not None:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
browser.close()
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
if server is not None:
|
||||
server.terminate()
|
||||
|
||||
print("\n" + "-" * 54)
|
||||
print("%d/%d checks passed." % (len(_PASS), len(_PASS) + len(_FAIL)))
|
||||
for f in _FAIL:
|
||||
print(" - " + f)
|
||||
return 1 if _FAIL else 0
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
sys.exit(main())
|
||||
31
tests/cdp.py
@@ -190,8 +190,26 @@ class Browser:
|
||||
f"--user-data-dir={self.profile}", "--remote-allow-origins=*",
|
||||
"--no-first-run", "--no-default-browser-check", "--disable-gpu",
|
||||
"--disable-extensions", "--disable-sync",
|
||||
"--window-size=1400,1000", "about:blank"],
|
||||
"--window-size=1400,1000"]
|
||||
# Run from an elevated (Administrator) shell, Edge and Chrome
|
||||
# "de-elevate": they relaunch themselves as a normal user through
|
||||
# Explorer and the launched process exits rc=0. The relaunch does
|
||||
# not keep the debugging port, so the port is never bound (found
|
||||
# 2026-10-02; Edge logs "Edge is running elevated: 1"). This
|
||||
# Chromium switch keeps the process we started. Ignored when the
|
||||
# shell is not elevated, and on other platforms.
|
||||
+ (["--do-not-de-elevate"] if sys.platform == "win32" else [])
|
||||
+ ["about:blank"],
|
||||
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)
|
||||
# On some Windows installs msedge.exe is a launcher: it starts the real
|
||||
# browser and exits rc=0 at once, and the real browser binds the port a
|
||||
# moment later. Giving up the instant the launched process exited
|
||||
# failed every attempt on such a machine although Edge worked when
|
||||
# started by hand (found 2026-10-02 running the wave 16 probes). An
|
||||
# rc=0 exit now gets a grace period to bind; a non-zero exit is still
|
||||
# a failure at once. Teardown is unaffected: close() sweeps by the
|
||||
# unique profile path, which also catches the handed-off process.
|
||||
exited_at = None
|
||||
for _ in range(160):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
with urllib.request.urlopen(
|
||||
@@ -199,9 +217,14 @@ class Browser:
|
||||
json.load(r)
|
||||
return
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
if self.proc.poll() is not None:
|
||||
last = f"exited rc={self.proc.returncode} without binding the port"
|
||||
break
|
||||
rc = self.proc.poll()
|
||||
if rc is not None:
|
||||
last = f"exited rc={rc} without binding the port"
|
||||
if rc != 0:
|
||||
break
|
||||
exited_at = exited_at or time.time()
|
||||
if time.time() - exited_at > 15:
|
||||
break
|
||||
time.sleep(0.25)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
last = "never bound the debugging port"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -112,6 +112,33 @@ def main():
|
||||
chk("cancel means no: bob is still an account",
|
||||
st == 200 and any(u.get("username") == "bob" for u in (users or [])),
|
||||
ascii_([u.get("username") for u in (users or [])]))
|
||||
# CR-020 / T12.5: the bulk delete is a PROMPT-style dialog (typed DELETE),
|
||||
# the kind this file's docstring says belongs back here.
|
||||
print("\n4. bulk delete needs the typed word")
|
||||
page.eval("(() => { const b=[...document.querySelectorAll('input.selbox')]"
|
||||
".find(x => x.dataset.id==='user_bob'); b.click(); })()")
|
||||
time.sleep(0.3)
|
||||
chk("ticking a row shows the bulk bar",
|
||||
page.eval("!document.getElementById('bulk-bar').hidden"))
|
||||
page.eval("document.querySelector('[onclick=\"bulkDelete()\"]').click()")
|
||||
time.sleep(0.4)
|
||||
chk("the bulk delete asks through the kit's prompt, listing the username",
|
||||
page.eval("(() => { const o=document.getElementById('wp-dlg-overlay');"
|
||||
" return o.classList.contains('open')"
|
||||
" && document.getElementById('wp-dlg-input-wrap').style.display !== 'none'"
|
||||
" && /bob/.test(document.getElementById('wp-dlg-msg').textContent); })()"))
|
||||
page.eval("document.getElementById('wp-dlg-input').value='delete';"
|
||||
"document.getElementById('wp-dlg-ok').click()")
|
||||
time.sleep(0.3)
|
||||
chk("the wrong word keeps it open and names what to type",
|
||||
page.eval("document.getElementById('wp-dlg-overlay').classList.contains('open')"
|
||||
" && /DELETE/.test(document.getElementById('wp-dlg-err').textContent)"))
|
||||
page.eval("document.getElementById('wp-dlg-cancel').click()")
|
||||
time.sleep(0.6)
|
||||
st, users = api(base, "/api/auth/users", tok["root"])
|
||||
chk("cancel means no: bob is still an account after the bulk prompt",
|
||||
st == 200 and any(u.get("username") == "bob" for u in (users or [])))
|
||||
|
||||
errs = [e for e in page.js_errors() if "beforeunload" not in e]
|
||||
chk("no JavaScript errors, and no path reached a native dialog (they throw here)",
|
||||
not errs, ascii_(errs[:3]))
|
||||
|
||||
192
tests/usage_check.py
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
||||
"""Is there exactly one analytics implementation, reported from admin? — D5, T7.10.
|
||||
|
||||
Usage analytics existed twice (creator + wizard), five of the nine colliding
|
||||
globals `creator-frame.md` counted, and the wizard's copy had no caller. One
|
||||
core survives in wp-usage.js; the pages keep thin track() wrappers; the report
|
||||
and its downloads live on the admin console behind the same role gate as the
|
||||
rest of that page. Keys are unchanged, so pre-move data still reads.
|
||||
|
||||
Self-contained: throwaway SQLite, its own uvicorn, headless Edge or Chrome.
|
||||
Exit 0 all passed, 1 a failure, 2 could not run.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import re
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
import time
|
||||
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))))
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
|
||||
|
||||
import cdp # noqa: E402
|
||||
from browser_check import seed, start_server, chk, _PASS, _FAIL # noqa: E402
|
||||
from sections_check import set_sop # noqa: E402
|
||||
from stepper_check import dismiss_dialogs # noqa: E402
|
||||
|
||||
ROOT = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
|
||||
HTML = os.path.join(ROOT, "html")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def ascii_(v, n=280):
|
||||
return re.sub(r"\s+", " ", str(v)).encode("ascii", "replace").decode()[:n]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def settle(seconds=0.6):
|
||||
time.sleep(seconds)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def strip_js(src):
|
||||
src = re.sub(r"/\*.*?\*/", "", src, flags=re.S)
|
||||
return "\n".join(re.sub(r"(?<![:'\"])//.*$", "", ln) for ln in src.split("\n"))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def main():
|
||||
exe = cdp.find_browser()
|
||||
if not exe:
|
||||
print("no headless-capable browser found; set WP_BROWSER.")
|
||||
return 2
|
||||
|
||||
# ── 1. the grep half: one implementation, no leftover controls ───────────
|
||||
print("\n1. grep: one implementation, nothing unreferenced")
|
||||
files = {}
|
||||
for name in os.listdir(HTML):
|
||||
if name.endswith((".js", ".html")):
|
||||
files[name] = strip_js(open(os.path.join(HTML, name), encoding="utf-8").read())
|
||||
|
||||
core_defs = [n for n, src in files.items() if "window.WPUsage" in src]
|
||||
chk("the WPUsage core is defined in wp-usage.js and only there",
|
||||
core_defs == ["wp-usage.js"], ascii_(core_defs))
|
||||
chk("the pages record THROUGH it - no page touches the storage keys directly",
|
||||
all("wp_iwp_analytics_v1" not in src and "wp_suite_analytics_v1" not in src
|
||||
for n, src in files.items()
|
||||
if n not in ("wp-usage.js",) and n.endswith(".js")))
|
||||
leftovers = {n: re.findall(r"analyticsLoad|analyticsSave|downloadAnalytics|showAnalytics"
|
||||
r"|ANALYTICS_KEY|USAGE_KEY|usageLoad|downloadUsage", src)
|
||||
for n, src in files.items() if n != "wp-usage.js"}
|
||||
leftovers = {n: v for n, v in leftovers.items() if v}
|
||||
chk("none of the five colliding globals survives anywhere; grep confirms",
|
||||
not leftovers, ascii_(leftovers))
|
||||
chk("no analytics control remains on the creator or the wizard; grep confirms",
|
||||
"Usage data" not in files["wp-creation-index.html"]
|
||||
and "showAnalytics" not in files["work-package-suite.html"])
|
||||
chk("both storage keys survive, verbatim, in the core (data continuity)",
|
||||
"wp_iwp_analytics_v1" in files["wp-usage.js"]
|
||||
and "wp_suite_analytics_v1" in files["wp-usage.js"])
|
||||
|
||||
tmpdir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="wpsuite-usage-")
|
||||
db_path = os.path.join(tmpdir, "check.db")
|
||||
server = None
|
||||
browser = None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
tok = seed(db_path)
|
||||
set_sop(db_path, {})
|
||||
port = cdp.free_port()
|
||||
base = "http://127.0.0.1:%d" % port
|
||||
server = start_server(port, db_path)
|
||||
|
||||
browser = cdp.Browser(exe)
|
||||
page = browser.page()
|
||||
page.clear_cookies()
|
||||
page.set_cookie("wp_session", tok["root"])
|
||||
page.viewport(1440, 900)
|
||||
|
||||
# ── 2. recording still works from both tools ─────────────────────────
|
||||
print("\n2. the tools still record")
|
||||
page.goto(base + "/wp-creation-index.html?project=projA")
|
||||
dismiss_dialogs(page)
|
||||
settle(2.0)
|
||||
# Plant a LEGACY-format event under the pre-move key: the done-when is
|
||||
# that data recorded before this task is still readable after it.
|
||||
page.eval("""(() => {
|
||||
const d = JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem('wp_iwp_analytics_v1')) || {events: []};
|
||||
d.events.unshift({ts: '2026-07-01T10:00:00Z', session: 's_legacy',
|
||||
event: 'legacy_probe_event', detail: null});
|
||||
localStorage.setItem('wp_iwp_analytics_v1', JSON.stringify(d));
|
||||
})()""")
|
||||
n0 = page.eval("WPUsage.load(WPUsage.KEYS.creator).events.length")
|
||||
page.eval("track('probe_event')")
|
||||
chk("the creator's track() still lands events under the old key",
|
||||
page.eval("WPUsage.load(WPUsage.KEYS.creator).events.length") == n0 + 1)
|
||||
|
||||
page.goto(base + "/work-package-suite.html?tab=sop")
|
||||
dismiss_dialogs(page)
|
||||
settle(2.0)
|
||||
n0 = page.eval("WPUsage.load(WPUsage.KEYS.wizard).events.length")
|
||||
page.eval("track('probe_event_wizard')")
|
||||
chk("the wizard's track() still lands events under its old key",
|
||||
page.eval("WPUsage.load(WPUsage.KEYS.wizard).events.length") == n0 + 1)
|
||||
wiz_errors = [e for e in page.js_errors() if "beforeunload" not in e]
|
||||
chk("...and the wizard page throws no errors without its old globals "
|
||||
"(the blocked-beforeunload console line is BL-020, filtered not hidden)",
|
||||
not wiz_errors, ascii_(wiz_errors[:2]))
|
||||
|
||||
# ── 3. the report, on admin, behind the admin gate ───────────────────
|
||||
print("\n3. the admin report")
|
||||
page.goto(base + "/admin.html")
|
||||
dismiss_dialogs(page)
|
||||
settle(2.0)
|
||||
page.eval("loadUsage()")
|
||||
settle(0.5)
|
||||
report = page.eval("(document.getElementById('usage-admin')||{textContent:''}).textContent")
|
||||
chk("usage data is reachable from admin.html, both tools reported",
|
||||
"Work package creator" in report and "SOP wizard" in report, ascii_(report, 160))
|
||||
chk("the pre-move legacy event is readable in the report",
|
||||
"legacy_probe_event" in report)
|
||||
chk("this session's fresh events are in it too",
|
||||
"probe_event" in report and "probe_event_wizard" in report)
|
||||
chk("each tool offers its download from the report",
|
||||
page.eval("[...document.querySelectorAll('#usage-admin button')].length") >= 2)
|
||||
|
||||
page.viewport(390, 844, mobile=True)
|
||||
settle(0.6)
|
||||
fits = page.eval("""(() => {
|
||||
const box = document.getElementById('usage-admin');
|
||||
return box && box.scrollWidth <= box.clientWidth + 2
|
||||
&& document.documentElement.scrollWidth <= 392;
|
||||
})()""")
|
||||
chk("the report is usable at 390px - no sideways scrolling", bool(fits))
|
||||
page.viewport(1440, 900)
|
||||
settle(0.4)
|
||||
|
||||
# The same role gate as the rest of the console: a non-admin sees the
|
||||
# denied card and no cards, this one included.
|
||||
page.clear_cookies()
|
||||
page.set_cookie("wp_session", tok["pat"])
|
||||
page.goto(base + "/admin.html")
|
||||
dismiss_dialogs(page)
|
||||
settle(2.0)
|
||||
chk("a non-administrator gets the denied notice, not the usage report",
|
||||
page.eval("""(() => {
|
||||
const denied = document.getElementById('admin-denied');
|
||||
const usage = document.getElementById('usage-admin');
|
||||
const visible = el => !!el && el.offsetParent !== null;
|
||||
return visible(denied) && !visible(usage);
|
||||
})()"""))
|
||||
|
||||
js_errors = [e for e in page.js_errors() if "beforeunload" not in e]
|
||||
chk("no JavaScript errors anywhere in this run", not js_errors,
|
||||
ascii_(js_errors[:2]))
|
||||
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
if browser is not None:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
browser.close()
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
if server is not None:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
server.terminate()
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
print("\n" + "-" * 54)
|
||||
print("%d/%d checks passed." % (len(_PASS), len(_PASS) + len(_FAIL)))
|
||||
for f in _FAIL:
|
||||
print(" - " + f)
|
||||
return 1 if _FAIL else 0
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
sys.exit(main())
|
||||